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ARTICLE 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FRAUD  
ON THE MARKET 
WILLIAM W. BRATTON† & MICHAEL L. WACHTER†† 
The fraud-on-the-market class action no longer enjoys much academic sup-
port.  The justifications traditionally advanced by its defenders—compensation 
for out-of-pocket loss and deterrence of fraud—are thought to have failed due to 
the action’s real world dependence on enterprise liability and issuer-funded set-
tlements.  The compensation justification collapses when considered from the 
point of view of different types of shareholders.  Well-diversified shareholders’ 
receipts and payments of damages balance over time and amount to a wash be-
fore payment of litigation costs.  The shareholders arguably in need of compen-
sation—fundamental value investors who rely on published reports—are un-
dercompensated due to pro rata distribution of settlement proceeds to all class 
members.  The deterrence justification fails when enterprise liability is compared 
to alternative modes of enforcement, such as actions against individual perpe-
trators, which deter fraud more effectively.  If, as the consensus view now has it, 
fraud on the market makes no policy sense, then its abolition would seem to be 
the next logical step.  Yet most observers continue to accept the action on the 
same ground cited by the Supreme Court when it first implied a private right of 
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action under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 in 1964’s J.I. Case v. 
Borak:  a private enforcement supplement is needed in view of inadequate Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) resources.  In other words, even a 
private-enforcement supplement that makes no sense is better than no private-
enforcement supplement at all. 
This Article questions this backstop policy conclusion by highlighting the 
sticking points retarding movement toward fraud on the market’s abolition and 
mapping a plausible route to a superior enforcement outcome.  We recommend 
that private plaintiffs be required to meet an actual-reliance standard.  We look 
to the SEC, rather than to Congress or to the courts, to initiate the change be-
cause the SEC is the lawmaking institution most responsible for the unsatisfac-
tory status quo and best equipped to propose corrective action.  Because an ac-
tual reliance requirement would substantially diminish the flow of private 
litigation, we also suggest a compensating increase in public-enforcement capa-
bility.  More specifically, the SEC Division of Enforcement needs enough funding 
to redirect its efforts away from the enterprise and toward culpable individuals. 
The Article addresses three barriers standing between here and there.  First, 
there is a new justification for fraud on the market circulating in the wake of 
the failure of the original justifications:  fraud-on-the-market litigation en-
hances the operation of the corporate governance system.  We show that this line 
of reasoning, while well suited to justify the federal mandatory-disclosure sys-
tem, does not support—and even detracts from—the case for fraud on the mar-
ket.  Second, we turn to politics to explain why fraud on the market retains po-
litical legitimacy despite the failure of its policy justifications.  Third, we assess 
the contention that inadequacy of public enforcement resources justifies main-
taining a fraud-on-the-market action.  To that end, we show that circumstances 
have changed materially since the Supreme Court first invoked the justification 
in 1964.  The SEC budget has grown elevenfold in real terms in the interven-
ing forty-seven years, with much of the growth coming in the wake of the Enron 
fraud.  The SEC’s enforcement resources, like those of the plaintiffs’ bar, ulti-
mately are funded with dollars drawn from shareholder pockets, inviting direct 
comparison between the two.  We show that public enforcement offers the share-
holders more value than private enforcement.  Private resources are tied to a 
low-deterrence, enterprise-liability framework.  Public enforcement, even now, 
yields the shareholders comparable damage returns per dollar invested in en-
forcement.  It can be deployed more flexibly, and it can be refocused against in-
dividual wrongdoers to enhance deterrence. 
We conclude that increased public enforcement makes sense for shareholders 
even if it implies a diminished volume of private litigation and propose a polit-
ical trade-off for the SEC to present to Congress:   double the enforcement budget 
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in exchange for an SEC-promulgated regulation replacing fraud on the market 
with an actual-reliance requirement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The fraud-on-the-market (FOTM) cause of action just doesn’t 
work.  At least that is the consensus view1 among academics respecting 
the primary class action vehicle under the federal securities laws.  
FOTM came forth making two promises:  (1) it would compensate 
present fraud victims, and (2) it would operate as a deterrent against 
future fraud.  FOTM is now generally seen to have altogether failed to 
 
1 See Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities 
Law:  Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 209 (2009) (“[T]he conventional 
legal academic view . . . is that securities litigation . . . is seriously compromised.”).   
 This view coalesced relatively recently.  For many years, James D. Cox and Joel Se-
ligman were the leading defenders of the action’s conceptual framework.  See, e.g., 
James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 511-15 
(1997) (defending securities class action litigation by analogizing its economics to that 
of insurance markets); Joel Seligman, Commentary, The Merits Do Matter:  A Comment on 
Professor Grundfest’s “Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws:  
The Commission’s Authority”, 108 HARV. L. REV. 438, 457 (1994) (providing a broad-
based defense of securities class actions).  Professor Cox later reduced his level of sup-
port.  See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fin-
gers:  Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Par-
ticipate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 449-52 (2005) 
(questioning FOTM’s compensatory justification in the wake of empirical evidence 
showing that financial institutions tend not to collect available settlement money).   
 Merritt B. Fox’s views have also changed over time.  Compare Merritt B. Fox, Under-
standing Dura, 60 BUS. LAW. 1547, 1549-50 (2005) (criticizing judicial application of 
the loss causation requirement from a compensatory perspective), with Merritt B. Fox, 
Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 252 (2009) [hereinafter 
Fox, Civil Liability] (reconceiving FOTM as a corporate-governance device and FOTM 
damages as a restitutionary measure lacking the objective of compensating sharehold-
ers for market losses).   
 Significantly, the only across-the-board defense of FOTM to appear in recent years 
proceeds at an entirely theoretical level.  See James C. Spindler, Vicarious Liability for 
Bad Corporate Governance:  Are We Wrong About 10b-5?, 13 AM. J.L. & ECON. 359, 359-62 
(2011) (showing that enterprise liability has deterrent value in a world where man-
agement and selling shareholders have a unitary interest in fooling buyers).  We have 
no quarrel with Professor Spindler’s signaling model within its four corners.  This Ar-
ticle, however, addresses FOTM in its institutional context. 
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deliver on the first promise.  Real-world FOTM actions proceed on an 
enterprise-liability theory with corporate—as opposed to individual—
defendants funding the compensation; investor “victims” are accor-
dingly compensated from the pockets of other innocent investors.  It 
follows that not only does FOTM fail as a compensatory mechanism, it 
doesn’t even make sense.  As to the deterrent promise, FOTM is 
thought to deliver, but only a little.  Enterprise liability causes the 
problem once again:  if FOTM were serious about deterrence, the 
funding would come from individual miscreants. 
FOTM is an artifact of history.  It follows from two ideas, both 
bound up in the securities law concept of investor protection.  The 
first dates to the 1960s and 1970s.  It holds both that investor protec-
tions under the securities laws’ antifraud provisions, in particular sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 19342 (1934 Act) and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 thereunder,3 
need a private enforcement mechanism4 and that the class action is 
the procedural mode best suited for that purpose.5  The second idea 
emerged as the courts elaborated the terms of the implied private 
right of action by reference to the common law of fraud.6   
The common law fraudster compensates the victim by paying his 
out-of-pocket losses.  Thus, the securities fraud defendant should pay 
the out-of-pocket losses of those who buy (or sell) a stock that is over- 
(or under-) priced due to a misrepresentation (or omission).  But the 
common law template also threw up substantive hurdles.  The tort of 
fraud presupposes parties dealing face-to-face and requires a showing of 
reliance on the misrepresentation,7 a showing that cannot be made as a 
practical matter in a class action.  FOTM, which the Supreme Court 
 
2 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). 
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
4 The private right of action under section 10(b) dates back to Kardon v. National 
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946), and was approved by the Su-
preme Court in Superintendent of Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 
404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).  The Court’s decision was without substantive comment, 
but included a citation to J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), which implied a 
private right of action under section 14 of the 1934 Act, reasoning that the SEC 
lacked the resources to review issuer proxy statements.  Id. at 432. 
5 See, e.g., Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market:  A Criticism of Dispensing with the Re-
liance Requirement in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435, 439-46 
(1984) (explaining the interrelation between the FOTM presumption and class ac-
tion enforcement). 
6 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1977) (requiring decep-
tion); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (requiring scienter).  
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (1965). 
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adopted in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,8 patched over the problem by relaxing 
the reliance requirement.  With a famous citation to the Efficient Capi-
tal Market Hypothesis (ECMH), the court ruled that a showing of re-
liance on the integrity of the market price would suffice.9 
It seemed like a good idea at the time.  But FOTM simply did not 
work in practice.  The consensus to that effect is notable in itself be-
cause big-ticket causes of action tend to have squads of academic 
cheerleaders.10  But that consensus fosters only a limited menu of pol-
icy alternatives.  On the one hand, FOTM’s opponents argue that 
FOTM and the entire mandatory-disclosure regime should be ab-
olished together.  On the other hand, FOTM’s proponents strenuous-
ly try to make it work.  They take two routes in this pursuit.  The first 
route treats FOTM as a misunderstood cause of action in need of 
fresh policy justification:  if FOTM makes no sense as a compensatory 
tort, then a conceptual framework that does make sense of it needs to 
be substituted.11  Corporate governance and agency-cost reduction 
have been suggested as this conceptual curative.12  The second ap-
proach focuses on FOTM’s meager deterrent properties and then 
looks away from theory to focus on practice.  Under this view, FOTM is 
a necessary enforcement supplement,13 despite its attendant conceptual 
problems:  even if it doesn’t work as promised, we are better off with it 
than without it.  Meanwhile, we can try to make it work a little better. 
 
8 485 U.S. 224, 248-50 (1988). 
9 Id. at 246 n.24.  FOTM can be traced back to Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 
906-08 (9th Cir. 1975).  The Supreme Court’s explicit acceptance of FOTM was pre-
saged by Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970), and Affiliated Ute Cit-
izens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972), both of which presumed reliance in 
order to avert factual difficulties in other private actions brought under the securities 
laws.  See also Basic, 485 U.S. at 243 (discussing with approval the lack of a reliance re-
quirement in Mills and Affiliated Ute Citizens). 
10 See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Politics of the Products 
Liability Restatement, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 668-69 & n.3 (listing academic defenses 
of the existing products liability regime). 
11 See infra Section III.A. 
12 See infra Section III.B. 
13 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 639, 642-43 (1996) [hereinafter Langevoort, Capping Damages] (re-
commending a shift from assessing out-of-pocket loss to levying individual fines, but not 
advocating for the termination of FOTM); Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate 
Executives “Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels”:  Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the 
Debate Over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 655-57 (2007) 
[hereinafter Langevoort, Corporate Executives] (noting FOTM’s underdeterrence short-
coming and discussing potential reforms, but not recommending its immediate termi-
nation). 
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This Article takes a new look at FOTM and its conceptual and 
practical failures with a view toward expanding the list of policy alter-
natives.  We reject the all-or-nothing connection that the opponents 
make between FOTM and the mandatory-disclosure system.14  In our 
view, disclosure mandates are necessary, but how best to enforce them 
is a separate question.  We also reject FOTM proponents’ conceptual 
strategy for the action’s rehabilitation.15  As will be discussed below, 
the switch from compensation to corporate governance does solve a 
few problems, but in the end, it fails to break FOTM free from its orig-
inal conceptual framework and attendant shortcomings.  The practic-
al defense is more compelling, even though it provides no theoretical 
cure and offers only the negative justification that although FOTM 
doesn’t work, it’s the best enforcement mechanism possible.  This de-
fense challenges FOTM opponents to make an affirmative case for 
disrupting the status quo. 
The issue is more political and practical than theoretical.  Accor-
dingly, this Article addresses the political economy of FOTM, explain-
ing why a cause of action that doesn’t work continues to enjoy political 
legitimacy.  After surveying the political landscape, this Article maps 
out a plausible route to a better policy outcome. 
The prevailing policy analysis of securities fraud tells us two 
things:  First, fraud is undeterred.16  Second, an enforcement system 
directed against individual perpetrators will deter fraud more effec-
tively than a system based on enterprise liability.17  These conclusions 
hold out two routes to a better result.  The first route would redirect 
class actions for corporate fraud away from the enterprise to individu-
al defendants.  This alternative has been explored in the literature.18  
But, in our view, this path is more expedient than promising.19  The 
second route concludes that private class action enforcement is intrac-
table and looks for alternatives.  This Article pursues the second path. 
Accordingly, we recommend a shift in emphasis from private to 
public enforcement.20  FOTM should be abolished in cases where the 
 
14 See infra Section III.D. 
15 See infra notes 192-04, 213-15 & 214-30 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 132-40 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 136-44 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 140-47. 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 148-55. 
20 Recent work by Professor Rose also stresses the importance of shifting emphasis 
to public enforcement.  See generally Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Se-
curities Law Deterrence:  A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173 (2010) [hereinafter 
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issuer makes no trades.  An actual-reliance requirement tailored to the 
circumstances of investors who do fundamental analysis should be 
substituted.  As this requirement would reduce the flow of private-
enforcement litigation, public enforcers should pick up the slack.  We 
accordingly recommend that FOTM reform be accompanied by an in-
crease in monetary support for the SEC Division of Enforcement suf-
ficient to shift the division’s focus from enterprise-liability settlement 
to holding individuals responsible for corporate wrongdoing.  We 
look to the SEC, rather than Congress or the courts, to initiate the 
reform because it is the institution most responsible for the current un-
satisfactory state of affairs and also the institution best equipped to fix it. 
Part I describes FOTM and its failure to accomplish its victim-
compensation objective.  The presentation concentrates on the num-
bers, showing how plaintiffs’ lawyers calculate out-of-pocket damages 
that support multibillion dollar claims,21 which, if pursued to judg-
ment against actual fraudsters, would result in hit-the-jackpot com-
pensation and crushing deterrence.  Unfortunately—or perhaps for-
tunately—attorneys in real-world class actions look for settlement 
value, and those facing financial destruction are either disinclined to 
settle or already judgment-proof.  Thus, corporate issuers of securities, 
hauled into court along with their employees on an enterprise liability 
theory, pick up the settlement tab in FOTM cases.  With the corpora-
tion paying the settlement, the cost of compensating the shareholders 
in the plaintiff class falls on those holding the company’s shares at the 
time of settlement.  The shareholders in the class and the successful 
plaintiffs’ attorney thus pick the pockets of the payor shareholders, 
which include the company’s longer-term shareholders.  Moreover, to 
the extent that the paying and receiving shareholders are fully diversi-
fied, cash inflows and outflows from FOTM settlements even out over 
time.  This result makes FOTM a wash rather than a source of compen-
sation, but a wash that ripens into a net loss once we account for attor-
neys’ fees, liability insurance premiums, and other costs. 
Compensation may benefit one set of shareholders:  underdiversi-
fied information traders who research companies and invest based on 
reported information.  These investors’ gains and losses do not neces-
 
Rose, The Multienforcer Approach] (questioning the deterrent effect of relying on a trio 
of federal, state, and private enforcers); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation 
Reform:  Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1354-55 (2008) (suggesting that federal authorities be ac-
corded the power to select private defendants).  
21 See infra subsection I.A.2. 
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sarily equalize over time, and compensation could reduce injury.  Un-
fortunately, FOTM does not work here either because returns on litiga-
tion do not come close to covering the losses from fraud.  While class 
action complaints do claim losses in the hundreds of millions of dol-
lars,22 settlement amounts are considerably smaller.  From 1996 to 2010, 
median settlements returned only 2.8% of estimated plaintiff losses.23 
The misdirected compensation could be redirected to those who 
need it by removing the Basic presumption and imposing an actual-
reliance requirement that is tailored to the circumstances of investors 
who research companies.  But because the number of plaintiffs able to 
show actual reliance will likely be small, their aggregated damages 
might be too low to support class action enforcement.  Thus, FOTM’s 
already modest deterrent effect would diminish further. 
Part II examines FOTM’s impact on fraud deterrence and the jus-
tification for the action based thereon.  We assume that fraud is a per-
sistent problem and the current antifraud enforcement system, in the 
absence of FOTM, is an inadequate deterrent.  Although FOTM gives 
the system a boost, its deterrent effect is significantly muted because 
the corporation and its insurance company make the payments rather 
than the corporation’s culpable agents.  FOTM proponents dismiss 
this objection as unpersuasive, arguing that an individual-liability sys-
tem with penalties of sufficient magnitude to attract private enforcers 
would be draconian and would likely impair recruitment of talented 
managers.24  In contrast, a system of individual liability lacking that dra-
conian aspect would remove the deep pocket from the settlement table 
and reduce the incidence of private enforcement.25  As a consequence, 
fraud, already underdeterred, would be deterred even less, and its 
deadweight social cost would increase.  Finally, public enforcement is 
not an effective substitute due to incentive problems and political con-
straints.26 
 
22 See infra subsection I.A.2 for the calculation process.  For a report on the recent 
filings, see CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2011 MID-YEAR 
ASSESSMENT 11 (2011), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_ 
research/2011_YIR/Cornerstone_Research_Filings_2011_Mid_Year_Assessment.pdf. 
23 ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES 
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS:  2010 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 10 fig.10 (2011), available at 
http://www.cornerstone.com/securities_settlements_2010 (follow “Securities Class 
Action Settlements–2010 Review and Analysis” hyperlink).   
24 See infra text accompanying note 139. 
25 See infra text accompanying note 139. 
26 See infra text accompanying notes 150-58. 
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We evaluate these assertions, concluding that any deterrent value-
added is indeed modest.  The economics of reputation does the heavy 
lifting respecting corporate-actor incentives.  To the extent that fraud 
persists despite this economic constraint, FOTM has done almost 
nothing to solve the problem; hence the steady and material increase 
in public antifraud enforcement resources in recent years.  We con-
clude that it is no longer necessary to view FOTM as an essential com-
ponent in a viable antifraud enforcement system. 
Part III analyzes governance and agency-cost reduction as substi-
tute justifications for FOTM and shows that they fall short.  At first, 
the governance justification seems to provide a viable framework be-
cause it solves the pocket-shifting problem that undermines the com-
pensation justification.  Once governance replaces tort as the frame-
work justifying FOTM, shareholder funding is no longer objectionable 
because shareholders happily pay for everything related to corporate 
governance so long as the agency-cost reduction exceeds the expendi-
ture.  But do shareholders have cause to be happy in the case of 
FOTM actions? 
In the securities context, reducing agency costs means enhancing 
corporate transparency.  Federal securities laws require truthful dis-
closures in order to seek to make corporate strategies and financial 
results observable from the outside.  This leads to two claims about 
agency costs.  First, investors in an unscrupulous market will disregard 
reported earnings, effectively raising the market’s cost of capital.27  
Second, transparency should lead to better business planning and ex-
ecution because shareholder monitoring not only deters outright 
fraud, but also improves business policy.28 
This raises the question of whether FOTM actions enhance trans-
parency.  FOTM litigation, taken alone, adds little to nothing to the 
informational mix.  The suits are ex post constructs activated not by 
the incorrect disclosure itself, but by its correction.  The heavy lifting 
on transparency occurs ex ante, when the mandatory-disclosure sys-
tem’s rulebook instructs the corporation to make information public 
 
27 Cf. Fox, Civil Liability, supra note 1, at 253 (noting that disclosure is unlikely to 
have an effect on investor protection where shares are unfair on average). 
28 The end point is the same as with deterrence:  more transparency means better 
governance and a lower cost of capital, and therefore it creates more value for each 
shareholder.  Cf. id. at 252 (arguing that among the primary benefits of disclosure “are 
a more efficient allocation of resources in the economy as a result of improved corpo-
rate governance, increased capital market liquidity, and the consequent reduction in 
the cost of capital”). 
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and to produce reliable financials.  Any “governance” contribution, 
then, is simply a derivative of the contribution already made by the 
mandatory disclosure system.  FOTM assists only by helping to keep 
the ex ante information base free of misrepresentations.  We accor-
dingly return to the deterrence justification.  But we have already seen 
that FOTM comes up short as a means of deterrence. 
There is an additional line of argument here:  FOTM actions are 
used as federal proxies for litigation that could be brought under state 
corporate law’s duty of care, addressing management defalcations in 
business operations and giving shareholders a direct mode of inter-
vention that bypasses the board of directors.  This also doesn’t work 
because FOTM does not hold managers directly accountable for fail-
ure.  Its consequences do not follow from the judgment of the share-
holders acting as a group, as occurs when the franchise is exercised.  
And those who make the decisions—lawyers, pension funds serving as 
representative plaintiffs, and federal judges—are largely unaccounta-
ble from a governance perspective. 
There is something to the point that FOTM overlaps with the ter-
ritory covered by the state law duty of care, but we think the compari-
son has devastating implications for FOTM.  The state law duty of 
care incorporated an opt-out possibility a quarter century ago,29 and 
by now most companies have opted out with their shareholders’ ap-
proval.30  In contrast, FOTM, like the rest of securities law, is manda-
tory.  We do not question federal disclosure mandates, but we think a 
shareholder opt-out provision makes sense for FOTM, at least in lieu 
of outright abolition. 
The Article, having suggested reform, turns to two barriers that 
block the path to a better result.  The first is political:  private securi-
ties litigation continues to enjoy political protection in Washington 
despite its failure in practice.  The second barrier is fiscal:  the SEC is 
assumed to be chronically underfunded, which would foreclose a shift 
to public enforcement. 
Part IV takes up politics.  FOTM endures as institutionally and 
economically salient as ever,31 despite layers of constraints and limita-
 
29 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 2010) (stating that the certificate 
of incorporation may contain a provision that eliminates or limits the personal liability 
of a director to the corporation or stockholders for breach of fiduciary duty). 
30 See infra note 212. 
31 Total annual settlement amounts for federal securities cases peaked at $18.3 
billion in 2006 as Enron-era litigation worked its way through the system.  Annual set-
tlement amounts in subsequent years were $7.6 billion in 2007, $2.8 billion in 2008, 
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tions imposed by congressional32 and judicial action33 as well as ero-
sion of support for its policy justification.  Why?  Political vulnerability 
does not necessarily follow when a legal institution makes no policy 
sense.  Indeed, Congress considered eliminating FOTM before it 
enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 
but decided instead to advance a smaller-scale reform.34  The business 
lobby has a follow-up package ready to be unwrapped in the right polit-
ical climate.35  If the past is any guide, an expanding economy and a 
bull market will be necessary conditions for such legislation’s passage.36  
Accordingly, FOTM is safe for now. 
In fact, it is better than safe.  Part IV describes deeper political 
forces that legitimize private class action enforcement.  FOTM suits 
are politically legitimate because managers are empowered actors in 
society and private anti-fraud litigation is a means with which to chal-
lenge their business decisions. Meanwhile, remaining questions about 
the incentives of those filing FOTM suits have diminished in volume:  
the PSLRA diminished the strike-suit problem37 and brought in institu-
tional investors as lead shareholders,38 which made class actions more 
respectable.  Even proponents of “light touch” financial regulation 
 
$3.8 billion in 2009, and $3.1 billion in 2010.  RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 1 
fig.1.  New class action filings peaked in 1998 with 242 new filings, but 2008’s 223 new 
cases came close.  In 2010, new filings decreased to 176.  CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SE-
CURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS:  2010 YEAR IN REVIEW 3 fig.2 (2011), available at 
http://www.cornerstone.com/securities-filings-2010-year-in-review (follow “Securities 
Class Action Filings–2010 Year in Review” hyperlink). 
32  See infra notes 229-44 & 298 and accompanying text. 
33 See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 
153 (2008) (holding that customer/supplier companies cannot be brought within a 
securities suit because the investors did not rely on misrepresentations from those 
companies); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007) 
(holding that the “strong inference” standard in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) meant that 
the “inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must 
be cogent”); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (requiring plaintiff 
to show “some indication of the [economic] loss [suffered] and the causal connection 
that the plaintiff has in mind”); Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Den-
ver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (holding that “a private plaintiff may not maintain an 
aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b)”). 
34 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-
67, sec. 101(b), § 21D(b)(3), (c), 109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-4 (2006)) (imposing barriers to litigation, such as sanctions for abusive litigation 
and discovery stays during pending motions to dismiss). 
35 See infra notes 292-14 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 234-49 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra note 289 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 278-284 and accompanying text. 
BRATTON-WACHTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  6:02 PM 
2011] Fraud on the Market 81 
balk at pulling the plug on FOTM because the specter of financial 
fraud looms large in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals.39 
In addition, shareholders have emerged as a politically salient in-
terest group.  Decades ago, no one thought of a shareholder as a 
proxy for the median voter.40  But things are different in our owner-
ship society.  Even though it makes little policy sense to pursue the 
shareholder interest in out-of-pocket loss compensation, invoking that 
interest could garner legislative results in the right political climate.  
That a different mode of enforcement might more effectively chal-
lenge management decisions, bring fraudsters to account, or protect 
the shareholder interest, makes FOTM contestable without denuding 
it of political legitimacy.  The political barrier, then, is high. 
Part V considers a core component of the FOTM defense:  the ar-
gument that we have to live with this bad tort because public en-
forcement resources are inadequate.  The SEC’s enforcement capacity 
has changed substantially since the Supreme Court first implied a pri-
vate right of action in 1964.  Today’s SEC deploys enforcement re-
sources of materially greater magnitude than it did at that time.  The 
SEC’s 1964 budget was $13.9 million compared to its 2010 budget of 
$1.1 billion, which represents an inflation-adjusted increase factor of 
11.2.41  A significant portion of the increases occurred in the recent 
post-Enron environment.42  While damage dollars yielded by private 
enforcement once dwarfed those brought in by SEC enforcers, that no 
longer is the case.43  More to the point, there is reason to believe that 
the SEC offers shareholders a more efficient use of enforcement re-
sources.  There is an irony here—just as the shareholders pay the 
damages in FOTM actions, so do they fund the SEC through fees col-
lected in connection with market trades and securities registrations.  
Part V shows that damages ordered in SEC proceedings cost the share-
holders less than do those stipulated in private sector settlements. 
We do not claim that today’s SEC makes the private-enforcement 
supplement irrelevant.  Nor do we contest the point that FOTM’s re-
 
39 Cf. MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S 
AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 74-76 (2007), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf (recognizing that many secur-
ities class action settlements are based on “legitimate” claims by investors with “war-
ranted damages,” but recognizing the negative perception of being a litigious society). 
40 See infra notes 245-72 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra text accompanying note 311-31.  
42 See infra Figure 1.  
43 See infra text accompanying note 324.  
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moval could result in lax enforcement.  We do suggest that expanding 
and refocusing the SEC could more than make up for reduced pri-
vate-sector enforcement at no additional cost to the shareholders.  To 
that end, we propose a trade off:  the SEC should ask for more money 
and refocus its enforcement operation on individual defendants and, 
in return, propose a rule that eliminates the FOTM presumption in 
private litigation. 
I.  FRAUD ON THE MARKET AS COMPENSATION 
Fraud on the market under Rule 10b-5 takes the common law tort 
of misrepresentation from face-to-face dealings to faceless markets, 
remaking it into a vehicle for class action litigation against those who 
make false and misleading statements about publicly traded securi-
ties.44  As at common law, the defendant must act with “scienter”—that 
is, recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally45—and the plaintiff class 
members must be the purchasers or the sellers of the subject secu-
rity.46  But the defendant need not be a contract counterparty and, in-
deed, need not be trading at all.47  Nor do the plaintiffs need to have 
relied on anything the defendant said.  Under the Supreme Court’s 
Basic decision, class members benefit from a rebuttable presumption 
of reliance on the integrity of the market price,48 which is grounded in 
the assumptions that the price of an actively traded stock reflects avail-
 
44 See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968) (en 
banc) (holding that a press release was issued in a manner intended to affect stock 
prices and influence investors and remanding the case to determine whether the re-
lease was misleading to investors).   
45 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976) (defining scien-
ter in terms of intentional conduct, but declining to decide whether recklessness falls 
within section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
46 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 736 (1975) (noting 
that violations under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 are “expressly limited to purchasers or sellers of securities”). 
47 See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that 
Rule 10b-5’s “‘in connection with’ element may be established by proof of the material-
ity of the misrepresentation and the means of its dissemination”). 
48 485 U.S. 224, 246 -47 (1988).  The Court interpolated the presumption for the 
express purpose of facilitating class action certification.  Id. at 250.  A predecessor case 
involving an omitted fact in a face-to-face transaction, Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. 
United States, held that reliance can be presumed from the materiality of the facts omit-
ted.  406 U.S. 128 153-54(1972).  Subsequent cases have read the rule to apply only in 
cases of omission.  See, e.g., Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999) (re-
lying on Affliated Ute Citizens to find that the presumption of reliance is not properly 
applied unless the case “primarily alleges omissions”).   
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able public information and that misinformation can impair the price’s 
accuracy.  Finally, in a limiting adjustment, Rule 10b-5 requires the 
plaintiff to show that the misrepresentation caused the loss.49   
Under the Supreme Court’s Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo 
decision, a price drop incident to a later disclosure of the truth will 
not be sufficient proof by itself of loss causation, for the reduced price 
“may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed economic 
circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or 
firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events, which taken separately 
or together account for some or all of that lower price.”50  If the plain-
tiff class pleads and proves all of the above, it recovers out-of-pocket 
damages as at common law, which are calculated as the difference be-
tween the inflated price and the securities’ intrinsic value.51 
Several additional points about FOTM cases are worth noting.  
First, insider trading is not a necessary part of the fact pattern, even 
though it is sometimes alleged concurrently.52  Neither is corporate 
profit-taking through sales of newly issued, overpriced stock a neces-
sary factor.53  Accordingly, profit disgorgement is not central to 
FOTM’s economic picture, even though it may show up in a given 
case.  FOTM instead concerns the informational damage that com-
pany insiders inflict on stock traders.  Unsurprisingly, the insiders are 
usually high-level managers at the stock issuer in question.54  But as 
long as there is at least one human defendant who is an agent of the 
corporation that issued the pertinent securities, the issuer will be added 
 
49 The loss-causation requirement dates back to Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 
507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1974).  Congress later codified the requirement in the 
PSLRA.  PSLRA Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 101(b), § 21D, 109 Stat. 737, 743 (1995) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006)). 
50 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005). 
51 See, e.g., Harris v. Amer. Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 224-27 (8th Cir. 1975) (discuss-
ing possible methods of calculating damages). 
52 Insider trading allegations have decreased steadily in recent years.  They appeared 
in thirty-eight percent of securities class action complaints filed in 2006, but only in six-
teen percent of complaints in 2010.  See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 31. 
53 Corporations that make material misstatements in connection with new issues 
can be sued under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 without a showing of corpo-
rate profit-taking.  Securites Act of 1933 (1933 Act), ch. 38, 48 Stat. 82 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77k). 
54 In 2004, chief executive officers and chief financial officers were named in ninety-
six percent and eighty-three percent of securities class action lawsuits, respectively.  
John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action:  An Essay on Deterrence and Its Im-
plementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1549 tbl.4 (2006) (citing PRICEWATERHOUSE-
COOPERS LLP, 2004 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 11 (2004)).   
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as a defendant on an enterprise-liability theory.55  This extension 
catches a deep pocket that will have insured itself against the loss, in-
creasing the amount of recovery available to plaintiffs. 
The cause of action, thus described, pursues federal securities 
laws’ purpose of protecting investors in two ways:  first, it compensates 
fraud victims for their losses, and, second, it deters fraud by imposing 
compensatory payment.  This Part considers FOTM’s performance of 
the first role.  Section A shows how damages are calculated.  Section B 
then shows both how damages are reduced in the course of settlement 
negotiations and how they are funded.  Section C evaluates the results, 
illustrating that FOTM fails to realize its compensatory purpose in two 
ways.  It cannot meaningfully compensate shareholders because most 
shareholders suffer no damages from fraud and only a subset of 
shareholders bears the settlement costs.  At the same time, a share-
holder who has actually sustained an economic loss receives no relief 
from small FOTM settlements.  An actual reliance requirement would 
address these problems but would also result in a diminished flow of 
private litigation. 
A.  Calculating Out-of-Pocket Damages under FOTM 
We begin our exploration of the meaning of “compensation” un-
der FOTM with damage calculation. 
1.  The Price Drop 
Settlement value stems from class damages, which begin with a 
sharp price drop in the wake of a corrective disclosure.  While it is not 
true that a large drop in a company’s stock inevitably leads to FOTM 
litigation,56 it is true that plaintiffs investigate stock-price drops as pre-
 
55 The defendant can incur liability under statutory or common law.  Under “con-
trol person” liability, good faith is a defense.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (providing that the 
controlling person is not liable if he had no “reasonable ground to believe in the exis-
tence of the facts” under which he would be liable); id. § 78t(a) (exempting control-
ling persons from liability if they acted in good faith).  However, under agency law, em-
ployer liability follows as long as the employee is acting within the scope of employment.  
See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets:  
Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 695-96 (noting that the good faith defense 
is “illusory” because courts apply agency law to securities fraud lawsuits). 
56 See Jennifer Francis et al., Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Disclosures, 32 J. 
ACCT. RES. 137, 138 (1994) (noting that of fifty-one firms that reported a twenty-
percent or greater decline in earnings or sales, only one was subject to a shareholder 
lawsuit related to the announcement of that decline). 
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liminary indicators of FOTM actionability.57  FOTM plaintiffs follow 
the money and look for big numbers, and they do so even more since 
the PSLRA raised litigation costs.58  Unsurprisingly, FOTM defendants 
tend to be big companies—larger even than their industry peers.59  
The plaintiffs also need to find the basic elements of a FOTM claim, 
namely material misstatements made with scienter.  Historically, these 
have tended to be statements made in advance of earnings declines.60  
While the PSLRA did not result in a decrease in the number of actions 
filed,61 its heightened pleading rule62 did cause plaintiffs to choose 
 
57 This is a function of the damage calculation practice detailed in subsection 
I.A.2, infra.  Cornerstone Research periodically reports on the declines in FOTM de-
fendants’ stock prices during class periods.  The numbers are part of a description of 
current plaintiffs’ behavior patterns.  Cornerstone reports that there were 176 class 
action filings in 2010 and 168 filings in 2009.  CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 31, 
at 3.  In 2010, the aggregate decline in market capitalization during the class periods 
for the subject companies was $474 billion; in 2009, the decline was $550 billion.  Id. at 
26 fig.25.  Market capitalization losses during the two days flanking the last day of these 
actions’ class periods—losses that make the companies good candidates to meet the 
loss causation requirement—were $72 billion for the 2010 filings and $84 billion for 
the 2009 filings.  Id. at 24 fig.23. 
58 Steven J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers:  Changes 
During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1497-98 (2006). 
59 See Irene Kim & Douglas J. Skinner, Measuring Securities Litigation Risk 16 
( June 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1632638 
(noting that larger firms are sued at higher rates).  Target industries, however, shift 
over time with market volatility.  Technology companies were the lead targets a decade 
ago; in recent years, financial and health care companies have displaced them.  See 
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 18 fig.18 (finding that 18.2% of filings in 
2001 targeted technology companies while financial and health care companies com-
prised 25.7% of new filings in 2010). 
60  Professors Thompson and Sale report a median earnings price drop of 54% as 
well as a focus on accounting and earnings management misstatements in 88% of the 
complaints filed in a one-year period.  Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities 
Fraud as Corporate Governance:  Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 893, 897-
98 (2003).  The 2010 filings follow this pattern:  93% of the complaints alleged misrep-
resentations in financial documents; 45% alleged false forward-looking statements; and 
26% alleged Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) violations.  The 2009 
filings for the same categories were as follows:  87%, 45%, and 26%, respectively.  
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 32.  Interestingly, announced restatements 
are becoming less salient as triggers, implicated in 7% of 2010 complaints and 8% of 
2009 complaints, as compared with 34% in 2006.  Id.  
61 See, e.g., Mukesh Bajaj et al., Securities Class Action Settlements, 43 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 1001, 1003 fig.1 (2003) (showing that the number of federal court filings re-
turned to previous levels one year after Congress enacted the PSLRA); see also Choi & 
Thompson, supra note 58, at 1496-97 (noting that “the number of federal suits quickly 
returned to near its pre-PSLRA level” after Congress foreclosed such litigation in state 
courts).  Bajaj and his colleagues also show that the settlement rate dropped substan-
tially over the same time frame, while the time between filing and settlement has in-
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their targets more carefully.  Plaintiffs now look for “hard evidence,” 
typified by misstatements in company financials as well as SEC en-
forcement actions.63 
Thus briefed, let us hypothesize a typical fraud-on-the-market 
case.  Assume that high-level actors at Ajax Corporation cause it to in-
correctly apply Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
with the result that Ajax overstates its earnings across seven fiscal quar-
ters beginning on January 1, 201X and ending after the third quarter 
of 201Y.  Ajax announces on January 2, 201Z that it will be restating its 
earnings for the preceding seven quarters, that its 201Y annual report 
will be delayed, and that the ex post quarterly earnings reductions will 
be between ten and thirty percent.  Ajax’s stock, which has been trad-
ing upward during the two years in question, beginning at forty dol-
lars and ending at sixty dollars, drops forty percent on the date of the 
restatement announcement, closing at thirty-six dollars.  In this hypo-
thetical, the January 2 corrective disclosure is the only possible cause 
of the price drop. 
A plaintiffs’ law firm promptly files a class action complaint.  The 
complaint defines the class as all purchasers of Ajax stock from Janu-
ary 1, 201X to December 31, 201Y, who continued to hold stock on 
January 2, 201Z, and claims out-of-pocket damages for each member 
 
creased.  Bajaj et al., supra, at 1009 tbls.3 & 4, 1010.  But see Choi & Thompson, supra 
note 58, at 1498 (reporting that the settlement rate is the same, but the time to reach 
settlement has increased).  Evidence on the rate of dismissal is mixed.  See id. at 1498 & 
nn. 54-56 (providing an overview of several studies that have reached different conclu-
sions about dismissals). 
62 PSLRA § 21D(b)(1)–(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) (2006) (requiring plain-
tiff to specify each statement, the reasons why each statement is allegedly misleading, 
and to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant 
acted with the required state of mind”). 
63 See Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON & ORG. 598, 601, 613-22 (2006) (defining “hard evidence” as 
a public announcement made before a filing in response to an accounting restatement 
or an SEC action, and finding support for these actions in an analysis of all initial pub-
lic offerings between 1990 and 1999).  Choi also suggests that the PSLRA dispropor-
tionately and negatively impacts non-nuisance litigation that lacks prefiling hard evi-
dence.  Id. at 614-16; see also Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, Do 
the Merits Matter More?  Class Actions Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627, 636 (2007) (finding a sharp increase in litigation grounded in 
accounting restatements following the introduction of the PSLRA); A.C. Pritchard & 
Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud?  An Empirical Study of Motions to Dismiss Under the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 125, 146 (2005) (find-
ing that revenue-related accounting violations and other GAAP allegations are nega-
tively correlated with dismissals in the Second Circuit but not in the Ninth Circuit).  
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at the difference between the inflated price paid for the stock on the 
purchase date and its lower, intrinsic value on the date of filing. 
2.  The Value Line 
One part of the damage calculation is easy.  The class members’ 
respective purchase prices are objectively determined by the record of 
market prices.  In contrast, the lower intrinsic values on each purchase 
date are hidden.  These values, like the market price itself, will have 
changed dynamically across the two-year period along with the for-
tunes of the company and the conditions in the wider economy.  In 
theory, for any class member who purchased at a particular time, 
there is a “correct” per-share damages calculation based on the intrin-
sic value of Ajax at the moment of purchase.  This would be the mar-
ket price minus one share’s allocation of the present value of Ajax’s 
future net cash flows projected based on accurate public information 
about Ajax and discounted based on then-prevailing economic condi-
tions.64  But, unfortunately, this theoretically correct damages calcula-
tion does not facilitate the pleading and proof requirements of a class 
action lawsuit.  Primary evidence of intrinsic value, such as one sees 
presented in an appraisal action, requires analysis of specific facts 
about the company, its prospects, and outside markets.65  This evi-
dence is expensive to generate and tends to be indeterminate.66  Gen-
erating and marshalling such evidence day-by-day across a class period 
would be practically impossible and would chill class action antifraud 
enforcement, much as would an actual reliance requirement.67 
 
64 Thus the intrinsic value of the stock will change dynamically across time, just as 
the market price does. 
65 See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Rationalizing Appraisal Stan-
dards in Compulsory Buyouts, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1021, 1041-43 (2009) (describing the com-
ponents of the going-concern value approach in appraisal, which includes the present 
value of earnings based on current assets and “the present value of the firm’s growth 
opportunities”). 
66 For additional information on indeterminacy, see infra note 69 and accompa-
nying text. 
67 Commentators have dismissed the fundamental value approach as unduly spe-
culative.  See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases 
Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 17 (1982) (“Attempting to appraise 
the value of the security by analyzing asset value, earnings data, and other information 
is inherently speculative.”).  Others contend that traditional fundamental-value evi-
dence fails to meet the admissibility standard of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993), which outlines reliability indicators a judge should 
use when determining whether to admit expert scientific testimony.  See Esther 
Bruegger & Frederick C. Dunbar, Estimating Financial Fraud Damages with Response Coef-
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Happily for class action plaintiffs, they do not need to show fun-
damental value.68  Instead, litigation experts use models that focus on 
market-price changes without an anchor in fundamental-value calcu-
lations.  This exercise begins on the corrective disclosure date with the 
pre- and post-disclosure prices:  here, sixty and thirty-six dollars.  The 
latter is taken as Ajax’s post-disclosure intrinsic value.  The analysis 
then works backward, comparing the thirty-six-dollar figure against 
the stock market for the two-year class period to construct Ajax’s per 
share intrinsic value at every date in the period.  Two price lines 
emerge:  a “market” line tracking Ajax’s actual stock price and a con-
structed “value” line.  The numbers on the constructed-value line 
purportedly determine the company’s per share intrinsic value at all 
times during the class period.  The difference between the stock-price 
line and the value line is the price inflation caused by the fraud. 
The value line is created using an asset-pricing model, which is 
based on empirical stock-return data from a prior period during 
which the fraud did not impact Ajax’s stock price.  The model articu-
lates risk and return relationships between the return on Ajax’s stock 
and two other factors—the return on the stock market as a whole (the 
capital asset pricing model’s beta factor) and the return on Ajax’s in-
dustry group.  The mathematical relationships, thus captured, provide 
a basis for inferring what the returns on Ajax stock would have been 
without the fraud.  Ultimately, the exercise yields intrinsic values for 
each day in the class period.69 
More precisely, the model yields proxies for intrinsic values.  It 
would take a huge leap of faith to support a stronger assertion about 
the accuracy of calculations generated by such a two-factor asset pric-
ing model.  Results vary greatly depending on the particular asset pric-
ing model employed, and there are several such models.70  Further, the 
 
ficients, 35 J. CORP. L. 11, 12-13 (2009) (presenting the common perception that expert 
testimony not grounded in event studies is “junk science” that is appropriately “re-
placed with expert testimony based on the generally agreed-upon notion that a proper-
ly performed event study is an appropriate method for estimating damages in share-
holder class action litigation”). 
68 The practice dates back to Judge Sneed’s concurring opinion in Green v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp.  See 541 F.2d 1335, 1344 (9th Cir. 1976) (discussing the creation of price 
and value lines to determine damages for each class member). 
69 See Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure Damag-
es in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV. 883, 897-98 (1990) (describing the steps 
used to calculate a value line using the comparable index approach discussed above).   
70 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1491-92 (1996) (describing the value line approach and noting 
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evidence shows that one component of the model used in FOTM 
cases—the capital pricing model (CAPM)—is inaccurate for most time 
periods.71  CAPM is still used in empirical finance simply because it is 
the best model available.  But we are left in an awkward evidentiary 
spot:  even if it were safe to assume that the stock price accurately re-
flected Ajax’s fundamental value on the start and finish dates, confi-
dence in the calculation for intermediate dates is very low. 
Confidence respecting the start and end dates will be higher, but 
not necessarily by much.  The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis 
(ECMH) that underlies Basic’s72 presumption of reliance on market-
pricing integrity does not predict that the stock price reflects funda-
mental value.  In its semi-strong state, it simply says that “no trading 
strategy based on public information can regularly outperform the 
market.”73  Alternatively stated, ECMH stands for the principle that 
even if the stock is mispriced on any given date (based on any capital 
asset trading model), the misalignment may get worse before it finally 
is corrected in the future.  In sum, FOTM damage calculations spin 
numbers based on a set of weak assumptions.  And the problems with 
the damage calculation in our hypothetical case have only just started. 
3.  Complicating Factors 
The hypothetical strives for simplicity by stipulating that the 
twenty-four-dollar price drop stems entirely from the corrective disclo-
sure and reflects no other influences.74  But there will be complica-
tions even with that stipulation.  Direct application of the asset-pricing 
model does not always yield plausible day-to-day figures.  For example, 
the price effect of the series of earnings misstatements may have cu-
mulated over time, with the impact differing across class members de-
pending on the time of stock purchase.75  We will surmount this bar-
 
that “the value line calculations of the experts for the two sides can differ greatly, even 
when they are using the same methodology”). 
71 See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 196-99 
(10th ed. 2011) (presenting a hypothetical scenario showing the model’s inaccuracy 
and concluding that “[t]here is no doubt that the evidence on the [model] is less con-
vincing than scholars once thought”). 
72 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
73 William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empower-
ment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 692 (2010). 
74 See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 69, at 893-94 (describing the calculative prob-
lem presented by multiple risks and multiple disclosure dates). 
75 See Bruegger & Dunbar, supra note 67, at 14 (mentioning the difficulty asso-
ciated with apportioning damages from securities class action lawsuits among multiple 
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rier with a further assumption:  the average price inflation across the 
two-year period is twelve dollars, and it is normally distributed. 
We may still be overstating the damages, however.  When a com-
pany restates its financials, there may be collateral damage in the form 
of market reappraisal of its managers’ capabilities.76  Given this effect, 
the forty-percent decline in the stock price may outstrip the funda-
mental-value implications of the accounting adjustment taken alone.77 
Let us assume that no collateral damage exists and estimate a 
damage figure for the class.  Assume that Ajax has twenty million 
shares outstanding, and that its market share turnover is one-hundred 
percent per year.  How many shares are in the class?  Things get tricky 
at this point.  The class members are those who bought Ajax stock 
during the class period and continue to hold it at the period’s end; in-
and-out traders are excluded.  If Ajax’s one-hundred-percent turnover 
stems from activity respecting only ten percent of its shares, each of 
which is traded ten times annually, then the class will be comprised of 
the holders of ten percent of the stock.  In contrast, if Ajax’s share 
turnover involved a complete repopulation of its shareholder group 
across the two years, then one-hundred percent of Ajax’s shares will be 
in the class.  Unfortunately, because the connection between daily 
stock-trading volume figures and corporate stockholder lists is 
opaque, no verifiable figures are available. 
 
co-defendants due to the challenge of assigning specific misrepresentations to individ-
ual co-defendants). 
76 Studies have provided empirical confirmation of this assertion.  See, e.g., Jona-
than M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 581, 582 (2008) (analyzing 585 enforcement actions brought between 1978 
and 2002 and finding that reputational impairment accounted for approximately sixty-
seven percent of the decline in a firm’s stock price following the announcement of the 
misconduct); see also, e.g., Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Collateral Damage and 
Securities Litigation, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 717, 723-27 (providing several examples of repu-
tational harm as “collateral damage” from negative disclosures); Allen Ferrell & Atanu 
Saha, The Loss Causation Requirement for Rule 10b-5 Causes of Action:  The Implications of 
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 63 BUS. LAW. 163, 168-70 (2007) (identifying 
“confounding events” that cause a stock’s intraday price drop following negative dis-
closure but are unrelated to the disclosure itself).  
77 It is not at all clear within Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 
(2005), that the misstatements will be deemed to have caused this additional loss.  See 
Cornell & Rutten, supra note 76, at 744-45 (noting the difficulty of considering colla-
teral damages under a loss-causation framework); Ferrell & Saha, supra note 76, at 175-
78 (discussing the impact postcorrective disclosure stock-price rebounds have on dam-
ages valuation). 
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Plaintiffs accordingly proceed inferentially and deploy experts 
who apply controversial models.78  To surmount this problem in our 
hypothetical, we must add another assumption:79  fifty percent of Ajax 
stockholders, holding a total of ten million shares, purchased of all 
their stock during the class period.  Using the average loss, this yields 
a damage figure of $120 million. 
Our simple hypothetical thus turns out to be rather complicated.  
In the real world, the situation will be more complicated still, for fac-
tors unrelated to the fraud will also have an impact on the stock price 
 
78 The plaintiffs start with daily volume numbers and then differentiate between 
traded and untraded shares.  Within the group of untraded shares, all buyers who sold 
the stock before the corrective disclosure date are eliminated.  The models employed 
in this exercise are much disputed.  See DANIEL R. FISCHEL ET AL., NAT’L LEGAL CTR. 
FOR THE PUB. INTEREST, THE USE OF TRADING MODELS TO ESTIMATE AGGREGATE DAM-
AGES IN SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION:  AN UPDATE 7-21 (2006) (criticizing the models 
and making an empirical showing of their tendency to overestimate damages); Linda 
Allen, Meeting Daubert Standards in Calculating Damages for Shareholder Class Action Liti-
gation, 62 BUS. LAW. 955, 955 (2007) (“Current modeling practice by damages experts 
may fail to meet [Daubert] standards.”); Linda Allen, A New Theoretically-Grounded Micro-
structure Trading Model for Calculating Damages in Shareholder Class Action Litigation?, 12 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 61, 62-65 (2006) (criticizing current models for using “aggregate 
trade volume” as their base and proposing a substitute based on “the net purchases of 
shares . . . on each day of the Class Period”); Michael Barclay & Frank C. Torchio, A 
Comparison of Trading Models Used for Calculating Aggregate Damages in Securities Litigation, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at 105, 117-18 (criticizing models in 
use as being highly inaccurate); John Finnerty & George Pushner, An Improved Two-
Trader Model for Measuring Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 213, 250-51 (2003) (finding fault with current models and proposing a more 
consistent substitute). 
 Damage calculation is in flux at all events.  The “proportional trading” model that 
plaintiffs have long preferred has been rejected by one court for insufficient scientific 
support.  See Kaufman v. Motorola, Inc., No. 95-1069, 2000 WL 1506892, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 21, 2000) (finding that the proportional trading model fails to satisfy Daubert re-
quirements).  But see RMED Int’l, Inc. v. Sloan’s Supermarkets, Inc., No. 94-5587, 2000 
WL 420548, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2000) (“Surely, every stock pricing model will be 
subject to some form of statistical criticism or unwanted interpretation.”).  For criti-
cism of the Kaufman opinion and a defense of the model, see Brian P. Murray & Eric J. 
Belfi, The Proportionate Trading Model:  Real Science or Junk Science?, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
391, 403-12 (2004).  A newer replacement model has been questioned by another 
court.  See In re Broadcom Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 02-0030, 2005 WL 1403756, at *3 (C.D. 
Cal. June 3, 2005) (casting doubt on the two-trader model after an extensive eviden-
tiary hearing but, because of the facts of the case, deciding not to rule on rejection).  A 
third court has rejected the concept of aggregate damages entirely.  See Bell v. FORE 
Sys., Inc., No. 97-1265, 2002 WL 32097540, at *3-4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2002) (theoriz-
ing that the PSLRA’s limitation on damages contemplates individual plaintiffs with 
individual claims). 
79 See FISCHEL ET AL., supra note 78, at 28-29 (suggesting that the question of dam-
ages be addressed during claims administration).   
BRATTON-WACHTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  6:02 PM 
92 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 69 
during the class period.80  Such “confounding” information comes in 
different shapes and sizes.81  The corrective disclosure could have re-
vealed additional bad news about Ajax’s prospects unrelated to its past 
financial reports.  Thus, the stock price decline might stem both from 
the restatement and from the effect of additional bad news.  Alterna-
tively, Ajax might have bundled good news with its corrective disclosure.  
Or the market may have anticipated the accounting news over time, 
drawing inferences from past reported events.82  There are even cases 
where it is not at all clear that the corrective disclosure played any role 
in the stock-price decline, or so the defendants argue.83  Defendants 
also argue that market prices can negatively overreact to disclosures of 
bad news, and that event studies do not filter out these effects.84 
Analysts agree that event-study methodology should be employed 
to sort out the different influences on the market price’s response to 
the corrective disclosure.85  But, in line with the state of empirical fi-
nance theory,86 there are wide differences in the methodology’s appli-
cation.  Indeed, these analysts debate matters as fundamental as 
choosing the appropriate event study models for the securities litiga-
tion context.87  Moreover, as confounding information accumulates, it 
 
80 See Alexander, supra note 70, at 1491 (noting that variation among experts is 
common value-line calculation). 
81 For a discussion of confounding events, see Ferrell & Saha, supra note 76, at 
168-70. 
82 This may, but need not, result from the company’s strategic conduct; the good 
news may be part and parcel of the corrective facts disclosed.  See Cornell & Rutten, 
supra note 76, at 719-20 (providing a common example of a corrective disclosure—a 
merger announcement—that “over-discloses” the prior misstatement); see also Janet 
Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 
1421, 1425-27 (1994) (noting that an announcement of new product opportunities over-
disclosed a prior misstatement and arguing that using the disclosure as a measure of 
price effect is flawed because it ignores the fact that investors often have distinct reasons 
for paying less for stocks after the disclosure that are unrelated to the disclosure itself). 
83 See Alexander, supra note 70, at 1425-26 (describing the stark contrast between 
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ stated positions in securities class action litigations). 
84 See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty:  Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 
WIS. L. REV. 151, 180 (arguing that event studies fail to provide an accurate picture of a 
security’s value “because noise and sentiment can influence price”).  A provision of the 
PSLRA that limits damages ameliorates this problem.  PLSRA § 21D(e), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-4(e) (2006). 
85 For a description of the methodology, see Bruegger & Dunbar, supra note 67, 
at 16-24. 
86 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.  
87 See Jonah B. Gelbach et al., Valid Inference in Single-Firm, Single-Event Studies 2 
(Robert Day Sch., Working Paper No. 2009-17, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
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becomes necessary to resort to old-fashioned financial analysis and 
make judgment calls about how investors would have responded to 
counterfactual scenarios:88  it is one thing to confirm a corrective dis-
closure’s pricing impact with an event study, but quite another to 
show the ex ante market value of the undisclosed information consid-
ered in isolation.89  In the end, despite the apparently determinative 
character of the financial techniques brought to bear, we wind up in 
the well-known territory where lawyers in high stakes litigation make 
legal arguments based on uncertain information.90 
B.  Pocket Shifting 
On whom have the losses, thus calculated, fallen?  The quantum of 
economic loss that Ajax stock purchasers experienced is much smaller 
than the foregoing damage calculation seems to indicate.  And who 
funds the compensatory check?  Shareholders supposedly protected by 
the cause of action.  Therein lie policy problems for FOTM. 
To return to the first question, note that every buyer in the Ajax 
class had a seller who benefitted from the price inflation, but who, 
having made no misstatement, may walk away with the inflated price 
in his pocket.  Accordingly, within this group of buyers and sellers 
there is no net loss, only a wealth transfer between innocent parties.91  
This scenario raises the question of whether FOTM litigation should 
function as an insurance scheme for buyers left holding the short end 
of the stick.  The answer is no.  The loss is not actually spread across a 
 
abstract=1442222 (criticizing single-firm event studies as having an antiplaintiff bias 
and proposing a different methodology). 
88 See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 69, at 896-97, 911 (noting that finance theory 
requires estimating investor assessments).  There are also numerous calculative ques-
tions arising from Dura.  For a review, see Frederick C. Dunbar & Arun Sen, Counterfac-
tual Keys to Causation and Damages in Shareholder Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 
199, 213-21 (2009). 
89 See Alexander, supra note 82, at 1427 (discussing the problems with using event 
studies to calculate damages, including the difficulty of separating a disclosure’s mar-
ket effect from the “litigation-related component”). 
90 See id. at 1458 (arguing that damages calculated from event studies are uncer-
tain, which has an impact on multiple levels of litigation proceedings); see also Abby F. 
Rudzin, Loss Causation and Damage Defense Strategies (describing the challenges of coun-
tering the “expert opinions” of plaintiffs’ experts who do not rely on “mathematical or 
statistical analysis” in making those opinions at trial), in WILLIAM R. MAGUIRE ET AL., 
MANAGING SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMS 45, 51-52 (2009).   
91 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 651 (1985) (describing how “trading in the aftermarket entails 
offsetting gains and losses”). 
BRATTON-WACHTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  6:02 PM 
94 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 69 
larger class of insured actors, as it would be in the case of casualty in-
surance.92  With Ajax, we have a plaintiff class holding fifty percent of 
the shares seeking compensation from a corporation owned by the 
holders of one-hundred percent of the shares.  To the extent that a 
shareholder in the class remains an Ajax shareholder at the time the 
compensation is paid, its pro rata contribution is a wash.93  In effect, 
then, those Ajax shareholders who are not in the class pay the dam-
ages.  The loss is shifted, but not really spread.94 
At this point, we need to sort out Ajax shareholders’ pecuniary in-
terests according to shareholder type.  Drawing on basic financial 
economics for a model, we break them into two categories:  (1) fully di-
versified portfolio shareholders and (2) underdiversified shareholders.  
The latter category in turn is broken into three subcategories:  (a) unin-
formed traders, (b) long-term investors, and (c) information traders. 
1.  Modern Portfolio Investors 
Many (and we would guess most) of Ajax’s shareholders, both in-
side and outside of the class, will be modern portfolio investors.95  
These shareholders accept the tenets of finance theory, fully diversify 
their portfolios, measure returns based on the wider market, and 
avoid trading on company-specific information.  These investors’ 
trades are either liquidity-driven or incidental to their portfolio man-
agement.96  Accordingly, they can be expected, on average, to be on the 
selling end of price-inflated stock trades fifty percent of the time and on 
the buying end fifty percent of the time.97  Their gains and losses will 
net out over time as their diversified status, in effect, insures them 
 
92 See Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations when Issuers Do Not 
Trade?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 297, 304-05 (“[T]he persons who will ultimately bear these 
losses—the shareholders at the time the suit is brought—are unlikely to be any more 
diversified than the persons who initially incur [them]. . . . [T]hese losses are spread 
among the holders of all the issuer’s shares, which . . . is a larger group.”). 
93 See Coffee, supra note 54, at 1557 (illustrating that shareholders bear the burden 
of any judgment or settlement).  
94 See Fox, supra note 92, at 308 (arguing that shifting losses creates social costs). 
95 See generally BREALEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 186-88 (providing a basic back-
ground of modern portfolio theory). 
96 See id. at 188-90. 
97 See Alexander, supra note 70, at 1500-03 (“The chance of being on the losing or 
winning side of a transaction . . . can be assumed to be random.”). 
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against price inflation.98  It thus makes no sense for these shareholders 
to pay an additional insurance premium in the form of litigation costs. 
These costs mount up.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys take an average of 
twenty-three percent of each settlement.99  Corporate defense attor-
neys, whom companies pay directly, add an additional cost of at least 
twenty-five to thirty-five percent over and above the settlement costs.100  
In addition, there are the costs of directors’ and officers’ (D&O) in-
surance premiums and the ancillary costs of disrupted business.101  
These factors imply that litigation costs may exceed the settlement 
proceeds directed to the class members.  It is thus unsurprising that 
class action filings are associated with immediate declines in company 
stock prices.102 
To summarize, diversified portfolio investors emerge undamaged 
but for the litigation costs.  It is still theoretically possible that a given 
investor institution could come out slightly ahead if its net proceeds 
from litigation settlements exceed its pro rata share of litigation costs, 
but that seems unlikely as a practical matter.  Professors Cox and 
Thomas collected distribution data on 118 settlements and found 
 
98 See id. (noting that investors who make more trades are more likely to have their 
gains equal their losses). 
99 This is the mean percentage recovery in securities cases for the period 1993 to 
2008 described in Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses 
in Class Action Settlements:  1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 245, 258 (2010).  
Figures for earlier periods tend to be higher.  See, e.g., Denise N. Martin et al., Recent 
Trends IV:  What Explains Filings and Settlements in Shareholder Class Actions, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. 
& FIN. 121, 141 (1999) (showing a recovery of thirty-two percent from 1991 to 1998). 
100 Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance:  The 
Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1815 n.95 (2007). 
101 See Fox, supra note 92, at 306-07 (discussing additional costs of securities litiga-
tion compensation, including lawyers’ fees, expert costs, “the time and attention of is-
suers’ executives required by litigation, the administrative costs associated with D&O 
insurance, and the use of scarce judicial resources”); cf. Langevoort, Corporate Execu-
tives, supra note 13, at 643-44 (asserting that a CEO is better suited to bear risk than the 
company, and thus, the CEO should be liable).  
102 See ANJAN THAKOR, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES OF SECURITIES LITIGATION 4-5 (2005), available at http:// 
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_doc.php?docid=857; Roberta Romano, The 
Shareholder Suit:  Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 67-68 (1991).  
This picture has been confirmed empirically, but with a wrinkle.  Thakor collected 
data documenting institutional investor positions in the stock of 755 companies that 
settled cases filed between 1995 and 2005 and tracking the investors’ gains and losses 
on inflated stock.  See ANJAN V. THAKOR WITH JEFFREY S. NIELSEN & DAVID A. GULLEY, 
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS 
ACTION LITIGATION 8 (2005), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/ 
get_ilr_doc.php?docid=855 (accounting for a slight trading loss by reference to share 
issuance activity by the defendant companies).   
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that, on average, only twenty-eight percent of eligible institutional in-
vestors bothered to file claims.103  They account for this behavior by 
referring both to some institutions’ collective interest in maintaining a 
posture of loyalty to corporate managers and to informational break-
downs within the chain of market intermediaries.104  Those institutions 
that do file claims direct the proceeds either to the particular portfo-
lio that bore the loss or to their general fund.  Accordingly, fund 
beneficiaries who exited during the (usually) long period between the 
corrective disclosure date and the settlement payment receive nothing 
from the settlement.105 
2.  Underdiversified Investors 
We now consider investors who buy and hold stocks in underdiver-
sified portfolios.  Because these investors forego diversification’s insur-
ance against price inflation damage, they are candidates for FOTM 
compensation.  An objection to their compensation should be noted, 
however.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson assumes the ECMH,106 and the ECMH’s 
primary advice to investors is to diversify fully.107  Thus, an investor who 
chooses to forego diversification to pursue informational (or other) ad-
vantages is outside of the ECMH, and is thus arguably outside the class 
that the FOTM presumption protects. 
We will waive this objection, however, and proceed by dividing the 
underdiversified investors into three groups:  (a) uninformed traders, 
(b) long-term investors, and (c) information traders.  It turns out that a 
clear policy case for compensation can be made only for the last group. 
a.  Uninformed Traders 
Uninformed traders—also known as “noise traders”—buy and sell 
stocks at random; their trades lack an informational basis and are not 
 
103  Cox & Thomas, supra note 1, at 424. 
104 See id. at 427, 431-33 (stating that many large financial institutions refuse to 
file claims against their clients and noting that investors often do not receive notice 
of claims). 
105 See id. at 449. 
106 485 U.S. 224, 246 & n.24 (1988). 
107 If one cannot make systematic profits trading on public information, and inves-
tors are compensated only for bearing systematic risk, there would be no other rational 
strategy.  See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE:  CASES AND MATERIALS 91-93 
(6th ed. 2008); Bratton & Wachter, supra note 73, at 692 (“[N]o trading strategy based 
on public information . . . can outperform the market . . . .”). 
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based on a system of portfolio management.108  Because these noisy 
trades occur randomly as the traders buy and sell both under- and 
overpriced stocks, gains and losses cancel out over time, which under-
cuts the policy case for compensation.109 
b.  Long-term Investors 
Underdiversified investors who hold Ajax stock over the long term 
and who trade only rarely emerge in a different posture.  Some of 
them could be outsiders saving for retirement.  But most are probably 
Ajax insiders:  officers and employees holding shares vested under  
equity-compensation schemes.  Any shareholders from management 
who sold during the class period can be expected to be named as de-
fendants with respect to their sales and can be put to one side.  The rest 
are the clear losers in the federal securities litigation game.110  They pay 
their pro rata share of Ajax’s litigation costs, but those who bought be-
fore the class date will be entirely on the defending side and will receive 
nothing from any settlement.  Moreover, because long-term holders do 
not trade often, they receive little benefit from price-inflated stock.  
There is an irony here:  this is the category containing any mom-and-
pops in Ajax’s shareholder group, and the system picks their pockets. 
c.  Underdiversified Information Traders 
To the extent that FOTM can be defended as a compensatory 
mechanism, the basis lies with this group.  These are the investment 
professionals (and, by extension, market intermediaries) who invest in 
analysis of publicly available information when making investment de-
cisions.111  Critically, this is also the only group whose members actu-
ally relied on Ajax’s public statements. 
These shareholders, although underdiversified, can buy and sell 
stocks very quickly.  Accordingly, we situate most of them on the plain-
tiff side, as they have purchased and held Ajax stock within the class 
 
108 For a general discussion of noise trading as an alternative to the efficient mar-
kets approach, see Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach 
to Finance, 4 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 19, 19-31. 
109 Cf. ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS:  AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIOR-
AL FINANCE 3 (2000) (describing noise traders’ gains and losses as portrayed in ortho-
dox financial economics). 
110 See Coffee, supra note 54, at 1560 (describing the underdiversified retirement 
savers as the “clearest losers”).  
111 We put aside the question, raised by the ECMH, of whether these informa-
tional investments can yield a positive long-term return. 
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period but have since moved on.  Of course, some shareholders may 
have held the stock through the disclosure date, thus creating an in-
terest in both sides of the litigation.  However, we find it hard to imag-
ine that an appreciable number of these investors will be situated only 
on the payor side. 
Note that this group includes a subset of investors who make addi-
tional investments in verifying the accuracy of public information.112  
Those who investigated Ajax stock during the class period and made 
the right call will have been amply rewarded by selling (whether from 
a long or short position) when the stock was overvalued.  Those who 
investigated and made the wrong call will be in the plaintiff class, de-
spite their skepticism. 
This group has a strong claim for compensatory solicitude.  These 
investors make a double investment:  once in the cost of generating 
information and once in the foregone benefit of full diversification.113  
At the same time, their informational investments yield a public 
benefit in the form of more accurate securities prices.114  In order to 
receive this public benefit, we arguably need to compensate the in-
vestors’ reliance interest.115 
Although this argument might be persuasive in a frictionless world 
where those who actually rely on public information could instantly 
and costlessly liquidate their fraud claims into the full amount of 
damages suffered, FOTM does not work that way.  To illustrate this 
point, assume that 5% of the holders in the Ajax class (500,000 
shares) fall into this category, and their average damages are $12 per 
share, for a total of $6 million.  Assume further that the class action 
settles three years after filing, which has been the average settlement 
 
112 It is not clear whether this makes sense.  Under FOTM, those who actually re-
lied but did not investigate end up sharing the recovery with the skeptics and the li-
quidity traders who do not suffer any damages.  For an analysis of the relative positions 
of the two types of informed investors under FOTM, see Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution 
Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 636-41 (1992). 
113 See Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 
WIS. L. REV. 333, 347 (“Informed traders . . . incur the costs of research. . . . And they in-
cur, disproportionately, the costs of securities fraud because, relying on firm-specific dis-
closure to trade, they are more likely than diversified investors to be net losers.”). 
114 See id. at 342 (“Accurate share prices enable performance-based compensation 
structures to provide more precise incentives.  They ensure that share buybacks and 
repurchases do not unfairly discriminate among shareholders, and that option grants 
do not dilute existing ownership interests.  Finally, accurate share prices facilitate dis-
cipline through the takeover market.”). 
115 See id. at 348 (arguing in favor of the compensation of informed traders “because 
their reliance-based investment strategy provides a corporate-governance externality”). 
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time since the passage of the PSLRA.116  The median settlement 
amount for FOTM actions in the $50 to $124 million range for the 
period 1996 to 2009 is 5.3% of estimated damages.117  The information 
traders accordingly recover $318,000 before attorneys’ fees.118  Of 
course, the number of information traders varies by company and 
over time.  Even larger numbers result if 25% of the Ajax class falls 
into this category:  $30 million total damages claimed for a settlement 
return of $1.59 million. 
Either way, the returns are chump change.  Many investors in this 
group are hedge funds.  They will have reported this loss to their in-
vestors and reduced their returns three years earlier, possibly suffering 
consequences in the form of capital withdrawals.119  Recouping 5% 
three years later does nothing to backstop the funds’ reliance or to 
encourage them to continue to invest in information.120 
 
116 See ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES 
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS:  2009 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 2 (2009), available at http:// 
www.cornerstone.com/Securities-class-action-settlements2009-review-and-analysis-03-24-
2010 (follow “Securities Class Action Settlements:  2009 Review and Analysis” hyperlink 
under “Related Documents”) (“[S]ettlements typically occur[] three years after fil-
ing.”).  Since 2006, the average settlement time has increased to three-and-a-half to 
four years.  Id. 
117 RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 5. 
118 Id. at 18 n.5. 
119 See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets:  Long Term 
Results 8-9 (Univ. Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 10-17, 2010) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1677517 (describing investor flight from the 
hedge fund, Pirate Capital, following portfolio reverses). 
120 The information traders do have a means of increasing their return.  In recent 
years, a number of institutions have opted out of FOTM class actions and brought par-
allel direct actions in state courts.  Historically such actions have been rare.  See Theo-
dore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Liti-
gation:  Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1550 (2004) (surveying 
consumer class actions filed between 1993 and 2003 and reporting an opt-out rate of 
less than 0.2%).  The recent shift occurred after the PSLRA created a role for institu-
tional investors in the selection of class attorneys.  Public pension funds have emerged 
in the lead role, and these funds have developed loyalties to particular law firms.  Opt-
outs occur when the fund’s preferred firm fails to win the counsel designation.  The 
law firm then initiates a parallel action in a friendly state court, sometimes even waiting 
for the settlement to be announced before opting out.  The defendant corporations 
tend to settle the parallel actions along with the action in chief.  As a result, the institu-
tional plaintiffs win larger settlement percentages than do the class plaintiffs.  See John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance:  Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
288, 317-18 (2010) (“Possibly, the defendants recognize that large, well-financed opt-
outs will simply not allow their counsel to settle cheaply and thus prefer to settle these 
cases outside the class action.”). 
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C.  Summary, Analysis, and Implications 
Commentators have been making the central points in the fore-
going discussion for many years.121  We know of no academic writer who 
controverts them.  The resulting implications for FOTM are devastating. 
1.  The Failure of the Compensation Justification  
and Actual Reliance 
FOTM is supposed to compensate shareholders for damages, but 
it fails in two ways.  First, the shareholders bear the costs of the pay-
ments.  Most cases settle within D&O insurance-policy limits, and the 
corporation, as opposed to the named individual defendants, still pays 
when the limits are exceeded.122  Nothing dictates this practice.  
Boards of directors could require contributions from individual de-
fendants, or courts could reject settlements for lack of individual con-
tributions.  But the system continues to endorse collectivized funding 
in all but a handful of cases.123 
The second failure concerns the amounts paid.  As we have seen, 
shareholders recover only a fraction of their losses.  FOTM actions 
start with whopping price-inflation figures extrapolated by statistical 
experts.  But the proceedings never yield the stated sums because liti-
gation to final judgment is not cost effective from the lawyers’ point of 
 
121 The critique of FOTM reached maturity with Professors Arlen and Carney, as 
well as with Mahoney.  See Arlen & Carney, supra note 55, at 730 (arguing that FOTM 
cases are not appropriate for the imposition of vicarious liability on offenders); Mahoney, 
supra note 112, at 656 (proposing FOTM’s rejection based on the argument that FOTM 
will lead to underdeterrence of securities fraud and underenforcement of current laws); 
see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 91, at 635 (originating elements of the analysis). 
122 See FREDERICK C. DUNBAR ET AL., NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS., RECENT 
TRENDS III:  WHAT EXPLAINS SETTLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS? 9 (1995) 
(showing that insurers pay an average of 68.2%, defendant companies 31.4%, and in-
dividuals 0.4% of settlement amounts). 
123 There have been a few spectacular cases in which top officers have made sig-
nificant payments—Global Crossing, WorldCom, Adelphia—but they are exceptions.  
See Coffee, supra note 54, at 1551-53 (noting that officer payment cases tend to involve 
insolvent corporations, individual defendants who promise to make restitution to avoid 
indictment, or an inadequate or rescinded D&O policy).  Outside directors have al-
most never been held liable.  See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. 
L. REV. 1055, 1068 (2006) (finding thirteen settlements involving out-of-pocket pay-
ments by outside directors among the hundreds of settlements reached between 1991 
and 2004).  The famous exception involved the WorldCom board, whose members con-
tributed twenty percent of their respective net worths.  See Coffee, supra note 54, at 1552-
53.  Alan Hevesi, the former New York state comptroller, insisted on this result.  See Gret-
chen Morgenson, Ex-Directors at WorldCom Settle Anew, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2005, at C1. 
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view.124  These large, complicated, and risky lawsuits provoke risk aver-
sion on the part of those in charge.125  If the action is dismissed, the 
law firm fronting the capital to develop the case loses its entire in-
vestment.  The further the law firm goes in pursuing the claimed 
damages, the larger its investment in the suit, the less likely a settle-
ment, and the greater the risk of loss in court due to evidentiary short-
comings or adverse findings of law.  Indeed, one of the most striking 
features of FOTM jurisprudence is the absence of case law on damage 
calculations.  Law is created only on issues that go to the complaint’s 
threshold validity, resulting in a mountain of case law on loss causation, 
developed on motions to dismiss, and next to nothing on loss itself.  As 
a result, “compensation” in the FOTM world comes down to numbers 
generated solely to provide parameters for settlement discussions. 
There is a further irony.  Suppose the securities litigation bar 
found it cost effective to go the distance.  In the Ajax hypothetical, 
that would mean a judgment approaching $120 million—one-sixth of 
the company’s equity capitalization as of the corrective disclosure 
date.  Such a payment presumably would have a material adverse im-
pact on the current shareholders.  Were such payments to be made by 
a large number of companies,126 the resulting injuries to shareholders 
would make FOTM a pressing economic and political problem.  The 
shareholder class itself would demand—and secure—its elimination. 
In sum, FOTM’s compensation justification makes no sense.  Only 
a subset of shareholders arguably needs compensation, and private lit-
igation is incapable of generating it.  At the same time, even if FOTM 
 
124 Since the PSLRA’s enactment, only twenty-two securities actions have gone to 
trial.  Seven of those cases were settled before a verdict.  Of the fifteen that went as far 
as a verdict, the defendants won ten and the plaintiffs five.  Adam T. Savett, Risk-
Metrics Grp., Securities Class Action Trials in the Post-PSLRA Era ( Jan. 2010) (unpub-
lished presentation), available at http://blog.issgovernance.com/slw/SCAS% 
20Trials.pdf. 
125 See Coffee, supra note 54, at 1543-44 (detailing the risk-conscious behavior of 
plaintiffs’ attorneys and corporate actors before commencing securities class actions). 
126 Between 1996 and 2010, 2.4% of listed companies had a complaint filed against 
them.  CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 12.  But even this small percentage 
encompasses a large number of complaints:  between 1996 and 2009, a total of 2372 
complaints were filed against listed companies.  CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES 
CLASS ACTION FILINGS—2009:  A YEAR IN REVIEW 9 fig.8 (2010), available at http:// 
www.cornerstone.com/Securities_filings_2009_yir (follow “Securities Class Action Fil-
ings—2009:  A Year in Review” hyperlink).  Actions cluster in certain industries in the 
wake of statement reversals.  In 2002, for example, 22.7% of communications compa-
nies and 34.3% of utilities were sued.  Id. at 12.  In 2008, 32.6% of financial institutions 
were sued.  Id. 
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makes a positive contribution as a fraud deterrent or as a governance 
supplement, it survives only because it undercompensates. 
The logical conclusion of this analysis is FOTM’s elimination.  The 
only players with a strong case for compensation are the underdiversi-
fied information investors, who also happen to be the only players 
who can make out a case of actual reliance. 
2.  Litigation Incentives 
Having suggested FOTM’s elimination, we must confront the 
problem of litigation incentives.  We have seen that limiting recovery 
to investors with reliance interests mitigates some policy problems, 
but it may create others.  Our hypothetical FOTM action yields a 
$6.36 million settlement, which implies an attorney’s fee of $1.46 mil-
lion, or 23%.  While not a jackpot, the figure is certainly large 
enough to incentivize litigation. 
Cases with smaller out-of-pocket damages can also incentivize liti-
gation.  The proportion of claimed damages yielded in settlements 
goes up as the claimed damages amount gets smaller.  In 2010, settle-
ments of FOTM actions claiming less than $50 million yielded a me-
dian of 9.9%, while settlements of cases in the $1 to 5 billion range 
had an average yield of 1.7%.127  As it turns out, there is such a thing as 
small-numbers securities litigation.  Accordingly, there is no reason to 
think that private securities enforcement would disappear entirely in a 
reliance regime. 
Still, at some point the projected yield is so low that the litigation 
incentive disappears.  Let us reset the Ajax numbers for a reliance-
based cause of action.  If 5% of the shareholder population consists of 
information traders, the implied attorney’s fee for a 5.3% settlement 
works out to $73,140.  If 25% are information traders, the fee be-
comes a more attractive $365,700.  In either case, a settlement will not 
create any appreciable decrease in the level of difficulty and expense 
confronting the lawyer as compared to the class action, which offers a 
fee of $1.46 million.  Indeed, the lawyer would need to prove reliance 
for each individual plaintiff, adding to the cost.  Reliance could (and 
should) be defined liberally, with a focus on institutional research and 
analysis practices rather than on particular investment decisions based 
 
127 RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 5 fig.5.  Indeed, small-scale settlements 
commonly result from FOTM actions.  From 1996 to 2009, the median settlement was 
approximately $7.6 million.  Id. at 2 fig.2. 
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on particular information.  Even so, the hurdles for an investment-
grade lawsuit do rise substantially. 
Some investors may be willing to sue and pick up expenses.  Here 
the activist hedge funds are the standout candidates.  They accumu-
late large percentage stakes in their targets and, from a governance 
point of view, surmount the traditional collective-action problem.128  
Further, hedge funds have proven ready to sue.129  But there remains 
the question whether the nexus of incentives that causes hedge funds 
to break the governance mold carries over to antifraud litigation.  
They are in the skeptical subset of informed investors.  They look for 
quickly recoverable value positives and do their best to avoid companies 
with hidden value negatives.130  Litigation would remain expensive and 
risky, even if reliance were easy to prove and the burden of class qualifi-
cation were lifted.  Moreover, the extended time to payment would dis-
courage investment in litigation in this highly competitive sector. 
We suspect that, given a liberal definition of reliance, there would 
be a steady stream of private 10b-5 litigation addressed to material 
misstatements.  But it is clear that the volume of litigation would di-
minish.  The issue is whether the diminution implies a welfare loss for 
shareholders or society in general.  FOTM could still add value despite 
its failure as a compensatory tort. 
There are two possible sources of value.  First is fraud deterrence, 
which is the second pillar of FOTM’s conceptual framework.  FOTM 
proponents more recently proposed the second possible source, con-
tribution to the corporate governance system, as a substitute justifica-
tion.  We discuss the second justification in Part III. 
II.  FRAUD ON THE MARKET AS DETERRENCE 
Although the courts constructed FOTM as a compensatory tort, its 
very existence assumes that the SEC, the public enforcer of securities 
laws, needs assistance from the private sector.  Thus, there is a possi-
 
128 See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 
1387-90 (2007) (describing the trend toward activist funds taking on more significant 
portions of target stock). 
129 See id. at 1403-05 (identifying examples that illustrate the willingness of activist 
funds to engage in proxy contests). 
130 See Christopher Faille, How (Not) to Be an Investor Activist:  Object Lessons, HEDGE-
WORLD DAILY NEWS, Mar. 6, 2006, available at LEXISNEXIS (search “HedgeWorld Daily 
News” database for “Object Lessons”) (citing hedge fund manager Robert Chapman’s 
advice that activist investors urging a corporate restructuring should ensure their stock 
“has the same characteristics that would make its passive ownership worthwhile”). 
BRATTON-WACHTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  6:02 PM 
104 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 69 
bility that FOTM, even though it cannot be sustained as a compensa-
tory measure, can still be justified on enforcement grounds.  This shift 
in justificatory emphasis takes us from the private law side of the poli-
cy line to the public law side, where one must consider the social cost 
of fraud and ask whether FOTM reduces that cost by preventing fraud 
in the first place.131 
 
131 A second mode of social cost justification could also be considered—FOTM 
could ameliorate the consequences of fraud by reducing investors’ fraud-protection 
costs.  This inquiry could also be characterized as externality identification.  Either 
way, it roughly tracks the compensation analysis in Part I—any cost-reducing effect is a 
function of the yield of damage payments and thus a function of FOTM’s performance 
as a compensatory vehicle.   
 This inquiry takes us to the economics of sanctions.  It sets the base sanction at the 
net harm inflicted on others and then adjusts this figure upwards to reflect the proba-
bility of detection and enforcement.  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 91, at 618; cf. 
Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct:  An Analysis of Cor-
porate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 694 (1997) (advocating “several potential-
ly optimal regimes,” including one that would combine vicarious liability and positive 
corporate enforcement duties). 
 The threshold question for FOTM concerns the calculation of the net harm.  An 
underdiversified informed trader who suffers a loss might take steps to avoid future 
loss by incurring information costs.  This is a social cost, as it is cheaper for companies 
to tell the truth.  See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 91, at 623; Mahoney, supra note 
112, at 630-31; see also A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors:  A Proposal to Replace Class Ac-
tions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 939 (1999) (noting 
additional costs, such as those borne by nonfraudulent sellers to establish credibility 
and distinguish themselves from fraudulent sellers).  Portfolio investors, by contrast, 
do not have an incentive to take precautions because they are as likely to be on the 
right side of the trade as on the wrong side.  It could work differently with a noise 
trader.  However, strictly speaking, a noise trader who responds to a loss by taking 
company-specific precautions leaves this category and becomes an informed trader.  
From a social-cost perspective, this would not necessarily be bad.  Alternatively, the 
noise trader might shift to full diversification, which certainly would be good.  Finally, a 
disappointed noise trader might quit the market altogether.  This situation has the neg-
ative consequence of reducing market liquidity.  But, significantly, the possibility of dis-
appointed exit is part and parcel of noise trading.  It happens all the time, whether or 
not company misstatements caused the price inflation.   
 For FOTM to make a positive contribution, it must result in an overall reduction in 
social costs.  Based on the above analysis, these costs are primarily precautionary or moni-
toring expenditures by the informed subset of investors.  See Mahoney, supra note 112, at 
630-31.  Let us now see how this works out.  First we consider FOTM in a hypothetical 
world in which plaintiffs are incented (for whatever reason) to litigate every case to pay-
ment of the full amount of damages.  Then we look at FOTM in the real world where 
cases settle for less than ten cents on the dollar.   
 In a high payout world, FOTM holds out an award approaching $120 million to the 
Ajax purchasers in the class, which is a substantial sum even after subtracting attorneys’ 
fees.  An expectation of such a high payment presumably would lead to a reduction in 
precaution costs.  But this remains a nonsensical approach to the problem.  Paying the 
judgment to the entire class—both relying and nonrelying traders who will never invest 
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The exercise begins as a justification, but it soon sounds like a 
backstop defense.  It starts with the assertion that fraud is a persistent 
problem because the motivations for fraud are difficult to extinguish.  
It follows that fraud is underdeterred in the present environment.  At 
this point, an objection to FOTM arises:  if greater deterrence is re-
quired, then the better option is to move away from enterprise liability 
to individual liability.  But FOTM proponents dismiss the objection as 
unpersuasive.  An individual liability system that handed out penalties 
of sufficient magnitude to attract private enforcers would be draco-
nian and would likely impair the recruitment of talented managers.  A 
more moderate system of individual liability would remove the deep 
pocket from the settlement table and so reduce the incidence of pri-
vate enforcement, much as would a shift to an actual reliance re-
quirement.  As a consequence, fraud, already underdeterred, would 
be deterred even less, and its deadweight social cost would increase.  
Meanwhile, public enforcement fails to offer an alternative, as it is 
hobbled by incompatibility and political opposition. 
This Part lays out the particulars of this defense of FOTM.  Section 
A notes the persistence of fraud.  Section B looks at the penalty alter-
native to enterprise liability and poses the overdeterrence question.  
Section C tells the standard story of SEC weakness.  Section D de-
 
in precaution—is unnecessary.  We emerge with a mix of under- and over-compensation:  
as long as the information traders get less than one hundred cents on the dollar, they still 
may invest in precaution, while the corporate defendant pays out a sum greater than the 
putatively efficient amount.  Note also that to the extent that the corporate defendant is 
required to overpay, a perverse effect could follow—overdeterrence of discretionary dis-
closure.  Cf. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 73, at 697-98 (noting that the mandatory-
disclosure system makes no attempt to impose a full-disclosure regime); Jonathan L. 
Rogers et al., Disclosure Tone and Shareholder Litigation 3-5 (Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of 
Bus., Research Paper No. 09-01, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1331608 
(showing that more optimistic disclosures attract litigation). 
 There is an easy way to bring the numbers into an efficient alignment:  discard 
FOTM and reshape the private right of action as a reliance tort.  See Mahoney, supra 
note 112, at 636-40 (discussing the differences between a FOTM rule and a reliance 
rule and noting that a FOTM rule does little to change investor behavior).  Social-cost 
analysis, then, takes us to the same spot as the analysis of FOTM as compensation.   
 We now shift to real world FOTM, where in Ajax’s case the damage pool will be 
5.3% of $120 million, or $6.36 million, distributed across the class as a whole.  Since 
any given information trader’s recovery will be minimal, it is clear that FOTM does 
nothing to promote reliance on companies’ public disclosures or to discourage pre-
cautionary spending.  To the extent that there are cash proceeds, most go to investors 
whose losses and gains net out over time, siphoning the recovery away from actors 
whose behavior could actually be influenced in welfare-enhancing ways.  There is a 
compensating benefit—the reduced financial stakes mitigate the risk of perverse ef-
fects on disclosure policy.  But that is not much of a commendation. 
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scribes empirical studies cited by proponents of FOTM as a means of 
deterrence, and shows that their defense comes down to a weak asser-
tion:  “Well, it still doesn’t make any sense, but it’s all we have.”  Sec-
tion E evaluates this assertion by pointing out that FOTM is not the 
only weapon in a growing arsenal of antifraud enforcement tools. 
A.  Motivations for Fraud 
Fraud is indeed a persistent problem.  The temptations are built 
into corporate capitalism, whether through concealment of bad news 
or overblown projection of future success.  Managers conceal bad 
news to buy time.  If an adverse business development leads to em-
ployment termination or reduces the value of stock options that are 
about to expire, then lying or nondisclosure staves off the day of reck-
oning.  Delay also creates turn-around opportunities, despite the risk 
of enforcement action.132  Misstatements motivated by unchecked op-
timism are less rational in the face of adverse enforcement conse-
quences, but still can be explained.  We live in a shareholder-value era 
in which corporate reputation is tied to stock prices.  Managers labor 
under pressure to talk to the market and tell investors what they want 
to hear.133  Equity compensation schemes, another product of share-
holder-value culture, add an additional element of self-interest to the 
motivational mix, whether the fraud stems from concealment or over-
optimism.134  Unsurprisingly, option compensation is positively asso-
ciated with earnings manipulation and shareholder litigation.135 
 
132 See Arlen & Carney, supra note 55, at 701-03, 724-32 (showing most securities 
fraud cases can be described in terms of last-period optimism and that almost twenty-
five percent of FOTM companies went into bankruptcy); see also Langevoort, Corporate 
Executives, supra note 13, at 635 (“The problem is that executives themselves will not be 
deterred from misconduct when their personal gain from perpetrating or concealing 
the fraud exceeds the impact they would suffer should the corporation have to pay”).  
There is evidence to support the proposition that, in accounting cases, defendant 
companies did indeed intentionally manage their earnings.  See generally Dain C. Do-
nelson et al., Discontinuities and Earnings Management:  Evidence from Restatements 
Related to Securities Litigation 26 (Dec. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1465029. 
133 See Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow:  The SEC’s Pur-
suit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 473 (2001) (discussing how the 
incentive structure can lead managers to make inappropriate disclosures). 
134 See Pritchard, supra note 131, at 931-37 (describing fraud as a product of fear, 
greed, and “Pollyannaism”). 
135 See Lin Peng & Ailsa Röell, Executive Pay and Shareholder Litigation, 12 REV. FIN. 
141, 166, 170 (2008) (associating a high proportion of option payout with share-
BRATTON-WACHTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  6:02 PM 
2011] Fraud on the Market 107 
B.  The Penalty Alternative 
If fraud is a persistent problem imposing deadweight social costs, 
then the antifraud enforcement system arguably needs greater deter-
rent punch.  Redirecting enforcement away from companies and to-
ward individual perpetrators presents an obvious means of improve-
ment.  This solution would also move the system away from 
compensatory damages and enterprise liability toward individual pe-
nalties.  Unfortunately, no one seems able to chart a plausible course 
that takes us from here to there. 
A line of commentary going back at least to the American Law In-
stitute’s Federal Securities Code of 1978136 advocates substituting civil 
fines against individuals for out-of-pocket losses charged against cor-
porations.137  Depending on the size of the company and its level of 
executive pay, a fine capped at $5, $10, $20, or $30 million, or, alter-
natively, a fine set at a percentage of individual net worth, might be 
enough to rouse the scruples of a CEO or CFO.138 
 
price manipulation and showing upward manipulation of earnings reports during 
class periods). 
136 See FED. SEC. CODE § 1708(c) (1978) (proposing capped damages for both enti-
ty and managerial liability). 
137 See Langevoort, Capping Damages, supra note 13, at 657-60 (discussing the me-
rits of a method of quantitative caps on damages and its advantages over the out-of-
pocket standard). 
138 The shareholders derivative action has been suggested as a model that focuses 
on individual liability—it reverses enterprise liability by making the enterprise the 
plaintiff and restricts liability to culpable actors.  See Richard A. Booth, The Paulson Re-
port Reconsidered:  How to Fix Securities Litigation by Converting Class Actions into Issuer Ac-
tions, 2 J. SEC. L. REG. & COMPLIANCE 244, 247 (2009) (rejecting civil fines and propos-
ing derivative actions brought by shareholder plaintiffs to recover insiders’ ill-gotten 
gains); Fox, Civil Liability, supra note 1, at 284 (making damages “payable to the issuer”). 
 Other proposals for alternate damage calculation focus on the disgorgement of ill-
gotten insider gains.  See Adam C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-
Atlanta:  The Political Economy of Securities Class Action Reform, 2007-08 CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 217, 219 (2008) (proposing that “damages . . . be measured by disgorgement of 
unlawful gains”); Booth, supra, at 249 (proposing a disgorgement regime).  For a con-
trasting approach, see Fox, Civil Liability, supra note 1, at 284-86.  Fox calculates dam-
ages using the company’s newly acquired capital during a period of price inflation.  Id. 
at 285.  He would accordingly cap damages in any given year at the amount of capital 
invested by the company.  Id.  He would also eliminate enterprise liability and levy 
damages on officers, directors, and add an external certifier modeled on the underwri-
ter of a new issue of securities.  Id. at 286. 
 Specifically, assume that Corporation X had $100 million in total assets at the be-
ginning of the year, capitalized 50% with debt and 50% with equity.  X’s equity market 
capitalization was $80 million, comprised of 2 million common shares trading at $40 
per share.  Assume also that X invested $10 million of newly acquired capital during 
the year, and that its stock price was inflated by $10 due to material misstatements by 
BRATTON-WACHTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  6:02 PM 
108 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 69 
Even so, setting individual penalties poses a difficult, possibly intrac-
table, trade-off in a system that relies on a private-enforcement supple-
ment.  On the one hand, the penalties must generate a damage pool 
large enough to attract plaintiffs’ attorneys.  On the other hand, if the 
increased fines generate sufficient funds to attract private enforcers, 
then there may be an inadvertent restriction of private enterprise.  Dra-
conian penalties could chill corporate recruitment and risk-taking.139 
Once the possibility of a chill is acknowledged, enterprise liability 
emerges in a more positive light.140  It places the precautionary burden 
on the company141 and thus aligns incentives so as to minimize the 
possibility of a chill.  The company is risk neutral, whereas its individ-
ual agents are risk averse.  Excess caution due to the fear of securities 
 
its officers.  Fox would carve out the damage pool by dividing the amount invested, $10 
million, by the $40 stock price.  The quotient, here 250,000, is a block of “phantom 
shares.”  This number is multiplied by the stock-price inflation of $10 to yield a dam-
age pool of $2.5 million.   
 Now compare FOTM damages for the hypothetical Corporation X.  We can con-
struct a figure by stipulating that investors who bought shares during the period held 
either 1 million or 500,000 shares at the end of the class period, yielding a price infla-
tion of $10 million or $5 million.  Using these numbers, Fox’s damages are indeed 
lower.  The question is whether the number remains too large to impose on individual 
defendants without a risk of overdeterrence.  Given these numbers, this appears to be 
a problem.   
 We also question the assertion that earnings retained during a period of price in-
flation are actually ill-gotten gains.  This capital emanates from the sale of goods and 
services or other assets, not from the pockets of capital providers.  This capital certainly 
is not “free” with regard to calculation of the equity-capital cost.  Further, price infla-
tion could skew that calculation and cause the company to accept a suboptimal 
project.  It does not follow that the capital is ill-gotten for purposes of a market-
regulation regime. 
139 This is the same problem that besets the corporate law duty of care, a problem 
that has been resolved in favor of minimizing the penalty risk.  See PRINCIPLES OF 
CORP. GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c), cmt. c–f (1994) (minimizing the risk of penalty by 
creating a Business Judgment Rule that provides a number of safe harbors for direc-
tors and officers). 
140 Some take the view that a tradeoff cannot be effected successfully.  For exam-
ple, Professor Coffee proposes that we retain enterprise liability but tweak FOTM to 
incent plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring individual defendants to the settlement table as con-
tributors.  More particularly, he would offer a bounty in the form of a higher percen-
tage of attorneys’ fees to the extent of individual contributions and couple that with 
requirements of independent-director review of settlement fairness and full disclosure 
of settlement terms.  See Coffee, supra note 54, at 1575-82 (proposing a form of attor-
neys’ fees that varies based on the settlement source along with SEC-mandated inde-
pendent-director review of any proposed settlement). 
141 See Langevoort, Corporate Executives, supra note 13, at 635 (“The threat of enter-
prise liability essentially instructs the firm to take precautions . . . to reduce the system-
wide fraud risk.”). 
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law enforcement is more likely to be a problem where individuals are 
the primary enforcement targets.142 
We note an alternative possibility—substituting public enforce-
ment.  If the risk of a chill is serious, then setting fines arguably should 
not be a function of assuring an attractive rate of return on investment 
in private litigation.  Instead, a public body pursuing a policy outcome 
should set fines.  To the extent that these fines are too low to attract 
private enforcers, public enforcement should be the fallback option. 
C.  Institutional Constraints 
Once the overdeterrence problem has improved the appearance 
of enterprise liability, the next phase of the argument puts a positive 
gloss on private enforcement by comparing the public alternative—in 
particular, SEC enforcement.  In this story, the choice lies not be-
tween private and public enforcement, but between private enforce-
ment and no enforcement at all. 
The SEC does have an arsenal of enforcement weapons, including 
civil penalties, disgorgement of profits, bars on employment at public 
companies,143  and, under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-
Oxley),144 freezes on extraordinary payments from issuers145 and a 
 
142 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 91, at 643-44 (stating that if private losses 
were not compensable, people would have an incentive to take too many precautions); 
Langevoort, Corporate Executives, supra note 13, at 635 (explaining how “risk-fearing in-
dividual executives . . . might . . . be excessively cautious,” and therefore the risk-
neutral firm should undertake the task of implementing precautionary measures).  To 
put this a different way, targeting the firm rather than the individuals spreads the risk 
from managers to investors, who, given diversification, are better able to bear it.  Eas-
terbrook & Fischel, supra note 91, at 640-41.   
 It has also been argued that enterprise liability has a hidden positive incentive.  
Even though it deflects the blame from the culpable, it encourages monitoring by the 
outside directors and third-party gatekeepers.  These actors are in need of incentives to 
engage in stricter monitoring.  See Langevoort, Corporate Executives, supra note 13, at 
636 (discussing how outside directors will not be subject to temptation or cognitive bi-
as and therefore “will insist on rigorous monitoring and internal controls to avoid 
large-scale enterprise liability”).  By contrast, note that one possible gatekeeper, the 
liability insurer, has no place at this incentive table.  See Baker & Griffith, supra note 100, 
at 1808 (showing, empirically, that D&O insurers invest little in monitoring management 
and that their risk assessment and pricing structures send a weak deterrence signal).  
143 Langevoort, Corporate Executives, supra note 13, at 652-54. 
144 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 
28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
145 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1103, 15 U.S.C. § 78-u3(c) (2006); see also SEC v. Gemstar-
TV Guide Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that section 1103 
“would allow the SEC, during an investigation, to seek an order in Federal court im-
BRATTON-WACHTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  6:02 PM 
110 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 69 
compensation clawback triggered by accounting restatements.146  But, 
historically, the agency has not vigorously deployed these weapons 
against individual defendants. 
Indeed, SEC enforcement actions bear a more than passing re-
semblance to FOTM actions—the agency tends to settle with the en-
terprise funding the penalty rather than with the culpable individu-
als.147  Actors at the SEC are aware of the problem.  Since Enron, the 
regulators have been targeting more individuals,148 but the agency 
continues to face internal disagreement regarding individuals versus 
corporate contributions to settlements.149 
 
posing a 45-day freeze on extraordinary payments to corporate executives”) (quoting 
148 CONG. REC. S6545 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Trent Lott)). 
146 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (providing a statutory enforce-
ment mechanism for asset-forfeiture proceedings against noncompliant officers).  
The SEC recently initiated the first clawback case in which the targeted executive did 
not act culpably.  See SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1073 (D. Ariz. 2010) (“Sec-
tion 304 requires a CEO to reimburse an issuer even where the CEO committed no 
personal wrongdoing”). 
147 See Langevoort, Corporate Executives, supra note 13, at 654 (explaining that the 
SEC’s limited resources restrain the agency from pursuing more contentious enforce-
ment actions against individual executives).  Historically, even when individual fines 
are imposed, the settlements often permit the operation of indemnification agree-
ments between corporations and managers.  Chester S. Spatt, Chief Economist, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Staff:  “Penalties and Sanctions for Securities 
Fraud”:  Remarks Before the American Economic Association (Jan. 6, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch010607css.htm.  But SEC practice has 
changed, and individual defendants now must pay themselves.  See infra text accompany-
ing note 361. 
148 See Langevoort, Corporate Executives, supra note 13, at 628 (“Since 2002 especial-
ly, the SEC has clearly been more aggressive in seeking remedies against individual ex-
ecutives, and even companies themselves appear more willing to try to recoup pay-
ments they have made to dishonest managers.”).  The SEC has also taken steps to 
articulate its standards for determining when to target the enterprise rather than the 
individuals.  See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement of the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm.  This initiative did not, however, contri-
bute to more vigorous enforcement.  See infra notes 264-87 and accompanying text. 
149 Those pushing for individual liability have been in the minority.  See Kara 
Scannell, Clawbacks Divide SEC, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7-8, 2010, at B3 (describing Commis-
sioner Aguilar’s “threat not to vote on cases where he thinks the agency is too lax”).  
Meanwhile, a few courts have recently displayed dissatisfaction with lowball SEC en-
forcement settlements and the agency’s failure to pursue individuals.  See Jonathan 
Weil, Citigroup’s Sweetheart Deal Flunks Smell Test, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 18, 2010, 9:00 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-19/citigroup-s-sweetheart-deal-flunks-smell-
test-jonathan-weil.html (describing district judge’s demand for a brief from the SEC 
regarding the agency’s questionable treatment of Citibank). 
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More generally, the agency is described as chronically under-
funded and understaffed, and its existing staff is described as subject 
to high turnover.150  It is also seen as politically vulnerable.  If the SEC 
rouses itself and directs its enforcement power against culpable execu-
tives, management can use its influence in Congress to reduce the 
agency’s budget, thereby choking off the initiative.151  Some see private 
enforcement as a way around this problem, with the promise of high 
settlement payments assuring a continuous enforcement incentive.  
Plaintiffs’ law firms, moreover, are seen to possess superior economies 
of scale and scope along with a significant financial incentive.152  This 
is, in short, a classic “public versus private” debate in which private in-
centives trump clumsy, compromised public administration. 
D.  Empirical Results 
A stack of empirical studies confirms that FOTM actions have 
some deterrent impact.  These studies show that private securities liti-
gation magnifies the negative impact of bad news disclosures by add-
ing costs for both the enterprise and individual managers, implying a 
deterrent effect.  For example, FOTM defendants are more likely to 
replace their CEOs than are companies that suffer financial reversals 
but no lawsuits.153  It follows that a CEO interested in holding onto his 
 
150 See Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the “Expectations Gap” in Investor Protection:  
The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1139, 1140, 1156 
(2003) (“The United States has under-funded the hard work of investor protection, 
holding back from the system the resources it would take to substantially lessen the 
expectations gap, even if it can never be eliminated.”). 
151 See Fox, supra note 92, at 328 (describing the “fear that administrative officials 
might fail to prosecute apparently worthwhile individual cases because of pressure 
from wealthy or powerful individuals who would be negatively affected”). 
152 Id. at 329-30. 
153 See, e.g., Greg Niehaus & Greg Roth, Insider Trading, Equity Issues, and CEO Turn-
over in Firms Subject to Securities Class Action, 28 FIN. MGMT. 52, 53 (1999) (“[D]efendant 
firms experience a higher CEO turnover rate relative to matched firms that also expe-
rienced large stock price drops . . . [and] meritorious cases are more likely to result in 
CEO turnover.”); Philip Strahan, Securities Class Actions, Corporate Governance and Man-
agerial Agency Problems 3-4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Paper No. 9816, 1998), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/research_papers/9816.pdf (“While 
ownership structure and broad composition do not change after securities class ac-
tions, the likelihood of CEO turnover nearly doubles, and the increase is statistically 
significant.”).  Results in this literature, however, are mixed.  See Anup Agrawal, et al., 
Management Turnover and Governance Changes Following the Revelation of Fraud, 42 J.L. & 
ECON. 309, 332 (1999) (finding little systematic evidence that firms suspected of or 
charged with fraud have unusually high turnover of senior managers or directors). 
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job should avoid involvement with fraud, and that enterprise liability 
is not necessarily without individual consequences. 
Let us accept the point that FOTM actions have negative conse-
quences.  A follow-up question arises:  how salient is FOTM’s conse-
quential contribution?  The closer one looks, the less salient its profile. 
Ex ante, the primary deterrence mechanism for corporate man-
agers is the market—bad things happen to those who perform badly.  
CEO turnover is in the first instance associated with poor corporate 
performance,154 and poor performance by itself generates antifraud 
litigation.  As between the two, we suspect the performance incentive 
looms larger as a motivator for corporate decisionmakers.  Note that 
in many cases where an executive is fired following a FOTM com-
plaint, the board is also faced with the discovery of culpable fraud (in 
some cases accompanied by insider trading), an occurrence that 
should result in termination quite apart from the presence or absence 
of private litigation.  Culpability and termination go together.  When 
firms are faced with enforcement action by the SEC or the Depart-
ment of Justice, the termination statistics are overwhelming:  Karpoff, 
Lee, and Martin find that 93.4% of managers identified as culpable by 
government enforcers lose their jobs.155 
We accordingly look to FOTM for an incremental impact.  To get 
a better handle on this, consider a finding on reputational effects.156  
By hypothesis, if private lawsuits target badly governed companies, re-
putational damage to the defendant companies’ independent direc-
tors should follow.  But Eric Helland’s study, which substitutes num-
bers of directorships as a measure of reputation, shows no such 
effect—to the contrary, numbers of directorships increase for direc-
tors of companies accused of fraud.157  There is an important caveat:  
 
154 Cf. Jerold B. Warner et al., Stock Prices and Top Management Changes, 20 J. FIN. 
ECON. 461, 487-88 (1988) (investigating the “relation between a firm’s stock price per-
formance and subsequent changes in its top management”); Michael S. Weisbach, Out-
side Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 453 (1988) (examining relation-
ship between board composition and frequency of performance-based CEO turnover).  
155 Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresen-
tation, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 201 tbl.3 (2008). 
156 See Eric Helland, A Secondary Market Test of the Merits of Class Action Securities Liti-
gation:  Evidence from the Reputation of Corporate Directors 18 (Contracting & Orgs. Re-
search Inst., Working Paper No. 2004-05, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=517183 (examining the correlation between reputational penalties for direc-
tors and shareholder class actions). 
157 Id. at 18. 
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directors of companies in the top quartile of the sample in terms of 
settlement amount appear to incur reputational damage.158 
There are two implications.  First, private actions do not in them-
selves signal governance defalcation to the markets.  Second, big set-
tlement numbers do signal governance defalcation.  It seems, once 
again, that performance matters most, with litigation positioned in a 
secondary, follow-up role so far as negative consequences and the as-
sociated deterrent effect are concerned. 
Finally, consider a finding on stock prices.  Professors Ferris and 
Pritchard took a sample of defendant firms and found an average 
negative stock price reaction of approximately 25% on the corrective 
disclosure date.159  The prospect of FOTM litigation is one factor in 
the negative mix.  Realization of that prospect in the form of a com-
plaint being filed causes a further average stock price reduction of 
3.33%.160  And so we have another FOTM consequence, but not neces-
sarily one that adds to the case for its defense.  These figures show 
how enterprise liability worsens a bad corporate situation and injures 
innocent parties, even as it fails to focus on the responsible actors. 
FOTM actions also have positive effects.  There is evidence that 
defendant companies are more poorly governed—accounting fraud is 
associated with fewer outside directors,161 and better governance is as-
sociated with more informative disclosure practices.162  Litigation, in 
turn, is associated with governance improvement.  CEO turnover can 
 
158 Id. at 4.  Evidence is mixed with respect to directors of companies subject to 
SEC enforcement actions.  See id. at 21-22 (showing a strong negative impact with re-
spect to the largest companies). 
159 Stephen P. Ferris & A.C. Pritchard, Stock Price Reactions to Securities Fraud Class 
Actions Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 3 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., John 
M. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Paper No. 01-009, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=288216.  
160 Id. at 7. 
161 See generally Mark S. Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board 
of Directors Composition and Financial Statement Fraud, 71 ACCT. REV. 443, 445 (1996) 
(“[N]o-fraud firms have significantly . . . higher percentages of outside directors than 
fraud firms.”); Patricia M. Dechow et al., Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipula-
tion:  An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, 13 CONTEMP. ACCT. 
RES. 1, 21 (1996) (investigating the motives and consequences of earnings manipula-
tion in a sample of firms subject to SEC enforcement actions). 
162 See Saumya Mohan, Disclosure Quality and Its Effect on Litigation Risk 11 (Sept. 
1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=956499 
(“[I]ndependent banks . . . are associated with more informative disclosure levels.”). 
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herald improved management at a defendant company.  Defendant 
companies also tend to increase numbers of independent directors.163 
But an endogeneity question arises:  why might a defendant com-
pany add independent directors?  Litigation might have prompted it 
to see the benefits of following the good-governance playbook.  Alter-
natively, litigation itself might make it more convenient to bring in 
new outsiders lacking ties to the events in question who can take the 
lead in approving a settlement.164 
Consider another positive finding:  a company subject to securities 
litigation is highly unlikely to be subject to further securities litigation 
for the three years following the suit.165  Learning is implied—the 
company now takes compliance more seriously.  But other inferences 
can also be drawn.  Perhaps securities fraud tends to be one-off be-
cause the market learns from the experience.  Companies that ana-
lysts follow will find it difficult to sustain optimism in the face of dis-
appointments, and a single misstatement followed by a correction will 
alert the analysts to scrutinize future claims of success closely. 
Finally, if companies and executives do learn from their expe-
riences with FOTM, what exactly is the lesson?  Companies subject to 
shareholder litigation reduce the amount of information they reveal 
to the markets, particularly about future-earnings expectations.166  
Managers, it seems, learn that plaintiffs’ lawyers can base accusations 
of misconduct on management’s own voluntary disclosures.167  It fol-
lows that it is better to say less to avoid another lawsuit.  More general-
ly, the higher the firms’ litigation-risk profile, the lower the level of vo-
luntary disclosure.168 
 
163 See Stephen P. Ferris et al., Derivative Lawsuits as a Corporate Governance Mechan-
ism:  Empirical Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding Filings, 42 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 143, 161 (2007) (finding that with derivative lawsuits “the proportion of out-
side representation on the board of directors increases”). 
164 Cf. Helland, supra note 156, at 3-4 (pointing out that increased board diversity 
in the face of litigation is not always demonstrative of better corporate governance be-
cause independent directors may be brought on simply to inoculate the board from 
allegations of poor governance at trial). 
165 Kim & Skinner, supra note 59, at 23-24. 
166 Jonathan L. Rogers & Andrew Van Buskirk, Shareholder Litigation and Changes in 
Disclosure Behavior, 47 J. ACCT. & ECON. 136, 154 (2009). 
167 Id. 
168 See Stephen P. Baginski et al., The Effect of Legal Environment on Voluntary Disclo-
sure:  Evidence from Management Earnings Forecasts Issued in U.S. and Canadian Markets, 77 
ACCT. REV. 25, 48 (2002) (arguing that lower legal liability leads to more consistent 
voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecasts and noting this finding’s con-
sistency with earlier studies).  See generally Carol A. Frost & Grace Pownall, Accounting 
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E.  Evaluation 
The case for FOTM, thus stated, is more than a little contradicto-
ry.  It holds that FOTM’s effectiveness stems not from its own deter-
rent power, but rather from the SEC’s lack thereof.  Further, FOTM is 
considered a success because an enforcement regime that actually had 
deterrent power would have the perverse effect of chilling risk tak-
ing.169  Empirical studies confirm this view.  Thus, FOTM is desirable 
because a serious deterrent regime is unlikely and undesirable.  This 
is an odd argument for a case that begins with the proposition that 
fraud is underdeterred. 
If fraud is underdeterred, FOTM does little to solve the problem.  
So little, it seems, that the system has begun to evolve around FOTM.  
Consider three developments during the decade since Enron.  First, 
public antifraud enforcement has become a growth industry.  Crimi-
nal enforcement of the securities laws, once rare, is now institutiona-
lized in specialized corporate fraud task forces organized by the Jus-
tice Department.170  The Bush Administration’s team reported that it 
obtained almost 1300 convictions (including those of 200 CEOs) and 
 
Disclosure Practices in the United States and the United Kingdom, 32 J. ACCT. RES. 75, 76 
(1994) (comparing statement disclosure rates).  For a game theory model confirming 
the result of distorted incentives, see Joshua Ronen & Varda (Lewinstein) Yaari, Incen-
tives for Voluntary Disclosure, 5 J. FIN. MARKETS 349, 373 (2002). 
  There is a related question:  when there is bad news, should it be disclosed imme-
diately, and, if so, does that preempt litigation?  There is a large and somewhat contra-
dictory body of work addressing the timeliness of negative disclosures.  See Laura Field 
et al., Does Disclosure Deter or Trigger Litigation?, 39 J. ACCT. & ECON. 487, 506 (2005) 
(finding that firms with higher litigation risks are more likely to disclose earnings 
warnings and that disclosure deters rather than triggers litigation); Douglas J. Skinner, 
Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News?, 32 J. ACCT. RES. 38, 57 (1994) (arguing that 
managers have incentives to disclose negative earnings statements as a way to preempt 
bad quarterly earnings news due to litigation risk and to maintain goodwill within the 
investment community); see also Dain C. Donelson et al., The Timeliness of Earnings News 
and Litigation Risk 11-12 (McCombs Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. IROM-
08-10, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641342 (showing an association 
between timely disclosure and litigation reduction). 
169 See infra note 175. 
170 Anton R. Valukas et al., Enforcement Actions in the Post-Enron World:  Zero Tolerance 
in the White-Collar Arena, 37 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 133, 141 (2004), available at 
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s18News/RelatedDocuments147/1246/Valukas_Sta
uffer_Travis.pdf. 
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levied hundreds of millions of dollars in fines and restitution between 
2002 and 2008.171 
Second, corporations themselves have been deputized as antifraud 
enforcers.  Mandatory internal-compliance systems were added to the 
enforcement regime, imposed first by the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1977 (FCPA)172 and then more emphatically by the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act of 2002.173  These statutes take federal antifraud enforce-
ment deep inside corporations, mandating reports and management 
systems that assure companies’ legal compliance.174   These internal 
compliance systems require planning and design, staffing and execu-
tion, and monitoring and auditing.175 
Third, corporate employees (and others) are being rewarded for 
giving tips to the SEC about potential violations.  Section 922 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act charges the SEC with developing a new whistleblower 
program to enhance the agency’s capacity to detect fraud in ad-
vance.176  The program, which is up and running,177 holds out substan-
tial financial compensation for high quality tips. 178 
 
171 PRESIDENT’S CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT TO 
THE PRESIDENT, at iii-iv (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf/ 
corporate-fraud2008.pdf.  
172 Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.). 
173 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 
28, and 29 U.S.C.).  
174 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006) (requiring internal 
compliance systems and an annual audit by outside auditors).   
175 These systems are thought to be costly.  See Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Con-
trols After Sarbanes-Oxley:  Revisiting Corporate Law’s “Duty of Care as Responsibility for Sys-
tems,” 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 959-60 (2006) (describing some of the costs of internal com-
pliance systems, ranging from audit fees to less tangible costs, such as less employee 
risk taking); Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley:  The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 
404, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703, 734 (2007) (attributing a decrease in small companies’ 
IPOs at least in part to the high costs of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance). 
176 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank Act), § 21D(a)(3), (b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)(3), (b)(1) (West 2011) (di-
recting the SEC to reward original information leading to a successful enforcement ac-
tion with an amount between ten and thirty percent of the sanctions exacted). 
177 An Office of the Whistleblower has been established.  Securities Whistleblower 
Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 34363 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); see also Welcome to the Office of the Whistleblower, U.S. SEC. & EX-
CHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/whistleblower (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). 
178 Participants in compliance programs are not eligible.  See 17 C.F.R. 240.21F-
4(b)(4)(iii)(B) (2011) (excluding employees responsible for compliance and audits).  
But eligible employees are encouraged to work with the compliance office.  See 17 
C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(3), (b)(3) (2011) (requiring the SEC to take into account coop-
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These developments occurred at the extremes—at one end we see 
high-intensity deterrence through criminalization and, at the other, 
enforced and rewarded cooperation outside of the litigation system.  
One wonders whether a long-term reduction in the incidence of securi-
ties fraud will result, but it is too early to tell.  Scholars have written 
about the costs of Sarbanes-Oxley’s new regime,179 but we are aware of 
no significant scholarship on the benefits of increased compliance.  In-
terestingly, however, accounting restatements, the bedrock evidence for 
FOTM actions during most of the past decade, started to decline in 
2007.  In 2006, a total of 1564 companies filed restatements whereas in 
2009 the number was down to 630.180  Maybe something is working. 
Fraud deterrence is thought to reduce social costs because it pro-
tects the securities markets.  These markets—and, in particular, their 
liquidity—depend on a core of confidence that companies fairly dis-
close basic information about themselves.  Today’s markets are more 
liquid than ever, despite the ups, downs, and scandals of the last dec-
ade.181  So, even if we still must say that fraud is underdeterred, an 
adequate confidence level appears to have been maintained.  Mean-
while, our legal system for the most part (the exception being the re-
cent stepped-up threat of criminal liability) avoids imposing penalties 
on individual miscreants.  What, then, makes the system work? 
We return to basic market assumptions:  the reputation market 
and private governance both punish financial failure, whether or not 
accompanied by fraud, and can be expected to punish more severely 
when thus accompanied.  In addition, as financial markets are quick 
to learn, misrepresentations are costly even without enforcement pe-
nalties.  Optimistic reporting or hiding bad news in the hopes of res-
cue in better times is a risky strategy in an efficient market.  While a 
company can control its own information flow, it cannot control news 
coverage of market trends or information from competitors who cor-
rectly inform the market. 
 
eration or interference with the operation of the compliance system in determining 
the amount of the award). 
179 See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 175, at 734 (noting Sarbanes-Oxley’s negative ef-
fect on small-company IPOs). 
180 MARK CHEFFERS ET AL., AUDIT ANALYTICS, 2009 FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS:  A 
NINE YEAR COMPARISON 1 (2010). 
181 See James Angel et al., Equity Trading in the 21st Century 7-26 (Univ. of S. Cal. 
Marshall Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. FBE 09-10, 2010), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1584026 (identifying a variety of metrics for analyzing recent volatil-
ity in equity trading). 
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None of this makes legal enforcement irrelevant.  But between 
criminal enforcement initiatives, internal compliance regimes, liberal 
rewards to whistleblowers, and market controls, we emerge skeptical 
about the backstop case for FOTM.  If, despite all of the above, fraud 
remains underdeterred, then perhaps it is time to seek more potent 
enforcement alternatives.  The specter of overdeterrence rises in re-
sponse.  We offer two rejoinders.  First, despite the continued refrain 
of underdeterence, increased criminal prosecution in the post-Enron 
era already creates an overdeterrence risk.  Second, civil enforcement 
only implies this risk if left to private plaintiffs.  Fines must increase to 
entice the plaintiffs’ lawyers to court, but public enforcement creates 
no such risk. 
In sum, FOTM’s deterrent value is so uncertain and the individual 
enforcement alternatives so clearly superior that “deterrence” cannot 
be an adequate standalone justification.  Reviewing the deterrence 
case does not close the book in FOTM’s favor, but rather keeps it 
open for further inquiry.  If the best that can be said about FOTM is 
“it still doesn’t make any sense, but it’s all we have,” then something 
has gone very wrong. 
We undertake the inquiry into what went wrong in Part IV.  
There, we account for FOTM’s politically protected status, noting in 
particular shareholder interest’s rise to political salience.  Having thus 
diagnosed the political pathology that gives FOTM its aura of inevita-
bility, we make a reform suggestion in Part V.  Using shareholder pro-
tection for policy grounding, we show that the SEC’s civil enforcement 
arm is a more formidable operation than it once was and make a case 
for stepped-up SEC enforcement capability as a cost-effective substi-
tute for FOTM.  But before we embark on those discussions, we must 
evaluate one final line of justification for FOTM.  FOTM advocates 
have repackaged their causes of action as a means of improving cor-
porate governance.  Part III considers this claim. 
III.  FRAUD ON THE MARKET AS GOVERNANCE 
FOTM proponents, presumably reeling in the wake of the com-
pensation critique and apparently not content to rest their case on de-
terrence, pursue a new path to justification.  They claim that FOTM 
makes a positive governance contribution.  This Part evaluates that 
position, which rests on the idea that the governance system works 
well only if shareholders have the information needed to evaluate 
management.  While this is a fair point, it seems more to underscore 
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the importance of the mandatory-disclosure system than to support 
FOTM.  Indeed, the more closely we look at FOTM as a mechanism 
within the governance system, the more anomalous and dysfunctional 
it looks.  FOTM does not result in direct accountability for managerial 
failure; its consequences do not follow from the judgment of the 
shareholders as a group; and it causes stock prices to go down.  Other 
corporate-governance institutions admit of significant contractual in-
puts and hew to productivity concerns as they evolve over time.  Fed-
eral judges applying self-referential case law and members of Congress 
responding to interest groups shaped FOTM several stages removed 
from the productivity margin. 
Section A points out substantive implications of the shift in con-
ceptual framework from compensation and deterrence to corporate 
governance.  Section B lays out the governance case for FOTM and 
points out its shortcomings.  Section C shifts course and draws on a 
comparison to state fiduciary law to make a governance case against 
FOTM.  Section D summarizes. 
A.  The Governance Framework 
The governance defense of FOTM has roots in Professor Roma-
no’s early empirical study of shareholder litigation.  She found, as 
have subsequent studies, that shareholder litigation tends to affect 
weakly governed companies and concluded that litigation comple-
ments shareholder monitoring to align the interests of managers and 
shareholders.182  But she also concluded that shareholder litigation is 
mostly ineffective.183  Subsequent writers reversed her conclusion, 
pointing to better governance not just as an incidental consequence 
of shareholder litigation, but as a self-standing justification for it.184 
 
182 Romano, supra note 102, at 85 (finding that firms who are sued are more likely 
to have weak governance structures and noting that shareholder litigation has conse-
quences that help to align the interests of shareholders and managers). 
183 Id. at 84-85 (“The data support the conclusion that shareholder litigation is a 
weak, if not ineffective, instrument of corporate governance.”).  Note that this begin-
ning point establishes a functional connection without reference to federal securities 
case law.  There one encounters Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, in which the Supreme 
Court ruled that fraud within the meaning of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act does not 
include unfair transactions that violate state fiduciary duties.  430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977), 
184 See Fox, supra note 92, at 325-30 (defending the present system on a gover-
nance theory while also proposing a substitute litigation framework directed at indi-
vidual actors); Pritchard, supra note 131, at 937 (describing governance enhancement 
as central to the purpose of some antifraud litigation). 
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The transition from deterrence to governance necessarily brings a 
shift of perspective.  Where deterrence seeks accurate market prices to 
promote liquidity, governance redirects the view to the individual 
corporate issuer and seeks transparency as a means to achieve agency-
cost reduction.185  More particularly, transparency leads to better busi-
ness planning and execution because shareholder inputs are mea-
ningful only if business-policy issues can be accurately appraised from 
the outside.  The shift from market accuracy to agency-cost reduction 
also means a shift from one body of law and economics to another—
from the economics of sanctions and public law to agency-cost econom-
ics and private law.  Finally, we shift from seeking social-cost reduction 
and social-welfare maximization to maximizing individual firm value. 
Despite these shifts, the governance and deterrence frameworks 
converge at the bottom line.  We are still talking about deterring fraud, 
even as the end in view shifts to better governance.  Transparency, the 
governance objective, presupposes accurate market prices, which in 
turn are the objective of the deterrence justification.  At the same time, 
accurately priced markets tend to be liquid markets, and these two fac-
tors together lower the cost of capital for securities issuers.  The public 
goal of protecting the markets thus, in the end, seeks the same corpo-
rate-value maximization as the private-governance framework. 
There is no such convergence between “FOTM as governance” 
and “FOTM as compensation,” even though the theories share some 
conceptual affinities.  Shifting from deterrence to governance returns 
us to the private side of the public-private divide.  This is the same side 
 
 Implications from a line of empirical analysis may have added traction to the go-
vernance analysis.  These are multicountry studies that compare public enforcement, 
measured in terms of government agencies’ legal empowerment, against private en-
forcement, measured in terms of disclosure mandates and private liability standards.  
The private factors are associated with deep trading markets, dispersed ownership and 
numbers of initial public offerings (IPOs).  See Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Se-
curities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1, 23, 25 (2006) (examining the nexus between IPOs and se-
curities-fraud liability).  Any traction has dissipated in the wake of Jackson and Roe’s 
paper, supra note 1, at 207, which substitutes and compares the results of a test based 
on resource allocations to public enforcers.  Unsurprisingly, the association between 
market robustnesss and public-enforcement resources is stronger than that based on 
the private factors.  See id. (noting that public-enforcement resources are as closely as-
sociated with strong capital markets as is private disclosure and are more associated 
with strong markets than are other markers of private enforcement). 
185 See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1049 (1995) (discussing how mandatory disclosure has its origins in 
common law devices for agency-cost reduction).  The SEC went on to transform man-
datory disclosure to enhance accuracy in the markets such that the system now pursues 
both objectives.  Id. at 1048-50. 
BRATTON-WACHTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  6:02 PM 
2011] Fraud on the Market 121 
as the compensation justification, which also emphasizes the share-
holder interest.  But the presuppositions that motivate FOTM as com-
pensation are otherwise discarded.  The compensation theory’s goal is 
to get money into the pockets of particular shareholders, but a debili-
tating internal inconsistency results when FOTM allows other share-
holders to fund the payments.  The shift to governance largely solves 
this problem.186  Shareholders are expected to pay for corporate go-
vernance because it reduces agency costs and makes them better off.  
Of course, FOTM does not spread its costs evenly.  But where the dis-
tributional imbalance inherent in pocket shifting is an adverse result 
within the compensation framework, it is irrelevant within the gover-
nance framework so long as FOTM’s beneficial effects imply net posi-
tives across the board. 
B.  The Governance Case for FOTM 
What benefits does FOTM bring to the corporate governance sys-
tem?  The literature puts forward a two-part answer:  (1) FOTM forces 
transparency and facilitates monitoring to foster good governance, 
and (2) FOTM helps shareholders surmount the legal and collective-
action barriers to fulfill their role as principals in an agency relation-
ship with managers.  We consider each claim in turn. 
1.  FOTM and Transparency 
Proponents of FOTM as governance point out that the gover-
nance system—and in particular the shareholders’ roles therein—
depends on transparency to function properly.187  They then rest their 
case, implicitly relying on a crucial assumption—that FOTM is neces-
sary to achieve transparency.188  This assumption in turn follows from 
the deterrence case, namely that FOTM enhances transparency by de-
terring fraud.  Thus does the governance case collapse back into the 
deterrence case, shifting the emphasis without adding anything. 
In order to strengthen the case for FOTM, the governance justifi-
cation requires additional support.  Because the justificatory claim 
 
186 See Fox, supra note 92, at 327 (describing the cost of shareholder litigation as a 
“user fee” for investors). 
187 Fox, Civil Liability, supra note 1, at 253-57. 
188 See id. at 273 (noting that foreign governments concerned with transparency 
have increasingly adopted civil liability for corporate noncompliance). 
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concerns transparency, then, by hypothesis, FOTM actions must add 
something to the information available about the target company. 
We are hard pressed to detect a positive informational contribu-
tion.  FOTM actions are backward looking.  Attorneys construct them 
by connecting a corporate announcement that causes a decline in the 
stock price with a material anterior disclosure that has since been 
deemed inaccurate.  The lawsuit’s chance of success depends largely 
on the strength of the connection and the financial impact of the 
connected events, which is established by a statistical analysis of past 
stock prices.  Any prospective informational input comes from the 
signal the lawsuit sends about management quality. 
But how much information does a FOTM suit add?  The bad busi-
ness news is already on the table, as is the anterior disclosure.  De-
pending on the facts, the action may or may not highlight that the an-
terior disclosure amounted to a misstatement.  Often, as with acc-
ounting restatements, the existence of a prior misstatement will be 
part and parcel of the bad news.  In cases with a parallel SEC proceed-
ing, the private action may have no informational role to play at all.  
Finally, although some cases will highlight or add facts, cases without 
merit will also generate noise on the screen. 
As noted, any information developed in connection with a FOTM 
action will relate primarily to management quality, and this informa-
tion will presumably bear negatively on individual managers’ reputa-
tions.  But we have seen that it is not safe to assume that FOTM ac-
tions have negative reputational consequences for all implicated 
managers, but rather follow only for outside directors of the compa-
nies with the biggest losses.189  Given a significant loss, we wonder 
whether the negative message would register in the marketplace with 
or without a FOTM action. 
Overall we see little in the way of a supplemental informational con-
tribution.  This thin benefit must be weighed against the informational 
cost.  We have seen that companies experiencing a FOTM action seek 
to avoid future confrontations by decreasing their discretionary disclo-
sures.190  Overall, then, we see no positive contribution to transparency. 
This is not a surprise.  When problems arise concerning the quan-
tum and quality of information flowing to the markets, attention turns 
to the mandatory-disclosure system.  When an adjustment seems ne-
cessary, rulemaking processes go forward at the SEC and the Financial 
 
189 See supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text. 
190 See supra notes 166-74 and accompanying text.  
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Accounting Standards Board.191  These processes include inputs of in-
formation and expertise from interested parties.  Now compare 
FOTM as a source of disclosure mandates.  It yields case law on par-
ticular questions of truth, falsity, and materiality.  That case law results 
from encounters between litigating attorneys (plaintiffs’, defendants’, 
the SEC’s, and amici’s) and courts whose judges, for the most part, 
are composed of former government attorneys.192  While such encoun-
ters certainly may benefit from considered policy analysis, the deci-
sionmakers have no duty to consider or seek out such inputs.  Nor do 
they necessarily possess expertise respecting either the policy or the 
mechanics of future application by reporting companies. 
It is fortunate, then, that FOTM plays only a minor role in gene-
rating the terms of the mandatory-disclosure system. 
2.  FOTM and the Shareholder-Manager Agency Relationship 
 Professors Thompson and Sale describe a governance role for 
FOTM independent of its role as a mandatory-disclosure backstop.193  
They suggest that federal securities litigation occupies governance ter-
ritory that overlaps with the state law duty of care.194  They look to spe-
cific provisions of the mandatory-disclosure system to establish the 
overlap and show how its directives probe deeply into corporate deci-
sionmaking and risk-management processes.195  They then extend the 
overlap to shareholder antifraud litigation, making a series of charac-
terizations, all of which are fair:  (1) a shareholder action prompted 
by an accounting restatement involving earnings is an action based on 
a loss in corporate value stemming from mismanagement, and thus 
such an action is a proxy for a state law duty of care action;196 (2) a 
federal antifraud shareholder action, like a state law care action, ad-
 
191 William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance:  A New Look at the Fi-
nancial Accounting Standards Board, 48 B.C. L. REV. 5, 13-15, 22-24 (2007). 
192 See RUSSELL WHEELER, BROOKINGS INST., THE CHANGING FACE OF THE FEDER-
AL JUDICIARY 6-8 (2009) (noting a trend toward appointing lawyers from the public 
sector as judges). 
193 Thompson & Sale, supra note 60, at 872. 
194 See id. at 872-73 (“The [SEC] regulations are extensive and provide for disclo-
sures arguably designed to enforce what are basic state law fiduciary duties.”). 
195 See id. at 873-75 (explaining how, for example, one such regulation describes in 
detail what should be included in a company’s financial report). 
196 See id. at 887. 
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dresses the officers’ conduct of the business;197 and (3) a federal 
shareholder action implies that the officers’ stewardship of the com-
pany is not what the shareholders would want it to be.198 
The overlap, thus established, is descriptive and does not advance a 
justification for FOTM.  But Thompson and Sale go further, asserting 
that federal litigation enhances opportunities for shareholders to per-
form a direct “governance role”199 and hold officers accountable, in ef-
fect letting the shareholders assume the board of directors’s monitoring 
role.200   These stronger claims, if sustainable, carry normative traction. 
We think Thompson and Sale carry their point a step too far when 
they suggest that FOTM litigation lets shareholders realize untapped 
potential as agency principals who may bypass the board of directors 
and directly hold managers accountable.  A FOTM complaint by defi-
nition names at least one corporate director or officer.  But FOTM in 
practice almost never holds anyone to an individual admission of lia-
bility, much less individual accountability, because doing so decreases 
the action’s economic value to the plaintiffs’ attorneys.201  Any real ac-
countability, such as a CEO firing, is an incidental effect.  Whether the 
termination follows from the business failure itself, the board’s reac-
tion to the executive’s defalcation, the violation of the securities laws 
taken alone, or the violation taken together with the FOTM action, 
will depend on the case.  Our sense is that when boards remove CEOs, 
business failures loom larger than compliance defalcations. 
Suppose for a moment that FOTM actually works as Thompson 
and Sale describe and does provide a direct channel for shareholder 
participation in business decisions.  We doubt that it would be tole-
rated for long in that role.  Under FOTM, it is not the shareholders 
acting as a group who make decisions, as occurs when they exercise 
the franchise, but a plaintiffs’ lawyer subject to oversight by a named 
plaintiff (or group of named plaintiffs)202 and a federal judge.  This, 
 
197 See id. at 897 (“The federal cases focus on the failure of managers, principally 
officers, to fulfill their management obligations.”). 
198 See id. at 907 (asserting that shareholders institute a securities action “by com-
plaining about the difference in the price at which they bought . . . and the lower, ac-
tual value of the stock with which they are stuck”). 
199 Id. at 871. 
200 See id. at 888 (stating that in state-law fiduciary suits, shareholders often respond 
to managers’ decisions by “suing to limit the directors’ freedom to act or not to act”). 
201 See supra notes 121-31. 
202 For a discussion of governance questions arising within the class action context, 
see Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. 
CT. REV. 337, 340.  See also Richard Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State:  
BRATTON-WACHTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  6:02 PM 
2011] Fraud on the Market 125 
quite simply, is not an appropriate context for business decisionmak-
ing, including decisions on CEO tenure.  There is a lack of accounta-
bility.  When shareholder litigation is meritless or otherwise has per-
verse effects on the defendant corporation’s business, neither the 
named plaintiff, nor its attorneys, nor the judge need take responsibil-
ity.  Further, the informational environment is not conducive to busi-
ness decisionmaking. Litigators and judges have forensic expertise 
and focus on the past.  Value, in contrast, concerns the future. 
Finally, FOTM actions can result in new internal governance regu-
lations.  Settling defendants often implement governance improve-
ments, but these nonpecuniary settlement items can be distinguished 
from the effects of the lawsuit itself.203  These items operate prospec-
tively and presumably have the approval of a board of directors that is 
itself forward looking.  Even if named plaintiffs, their lawyers, and 
federal judges are not the ideal actors to generate corporate legisla-
tion, and even if a settlement table trading governance improvements 
for damages and attorneys’ fees is far from an ideal negotiating envi-
ronment, positive contributions can nonetheless be made. 
For us, the question presented concerns the place that nonpecu-
niary settlement terms take in the overall cost-benefit balance.  We 
suspect they carried greater weight thirty years ago when good-
governance practices were only setting out on the long road to institu-
tionalization.  It is different today.  Best practices are the subject of 
ongoing engagement between managers, directors, market interme-
diaries, institutional shareholders, and regulators.  The curve of self-
regulatory responsiveness has been sloping upward.204  There certainly 
is room for governance improvement incident to litigation shocks at 
poorly governed firms.  But an institution as costly as FOTM cannot 
 
Kalven and Rosenfeld Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 604 (2008) (discussing the chal-
lenges of class action settlement in the regulatory state).  The PSLRA supposes that size 
of shareholding should be the lead factor in determining the selection of an appropri-
ate lead plaintiff.  See PSLRA § 101(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2006) (“[T]he 
court shall adopt a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff in any private action 
arising under this chapter is the person or group of persons that . . . has the largest 
financial interest in the relief sought by the class.”); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, 
Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1109, 1155 (2011) (challenging the supposi-
tion on legitimacy grounds and advocating formation of broadly based groups of 
named plaintiffs).  
203 See Ferris et al., supra note 163, at 163 (discussing corporate governance im-
provements in the wake of litigation and settlement). 
204 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 73, at 675-88 (challenging the notion that 
shareholder empowerment will result in the reduction of agency costs). 
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possibly make sense as a generalized mechanism for the dispersion of 
best practices. 
C.  The Governance Case Against FOTM 
We noted above that nobody goes to court to procure disclosure 
rules that enhance transparency and hence improve governance.  But 
the corporate governance system does remit shareholders to court to 
enforce management fiduciary duties.  It follows that the state law fi-
duciary enforcement apparatus, which also involves going to court, 
provides a reference point from which to appraise FOTM’s role in 
corporate governance. 
State fiduciary law and the federal securities laws have numerous in-
terconnections.  For example, history’s first disclosure mandates were 
targeted at conflict-of-interest transactions and were promulgated to fa-
cilitate private enforcement of fiduciary law.205  Today, section 10(b)’s 
insider trading cases create a zone of prohibited self-dealing where state 
law hesitated to intervene.206  But insider trading is a zone of individual 
rather than enterprise liability, so it does not implicate FOTM’s policy 
problems.  The fiduciary territory closest to FOTM is the state law duty 
of care, as Thompson and Sale correctly point out.207  We differ from 
them, however, with respect to the comparison’s policy implications. 
The state law duty of care could easily be a venue for big-ticket liti-
gation, just like FOTM.  For that to be the case, business judgments 
gone wrong would need to be actionable on a res ipsa loquitor basis, with 
damages set as the economic loss to the corporation from the careless-
ly undertaken action.  Accountability would follow—state fiduciary du-
ties are enforceable through derivative actions and so directly target 
board members.  Thus hypothesized, the state law duty of care would 
be considerably more threatening to business people than is FOTM. 
But, of course, the duty of care is anything but threatening be-
cause state law has sought to ensure that business judgments gone 
 
205 See Mahoney, supra note 185, at 1089 (arguing that “the alleviation of agency 
problems . . . [was] identified as an indirect benefit of the ‘full disclosure’ philosophy”). 
206 See Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts:  The Ideology and Practice of 
Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1321-30 (1999) (describing the Su-
preme Court’s insider trading jurisprudence in fiduciary terms);  cf. Santa Fe Indus. v. 
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977) (cutting off access to section 10(b) as an avenue 
for direct enforcement of the state law duty of loyalty).   
207 See supra notes 194-08 and accompanying text. 
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wrong do not become actionable as a function of hindsight.208  So nar-
row is the duty of care’s formulation that it was once fashionable to 
propose its abolition on the ground of sheer irrelevance.209  But that 
was before the Delaware Supreme Court departed from tradition in 
Smith v. Van Gorkom to use the duty’s traditional formulation to hold a 
board of directors liable for a hastily approved merger.210  Van Gorkom, 
by signaling that the duty of care could be plaintiff-friendly, led to its 
de facto abolition.  The Delaware legislature responded to dissatisfac-
tion with the decision by adding section 102(b)(7) to Delaware’s cor-
porate code, permitting corporations to opt out of the duty of care in 
their charters (but not the duties of loyalty and good faith).211  By now, 
most large corporations have done so.212 
The comparison to FOTM is telling.  Where federal courts parrot-
ing the phrase “investor protection” expand liability without much 
concern for the impact on business decisionmaking and operations, 
state courts do concern themselves with business operations and 
shape fiduciary law accordingly.  Their scrupulousness follows from 
charter competition:  any state that fails to be scrupulous loses its large 
incorporations,213 with Delaware being the only state with large stakes 
in the game.  An element of contractual consent thereby enters into 
the relationship of the regulator and the regulated,214 an element 
 
208 See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (explaining that “liability is 
rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers simply for bad judgment”). 
209 See Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Go-
vernance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 937 (1983) (“[V]ery little of any value would be 
lost by outright abolition of the legal duty of care and its accompanying threat of a law-
suit.”); Elliott J. Weiss, Economic Analysis, Corporate Law, and the ALI Corporate Governance 
Project, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1984) (arguing against the duty of care on the 
grounds that individual directors are assumed to give considerable thought to each 
business decision, thus rendering them invulnerable to suit). 
210 See 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (holding that “[i]n carrying out their mana-
gerial roles, directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation 
and its shareholders” and that the board of directors had failed to uphold such duty). 
211 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 2010). 
212 See Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties:  The Focus on Loyalty, 11 
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 675, 692 (2009) (“After section 102(b)(7) was enacted, the sharehold-
ers of almost all Delaware corporations approved charter amendments containing 
these exculpatory provisions . . . .”). 
213 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of 
Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 626-31 (2006) (outlining New Jer-
sey’s fall from being the jurisdiction of choice for American corporations). 
214 See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 130 (1993) 
(“[T]he powerful dynamic of state competition ensures that provisions perceived to 
increase share value are enacted over time.”). 
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largely absent in the federal securities context.  With the 102(b)(7) 
opt-out, explicit consent enters the state law picture, and corpora-
tions—with their shareholders’ approval—have decided that the ben-
efits of care-based litigation are not worth the costs. 
The state law comparison thus raises the question of opting out of 
FOTM.  The issue follows inevitably from the invocation of corporate 
governance as an evaluative framework.  Governance, as we noted 
above, moves the discussion to the private side of the public-private 
divide to focus on agency-cost reduction.  Agency-cost reduction, in 
turn, is predominantly a contractual exercise.  In their classic work, 
Professors Jensen and Meckling depicted agency-cost reduction as a 
dynamic contracting process in which both managers and sharehold-
ers address agency costs over time, in the managers’ case by bonding 
their fidelity, and in the shareholders’ case by monitoring their in-
vestments.215  If agency costs remain unaddressed, it is because it is too 
costly for the parties to remove themselves.  The result that follows for 
corporate governance is that, as new agency costs appear, the system 
will find ways to reduce them, even as residual agency costs will persist 
in the wake of the system’s adjustments.216  If the actors in the govern-
ance system do not find FOTM costs beneficial, then they should be 
free to contract around FOTM, just as they contract around the duty 
of care and into lower agency costs. 
The objection to this line of reasoning is that fraud is different.  
The agency model depicts endogenous contractual adjustments within 
a system to which fraud is exogenous.  In the model, agency-cost re-
duction follows from management bonding and shareholder monitor-
ing.217  When managers do not tell the truth, it disables the sharehold-
ers’ monitoring function (even as nothing prevents a manager from 
bonding himself to tell the truth).  Thus, agency-cost reduction pre-
supposes disclosure mandates and fraud enforcers. 
Assume that this argument is correct, and that fraud is exogenous 
to the agency model and requires mandatory suppression.  It does 
not necessarily follow that FOTM also must be mandatory, for with-
 
215 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Beha-
vior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 312-30 (1976). 
216 We have argued elsewhere that the corporate governance system has indeed 
evolved dynamically over the past several decades to reduce agency costs substantially, 
making a series of endogenous adjustments to agency-cost control both in boardrooms 
and in financial markets.  See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 73, at 675-88. 
217 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 215, at 308-09. 
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out it, we would still have an extensive public apparatus to enforce 
disclosure mandates. 
Let us then go forward to a thought experiment in opting out.  
Suppose Congress enacted a statute (or the SEC promulgated a rule) 
that put FOTM up for a yea-or-nay vote at every publicly traded com-
pany.218  A nay would mean that in any future section 10(b) action 
respecting a disclosure or failure to disclose by a nontrading company 
or company actor, the plaintiff would be required to show actual re-
liance.  Because FOTM is a creature of federal law, a federal law pre-
sumably could give effect to a shareholder opt-out resolution without 
ancillary complications concerning placement in corporate charters 
or bylaws.219 
We would structure this company-by-company plebiscite to preci-
pitate maximum focus within the shareholder community on the cost-
benefit question presented.  We would thus delay a vote until the 
second proxy season after enactment to allow institutional investors 
adequate time to formulate their policy views.  To minimize the risk of 
perverse effects, no company would be locked into the result 
reached.220  Prospectively, all companies would be free to opt in or out 
of FOTM in the future, with shared agenda control—either a share-
holder proposal under Rule 14a-8 or a management proposal would 
put the issue to the shareholders. 
It is hard to see what objections could be raised against this ar-
rangement, given the assumption that FOTM is a corporate-
governance device on the private side of the public-private divide.  
The best objection we can conceive is the one we have raised else-
 
218 We are not the first to discuss opting out in connection with FOTM.  Pritchard 
argued that shareholders should make a partial waiver of the FOTM reliance presump-
tion to deprive wrongdoers of any benefit under Rule 10b-5.  See Pritchard, supra note 
138, at 247-55.  However, our thought experiment puts the matter in a framework that 
advances the policy discussion.   
 Meanwhile, Professor Pritchard has put forward opting out of FOTM as a share-
holder proposal proponent at Alaska Air.  Alaska Air sought permission to exclude the 
proposal, and the SEC staff responded with a no-action letter.  See Alaska Air Group, 
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 916161, at *2 (Mar. 11, 2011) (stating that the 
SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance would not recommend enforcement against 
Alaska Air for omitting the proposal from its proxy materials).   
219 A shareholder resolution that the board of directors did not first approve would 
not conform to Delaware’s requirements for a charter amendment.  DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit.8, § 242 (Supp. 2010).  It could, if necessary, be characterized as a shareholder bylaw.   
220 Cf. Fox, supra note 92, at 316 (noting that a contractual disclosure regime es-
tablished at the time of an IPO could not guarantee credible disclosure for the life of 
a firm). 
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where against shareholder empowerment with respect to business po-
licymaking—that the shareholders, due to information asymmetries, 
are incapable of competently exercising the franchise.221  But we think 
the cases are distinguishable.  A shareholder power to opt into control 
over business policy would have immediate negative consequences.  
The very threat of intervention would cause management to cater to 
the stock’s market price in formulating and executing the business 
plan.  Perverse effects could follow.222  With FOTM, any connection to 
business policymaking is indirect, and information asymmetries 
present less of a problem.  It is true that shareholders at a particular 
company could vote against FOTM, only to discover later that fraud 
had been brewing even as they took a fraud-enforcement device off 
the table.  But we would expect them to anticipate that possibility 
when voting.  To the extent they deem FOTM to have robust compen-
satory, deterrent, or governance properties, they should vote yea.  If 
not, they should vote nay, whether or not a fraud was brewing. 
Mandating an across-the-board vote at every company could be 
controversial.  The section 102(b)(7) precedent, by vesting the opt 
out in the corporate charter, puts the decision in management’s 
hands, subject to a ratifying shareholder vote.  It can be argued that 
the same should be done here.  If a given management is happy to 
remain subject to FOTM actions, why should we disturb the status 
quo?  There are three answers. 
First, an economy-wide referendum only becomes possible once 
we shift from the state to the federal context.  Any state law precedent 
is indirect.  Second, because the policy questions surrounding FOTM 
concern the trading market and implicate shareholder interests across 
the board, it follows that solicitation of an across-the-board response is 
an appropriate reaction to the problem.  Third, an across-the-board 
approach keeps the informational screen as clear of noise as possible.  
Leaving the motion to management muddies the water with questions 
about positive or negative signals of the particular managers’ fidelity 
 
221 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 73 , at 696-705 (discussing the importance of 
managers due to the information asymmetries of shareholders).  For a strange twist on 
FOTM and shareholder empowerment, see COMM. ON CAP. MARKETS REG., INTERIM 
REPORT 16 (2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_ 
Interim_ReportREV2.pdf, which suggests that greater shareholder empowerment 
means stronger market discipline and diminished reliance on litigation as a gover-
nance supplement. 
222 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 73, at 698-703 (arguing that information 
asymmetries may negatively affect IPO pricing, financing choices, and corporate in-
vestment policy). 
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to the mandatory-disclosure regime.223  Alternatively, a given manage-
ment might hesitate to present the question for fear that a negative 
shareholder response might destabilize its position.  In this regard, 
note that the grounds for contractual modification of FOTM already 
may exist.  The strongest such case applies to contractually mandated 
arbitration, which has been validated elsewhere under the 1934 Act by 
the Supreme Court.224  Alternatively, companies may have the power 
to waive their shareholders’ right to bring class actions.225  Yet we are 
not aware, under either alternative, of any management generated 
opt-out experiments indicating hesitation on management’s part. 
We see no ancillary process or informational problems.  If the 
shareholder community, on reflection, concludes that FOTM is bene-
ficial, it can be expected to vote yea, just as it does year after year on 
the nay side with respect to the vast majority of shareholder proposals.226  
A question arises:  might the shareholders vote nay, expecting public 
enforcers to pick up any resulting slack and thereby externalizing the 
 
223 See Ian Ayres, Back to Basics:  Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 
VA. L. REV. 945, 954-56 (1991) (providing a default rule analysis of mandatory disclo-
sure and FOTM, highlighting the range of possible corporate preferences).  
224 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485-86 
(1989) (holding claims under the 1933 Act to be arbitrable); Shearson/Am. Express, 
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987) (holding 1934 Act claims to be arbitrable 
and not barred by section 29’s invalidation of waivers of compliance); see also John C. 
Coffee, Jr., No Exit?:  Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special 
Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919, 954 (1988) (suggesting that some 10b-5 actions 
could be precluded by an agreement to arbitrate set out in the charter).  An SEC rule 
barring arbitration of class action claims stands in the way, however.  Order Approving 
Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions from Arbitration 
Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg. 52,659, 52,660 (Nov. 4, 1992).  For an extended discussion, 
see Bradley J. Bondi, Facilitating Economic Recovery and Sustainable Growth Through Reform 
of the Securities Class-Action System:  Exploring Arbitration as an Alternative to Litigation, 33 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 607, 635 (2010). 
225 See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability:  The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the 
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 424 (2005) (exploring possibilities for prec-
lusion of class actions through collective-action waivers).  Professor Pritchard extends 
the point, suggesting that companies include a partial waiver of the FOTM reliance 
presumption in their charters.  See Pritchard, supra note 138, at 248-51 (suggesting 
changes to the damages provision).  Under this theory, reliance on FOTM would limit 
recoverable damages to profit disgorgement; a party establishing actual reliance could 
request out-of-pocket losses.  Id.  Pritchard acknowledges that a bar to waivers of com-
pliance in section 29 of the 1934 Act might amount to a barrier.  Id. at 252. 
226 See Doron Levit & Nadya Malenko, Non-Binding Voting for Shareholder Proposals, 
66 J. FIN. 1579, 1579-80 (2011) (reporting that even despite a recent increase in sup-
port for shareholder proposals, the percentage of proposals receiving a majority vote 
stood at only 21.2% in 2006). 
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cost of enforcement to the taxpayers?  The answer is no.  We will see in 
Part V that the shareholders also pay for public enforcement. 
Should the shareholders vote nay, we would go forward with a 
conditional experiment on antifraud enforcement.  Say, for example, 
that the shareholders vote nay, but then have second thoughts after 
public enforcement capability is cut back.  Today’s institutional 
shareholders are coordinated enough to bring back FOTM in a single 
proxy season.  At the same time, we note that voting nay might jolt the 
SEC and Congress into a beneficial reassessment of the resources de-
voted to public enforcement. 
If the plebiscite yielded a separating equilibrium, with some com-
panies or some industries opting in and while others opted out, creat-
ing dynamic change over time, we presumably would benefit from an 
information-enriched environment that teaches us something about the 
benefits and costs of different modes of fraud enforcement.  Share-
holder confusion would not be problem; FOTM status would be easily 
ascertained, alongside the P/E ratio and the state of incorporation, on 
shareholder information services like Bloomberg, Yahoo, or Hoover’s. 
If our thought experiment is reasonable, there is little basis on 
which to defend FOTM in its present, mandatory posture as a corpo-
rate governance institution. 
D.  Fraud on the Market and the Mandatory-Disclosure System 
Our opting-out discussion avoids the approach to mandatory-
enabling issues that prevails in the securities regulation literature.  In 
the securities context, contractual choice tends to be seen as a mono-
lithic proposition with mandatory disclosure and a private right of ac-
tion on the one hand, and a complete absence of federal mandates 
on the other.  We suspect that FOTM incidentally benefits from this 
either/or situation.  The minority of commentators who would elimi-
nate FOTM advocate a broader rollback of federal securities laws and 
the existing mandatory-disclosure system.  They project a contractual 
big bang, with regulation of disclosure remitted to market intermedia-
ries227 toward the end of dynamic, responsive, contractual governance.  
 
227 See Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers:  A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 279, 315-18 (2000) (arguing for a deregulation of securities markets that 
could lead to the elimination of most significant federal regulation); Paul G. Mahoney, 
The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1457-62 (1997) (providing arguments in 
favor of regulatory competition); see also Pritchard, supra note 138, at 247-49 (advocat-
ing that shareholders at least partially opt out of the FOTM presumption). 
BRATTON-WACHTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  6:02 PM 
2011] Fraud on the Market 133 
Recent defenses of FOTM give us a mirror-image view.  FOTM propo-
nents frame their case as a follow-up to a defense of the mandatory-
disclosure system.228 
The either/or is not useful and is a sticking point; the issues are 
layered and separable.  The narrowest question, the one we address 
here, is whether FOTM makes sense as the formulation of the reliance 
requirement in private antifraud suits, assuming a judicially implied 
private right of action exists.  Addressing this question requires taking 
up a related question regarding the role private litigation plays in se-
curities law enforcement.  But it does not require us to confront the 
desirability of the mandatory-disclosure regime.  We here assume a 
positive answer to that question, leaving the global question of con-
tract versus mandate to another day. 
IV.  POLITICS AND LEGITIMACY 
We have pursued three policy justifications for FOTM without get-
ting a favorable result.  Policy vacuity does not necessarily imply politi-
cal vulnerability, however.  Indeed, Congress once considered elimi-
nating FOTM and decided against it.  One of the PSLRA’s 
predecessor bills, the Securities Litigation Reform Act,229 would have 
imposed an actual reliance requirement on private securities plain-
tiffs, along with a “loser pays” rule for attorneys’ fees230 and elimina-
tion of liability for recklessness.231  The provisions were dropped be-
fore the bill was reported out of committee, apparently in response to 
objections raised by Arthur Levitt, then the chairman of the SEC.232  
An inference arises:  FOTM enjoys a shield of legitimacy even in ad-
verse political climates.  This Part looks into the sources of this politi-
cal credibility and identifies residual problems that could, given a 
conducive political climate, occasion further legislative constraints. 
Section A connects FOTM to the politics of management accoun-
tability.  FOTM has political legitimacy because managers are empo-
 
228 See Fox, Civil Liability, supra note 1, at 252-68 (advocating continued mandatory 
disclosure and addressing civil liability in the mandatory regime); Zohar Goshen & 
Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Litigation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 719, 
766-71 (2006) (voicing support for FOTM theory, even in inefficient markets). 
229 See H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing amendments to several federal lia-
bility laws). 
230 Id. § 203. 
231 Id. § 204. 
232 John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform:  The Long and Winding Road to the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 348-49 (1996). 
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wered actors in society and in the economy, and FOTM holds out a 
means by which to challenge business decisions gone wrong.  Its 
promise to enforce the law against fraudsters strengthens the case.  
Section B shows how FOTM, with its putative goal of shareholder 
compensation, also benefits from shareholders’ emergence as a politi-
cally salient interest group.  That a different enforcement mode might 
more effectively challenge management decisions, hold fraudsters ac-
countable, or protect the shareholder interest makes FOTM contesta-
ble without denuding it of political legitimacy.  Section C turns to the 
contrary political agenda.  Management went to Congress to make 
class action lawyers’ lives harder with the PSLRA and stands ready to 
lobby again for further constraints.  Outright abolition of FOTM, 
however, is not on any of the current wish lists.  This suggests a cu-
rious alignment of interests between management and the plaintiffs’ 
bar.  For managers, an inconvenient but ineffectual enforcement tool 
may be better suited than any politically plausible alternative regime, 
particularly a regime directed to enforcement against individuals ra-
ther than companies. 
A.  Management Accountability 
Corporate law, ever since Berle and Means, has depicted managers 
as private actors who wield considerable social and economic power in 
society without being subject to accountability constraints comparable 
to those imposed on public actors.233  Policy debates have focused ever 
since on appropriate modes of public and private constraint. 
The intensity of the debates waxes and wanes with the health of 
the economy.  When companies produce successfully, and the econ-
omy grows, so does management’s legitimacy.  Thus a buoyant stock 
market cleared the way for the PSLRA.234  On the other hand, eco-
nomic reversals trigger new demands for accountability.235  The FCPA, 
Sarbanes-Oxley, and, most recently, the Dodd-Frank Act each ad-
 
233 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 249 (1933); see also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, 
Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins:  Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. 
CORP. L. 99, 118-22, 147-50 (2008) (summarizing Berle’s theories and the evolution of 
those theories today). 
234 See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 213, at 672 fig.VII (illustrating the correla-
tion between the growth of the stock market and the enactment of the PLSRA and 
other related statutes). 
235 See id. at 661-69 (describing the new legislation passed as a result of the Water-
gate and Enron scandals). 
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dressed such downside demands.  The federal securities laws did also; 
according to a “creation story” told at the SEC, the 1933 and 1934 Acts 
responded to market failure and the need to defuse “public resent-
ment of economic privilege” in the midst of the Depression.236  Note 
that the story asserts a common interest between managers and securi-
ties law enforcers:  when enforcers hold managers accountable, they 
do so for the sake of preserving a system that empowers the managers 
in the first place. 
The SEC creation story, with its emphasis on the social settlement 
and its overtones of class warfare, is nicely suited to the plaintiffs’ bar.  
Securities class actions allow upstart lawyers to pursue and bring down 
the social structure’s top dogs.  The class warfare story is dated, but it 
still resonates, if only because a subgroup of corporate actors abuses 
its position and perpetrates fraud, while its members line their own 
pockets.237  The abuse of position account also circulated at the time 
the securities laws were enacted, but as a point of criticism.  William 
Douglas, then a Yale law professor, described the shortcomings of the 
about-to-be-enacted federal securities statute in an article in the Har-
vard Law Review.238  He described the scandals that had come to light 
in the aftermath of the Great Crash of 1929, variously involving secret 
loans, undisclosed profit-sharing plans, self-dealing contracts, and in-
sider trading.239  Mandatory-disclosure rules, he argued, would not be 
enough to prevent the repeat of such sorry spectacles in the next cyc-
lical market rise.240  Justice Douglas has been proven correct again and 
again, and the securities law regime has been adjusted repeatedly to 
deal with the problem.  FOTM is one of those adjustments. 
More generally, even in our market-oriented, deregulatory age, 
private economic and social empowerment generates demands for rec-
 
236 Langevoort, supra note 206, at 1329. 
237 See Cary Coglianese, Legitimacy and Corporate Governance, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 159, 
160 (2007) (“[C]orporate managerial power . . . can be used to satiate the self-
interested thirst of greedy CEOs at the expense of shareholders.”).  Management greed 
and manipulation are standard themes in the literature of FOTM defense.  See, e.g., James 
C. Spindler, Why Shareholders Want Their CEOs to Lie More After Dura Pharmaceuticals, 95 
GEO. L.J. 653, 691 (2007) (showing how defendants can circumvent the loss-causation 
requirement to cover up fraud by simultaneously disclosing positive results). 
238 See William O. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1329-
34 (1934) (noting that the upcoming legislation was a step in the right direction but 
that it was still a “task half done”).  
239 Id. at 1306. 
240 Id. 
BRATTON-WACHTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  6:02 PM 
136 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 69 
titude and accountability.241  Private antifraud litigation addresses this 
demand.  That its upstart private attack dogs never go for the top dogs’ 
jugulars does not seem to matter; the performative value is there.242 
All of this teaches an important lesson:  it is corporate managers 
themselves who keep the game going for FOTM.  They do so partly by 
virtue of their structural position, and, to this extent, they are not to 
blame.  But they also do so partly by virtue of the actions of the subset 
of miscreants in their group.  To this extent, FOTM is their own fault. 
Ironically, managers also can be seen as incidental beneficiaries of 
FOTM.  When fraud and misuse of corporate authority trigger policy 
questions, progressives look for ex ante regulatory responses that dis-
empower managers generally by constraining business judgments and 
reducing rents.243  Conservative politicians and administrators, in con-
trast, prefer to redirect political demands against management to 
tougher enforcement of existing regulations.  The redirection averts 
substantive regulation that would constrain discretion in business poli-
cymaking.244  FOTM, by combining a show of enforcement and a li-
mited threat of disruption, contributes to the deregulatory equilibrium. 
B.  Shareholder Solicitude 
Shareholder solicitude occupies the other side of FOTM’s politi-
cal coin.  It is wrought into the structure of antifraud litigation as the 
“right” in the private right of action.  Then–SEC Chairman Harold 
Williams described the private enforcement function in 1979:  “Private 
actions, brought by aggrieved individuals to protect their own rights, 
supplement the Commission’s own enforcement program, and signifi-
cantly increase the likelihood that securities law violations will be chal-
 
241 See also Coglianese, supra note 237, at 160-61 (questioning corporations’ legiti-
macy, namely, their integrity and trustworthiness, in the face of the immense power 
they wield); cf. Douglas, supra note 238, at 1327-28 (outlining potential reforms that 
would better protect investors). 
242 For a contrasting discussion of private securities litigation and management 
accountability, which looks to justification rather than description, see Elizabeth 
Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 
63, 99-106 (2008). 
243 See Langevoort, supra note 150, at 1142 (“To the progressive, Enron is a story 
about arrogance and abuse, and a call for wide-ranging reforms designed to reduce the 
rents from corporate stewardship.”); see also Coglianese, supra note 237, at 161-62 (dis-
tinguishing between corporate regulation, which is imposed by the government, and 
corporate governance, which includes internal board procedures).  
244 See Langevoort, supra note 150, at 1141-42 (describing the viewpoints of both 
conservatives and progressives). 
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lenged and corrected.”245  Here the “right” is not merely the means to 
the end of a policy goal—it is a substantive entitlement in itself. 
Shareholder solicitude, thus embedded in the tort, only recently 
began gaining political traction.  Before then, the shareholder interest 
was seen as distinct from the public interest.  Another look at Adolf 
Berle illustrates this viewpoint.  Berle believed that management pow-
er should be contained to promote the public interest.  He simulta-
neously promoted a model of corporate governance built around a 
shareholder trust,246 which was calculated to limit management self-
dealing.  But Berle also drew a sharp distinction between the share-
holder interest and the public interest:  shareholder welfare could be 
a proxy for social welfare only when shares were equitably distributed 
among the public as a whole.247  That was not the case then, nor is it 
the case now. 
The FCPA, enacted in 1977,248 holds out a legislative (and politi-
cal) example of separation between shareholder and public interests.  
The FCPA, like Sarbanes-Oxley, responded to political demands for 
management accountability following a series of high-profile scandals.  
In the FCPA’s case, the scandals were “questionable foreign payments” 
made by corporations to actors abroad in connection with the sale of 
big-ticket American products—payments discovered incidentally in 
the course of the Watergate investigation.249  The public response cast 
managers as irresponsible public actors:  corporate corruption was 
 
245 44 SEC ANN. REP., at vii (1978), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/annual_ 
report/1978.pdf. 
246 See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 233, at 248 (paraphrasing an underlying thesis 
of corporate law, namely that “all powers granted to a corporation or to the manage-
ment of a corporation, or to any group within the corporation, whether derived from 
statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the rata-
ble benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears”). 
247 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 233, at 142-43. 
248 Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.). 
249 See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The 
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 79, 86-87 (2005) (chronicling the history of the FCPA).  During the Watergate in-
vestigations of 1973–1974, the special prosecutor discovered corporate political slush 
funds that evaded normal accounting controls.  See GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE 
WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 63 (1982).  The SEC announced a 
voluntary disclosure program, and admissions by over 300 companies resulted.  See Da-
niel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private Right of Action, 82 
CALIF. L. REV. 185, 187-188 (1994).  It was the Watergate era, and the public demanded 
a cleanup of corporate corruption.  See, e.g., DONALD R. CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 5 (1999). 
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unacceptable, even if it occurred abroad in pursuit of shareholder 
value at home.  Given a public willing to impose new ethical standards 
on managers at the expense of shareholders, Congress imposed re-
sponsibility by law.250 
Sarbanes-Oxley admits of a similar reading.  Professor Langevoort 
points out that even as Sarbanes-Oxley is nominally investor protec-
tive, it accords the shareholders no new powers.  Instead, it imposes 
good-governance constraints on businesses with an eye toward dulling 
overly sharp incentives and keeping corporate risk taking within so-
cially acceptable limits.251  Viewed this way, Sarbanes-Oxley is no more 
about shareholder value maximization than was the FCPA.  Like the 
FCPA, it imposes public accountability on large corporations to create 
public legitimacy.252 
But, unlike the FCPA, Sarbanes-Oxley was prompted by scandals 
unrelated to elected officials, scandals instead tied to spectacular 
losses at a number of large enterprises.253  These shareholder losses 
figured into the political motivation.  Stock ownership had become 
more widespread between 1977 and 2002, albeit collectivized in the 
form of pension and mutual fund interests.  Politicians, moreover, 
had begun to cater to the “Investor Class”254 and to promote an “own-
ership society”255 in which individually vested pension savings figured 
importantly.  So when Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley, even though 
retail investors viewed as an interest group continued to have little in-
fluence,256 the shareholder qua shareholder had edged much closer to 
 
250 See Andrei Shleifer, Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 
414, 418 (2004) (noting that as societies grow rich they prove more willing to pay for 
ethical behavior through enforcement). 
251 See Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 1817, 1828-29 (2007) (“SOX is less about redistributing private power as diffusing 
it through more checks, balances, and sunlight.”). 
252 See id. at 1820 (“SOX’s most important effects may be less about investor pro-
tection than about renegotiating the boundary between the public and private spaces 
in big corporations, a much deeper ideological issue.”). 
253 Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Gover-
nance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005). 
254 In 2004, one third of American voters described themselves as “investors,” and 
national politicians now cater to the so-called “Investor Class.”  Richard S. Dunham & 
Ann Therese Palmer, Just Who’s in the ‘Investor Class?’, BUS. WK., Sept. 6, 2004, at 42-43. 
255 See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet:  America’s Ownership Society:  
Expanding Opportunities (Aug. 9, 2004), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040809-9.html (outlining Presi-
dent George W. Bush’s policies favoring an “Ownership Society”). 
256 See Donald C. Langevoort, Structuring Securities Regulation in the European Union: 
Lessons from the U.S. Experience (explaining that retail investors have had little political 
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the median voter and loomed large politically.  Shareholder empo-
werment, missing in Sarbanes-Oxley, would follow in the next 
round—the Dodd-Frank Act, which enables the placement of share-
holder board nominees in management proxy statements and accords 
the shareholders “say on pay” rights, among other things.257 
The Congress that enacted Sarbanes-Oxley, while granting no new 
powers to shareholders, did find other, innovative ways to cater to 
their interests.  Consider in this regard the Investor and Capital Mar-
kets Fee Relief Act of 2002 (Fee Relief Act), a tax relief measure for 
the investor class.258   The fees in question were those that fund the 
SEC—fees collected from exchange transactions and in connection 
with SEC registrations.  Fee revenues had been in excess of the SEC’s 
annual budget for many years,259 and the excess had disappeared into 
the Treasury.  Congress enacted the Fee Relief Act to align the fee 
revenues and the cost of running the SEC with the goal of reducing 
fees.  The Fair Funds provision in Sarbanes-Oxley was similarly moti-
vated.260  Historically, the SEC had endeavored to return profits dis-
gorged by defendants in its enforcement actions to victimized inves-
tors.  When a defendant paid a penalty, in contrast, the SEC remitted 
the amount to the Treasury.  Sarbanes-Oxley’s Fair Funds provision 
charges the SEC to endeavor to return penalty monies to injured in-
vestors,261 elevating the interests of shareholder victims over those of 
the public fisc. 
Significantly, Fair Funds disbursements mimic FOTM economics.  
As we have seen, SEC penalties tend to be paid by corporate defen-
dants, as are FOTM settlements.  A Fair Funds distribution to a subset 
of shareholders is every bit as much an exercise in pocket shifting as is 
payment of a FOTM settlement.  The political implication is as power-
 
clout, except during times of perceived scandal), in INVESTOR PROTECTION IN EUROPE 
489, 491 (Guido Ferrarrini & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 2006). 
257 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 951, 953–55, 971, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78j-4, 78n-a, 78n-1 (West 
Supp. 2 2011). 
258 Pub. L. No. 107-123, 115 Stat. 2390 (codified at 15 U.S.C.). 
259 See infra text accompanying notes 346-67. 
260 See 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a)–(b) (2006) (requiring that civil judgment penalties be 
added to associated disgorgement requirements). 
261 The charge is conditioned on a concomitant disgorgement order, and the de-
cision to remit is left to the agency’s discretion in any given case.  See id. § 7246(a) 
(“[T]he amount of such civil penalty shall, on the motion or at the direction of the 
Commission, be added to and become part of the disgorgement fund for the benefit of 
the victims of such violation.”). 
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ful as the underlying policy analysis is faulty:  the Fair Funds legisla-
tion, by tracking FOTM, implicitly endorses it. 
So long as catering to shareholder interests appears advantageous 
to Congress, it is difficult to imagine a political coalition forming to 
eliminate FOTM.  Dodd-Frank, although it does nothing to enhance 
the present position of securities plaintiffs, signals a tilt in their position.  
Among the many studies commissioned by the statute, two concern pri-
vate securities litigation and look into the possibility of overruling Su-
preme Court decisions that restrict the scope of FOTM actions.262 
We close with a caveat respecting the politics of shareholder solici-
tude.  Even as we think that current politics protect FOTM from fron-
tal attack, concern for the shareholder interest means different things 
to different people and holds out a range of policy implications.  
These concerns can be deployed to undermine securities law en-
forcement activity.  For example, management advocates who propose 
new measures to limit FOTM invoke pocket shifting and solicitude for 
the payor shareholders.263 
Consider in this regard an enforcement scenario acted out at the 
SEC post–Sarbanes-Oxley.  In 2006, the SEC articulated a set of guide-
lines to govern the imposition of fines against corporations, specifying 
nine factors to use in assessing an appropriate penalty.264  Most of the 
items on the list were standard enforcement concerns such as culpa-
bility, cooperation, detection, and injury inflicted.265  But the SEC sin-
gled out two concerns as paramount, one tending to support a penalty 
and the other tending to oppose it:  (1) in favor of a penalty, the pres-
ence (or absence) of a “direct and material benefit” to the corpora-
tion from the offense, such as through reduced expenses or increased 
revenues; and (2) against a penalty, whether a penalty will cause addi-
 
262 One study, commissioned by the Government Accountability Office, will con-
sider liability for aiders and abettors as well as secondary actors, implicitly questioning 
the Supreme Courts’ rulings in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 
511 U.S. 164 (1994), and Stoneridge Investment Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 
U.S. 148 (2008).  See Dodd-Frank Act § 929Z, 124 Stat. 1375, 1871 (requiring the 
Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study analyzing aiding and ab-
etting liability in securities laws).  
263 See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LIT-
IGATION:  THE PROBLEM, ITS IMPACT AND THE PATH TO REFORM 41 (2008), available at 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_doc.php?docId=1213 (“Congress also 
should address the fact that payments by defendant companies punish innocent exist-
ing shareholders, while investors (often large, diversified investors) who sold their 
shares at an inflated price before the disclosure of the fraud reap windfall gains.”). 
264 See Press Release, supra note 148. 
265 Id. 
BRATTON-WACHTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  6:02 PM 
2011] Fraud on the Market 141 
tional harm to shareholders who have committed no violation.266  
Shareholder solicitude motivates both of these factors.  The first factor 
attaches penalties to cases where the payor shareholders benefitted 
from the fraud, while the second weighs against penalties in cases 
where the payor shareholders neither participated nor benefitted.267 
The two factors quickly came to dominate SEC enforcement poli-
cy.  At the Commission’s insistence, the enforcement staff had to qual-
ify a penalty with an affirmative showing of tangible benefits to the 
company, usually based on an event study.268  The result, unsurprising-
ly, was that it became more difficult to impose fines in pure market-
fraud situations.  The policy also discouraged the SEC staff from under-
taking complex cases, inhibited the imposition of penalties for egre-
gious conduct, and blurred the distinction between penalties and dis-
gorgements.269  Chairman Christopher Cox followed up in 2007 with a 
second internal requirement:  Commission approval of a penalty range 
in certain cases in advance of the staff’s commencement of settlement 
discussions.270  This operated as a wedge with which the Commission 
could delay disfavored proceedings and effect penalty reductions.271 
The SEC’s penalty-qualification requirements could have been 
lifted straight out of the policy playbook of a management lobbyist.272  
Both requirements were criticized in a 2009 Government Accountabil-
 
266 Id. 
267 For a discussion of the tradeoff, see Chester S. Spatt, An Informal Perspective on 
the Economics and Regulation of Securities Markets, 2 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 127, 138 (2010). 
268 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMIS-
SION:  GREATER ATTENTION NEEDED TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION AND UTILIZATION 
OF RESOURCES IN THE DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT 41 (2009), available at http:// 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d09358.pdf (reporting the heavy burden placed on the En-
forcement Division to show corporate benefit when seeking to impose a penalty). 
269 See id. at 42-43 (relating the reported effects of the two factors on enforcement 
incentives and success rates). 
270 See Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address to the 
Mutual Fund Directors Forum Seventh Annual Policy Conference (Apr. 13, 2007), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch041207cc.htm (“So in a hand-
ful of cases where the need for national consistency is greatest, we’re reviving what had 
been a long standing policy of the SEC for all cases for many years—that Commission 
approval be obtained before settlement discussions are commenced.”). 
271 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 268, at 39-43 (reporting 
that SEC investigators and enforcement attorneys had incentives not to seek penalties 
due to the obstacles to their approval). 
272 See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 263, at 41 (urging Con-
gress, on behalf of the business community, to impose penalties only very cautiously). 
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ity Office Report.273  The present SEC Chair, Mary Schapiro, lifted the 
advance notice requirement upon taking office in 2009.274  Since then, 
the SEC’s Enforcement Division has been reorganizing itself, report-
ing enhanced efficiency and results, including stepped-up amounts of 
both penalties and disgorgements.275  It is not clear what, if anything, 
this change implies about the continuing application of the 2006 pe-
nalty guidelines.  We have discovered no public statement regarding 
their present status. 
C.  Agency Problems 
Two different groups of private agents populate the FOTM fact 
pattern:  plaintiffs’ lawyers and corporate managers.  This section 
brings them into our political economy.  These two groups stare at 
each other across a field of combat.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers favor FOTM as 
it is (or was), while managers would like to pick up where the PSLRA 
left off and constrain it still further.  At the same time, neither group 
of agents would want Congress to eliminate FOTM completely. 
We start with the plaintiffs’ bar, which has its own legitimacy prob-
lem.  Those in charge of an enforcement institution founded on con-
cerns about management accountability must be accountable in turn.  
Unfortunately, the class action lawsuit is not an institution well suited 
to this end.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys—in theory the shareholders’ agents—
in practice make litigation decisions in a zone of discretion.  When 
they seem to abuse their discretion and impose deadweight costs on 
defendant companies without corresponding benefits to shareholders, 
discretion-constraining legislation may follow in the right political 
climate.  For example, a bull stock market276 and a class of favored 
companies in the technology sector combined in 1995 to focus con-
 
273 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 268, at 41 (“[S]ome inves-
tigative attorneys came to see the Commission as less of an ally in bringing enforce-
ment actions and more of a barrier.”) 
274 Id. at 36. 
275 See Robert Khuzami, Director, Div. of Enforcements, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Speech to the Society of American Business Editors and Writers (Mar. 19, 
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch031910rsk.htm 
(“[F]ast-forward one year, and the Division of Enforcement, and the Commission as a 
whole, are in a very different place.”). 
276 See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 213, at 671-72 (charting the value of the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average alongside the political maneuvers that led to the 
PLSRA’s passage). 
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gressional attention on abusive practices of securities plaintiffs—in 
particular, the strike suit.277 
The PSLRA resulted, and with it an experiment in attorney agency-
cost control in the form of the lead plaintiff provision.278  This provi-
sion takes the selection of the class action’s named plaintiff out of the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers’ hands, makes it contestable, and vests the decision 
in a court charged to presume that good litigation governance follows 
from “the largest financial interest in the relief sought.”279  Thus con-
structed, the PSLRA operates on the assumption that a financial in-
terest in the stock in itself imports incentives to control litigation 
agency costs.280  Experience has taught a different lesson, which fol-
lows from the economics of institutional investing.  Mutual funds have 
competitive reasons to avoid investing time and resources in share-
holder activism and have business reasons to keep friendly channels 
open to the corporate sector.281  They accordingly have refrained from 
stepping forward as lead plaintiffs.282  Public pension funds, in con-
trast, are managed by public servants who have incentives to build 
reputations as governance activists.283  Unsurprisingly, lead plaintiffs 
have often come from this sector,284 even though they lack the pure 
financial incentives contemplated by the PSLRA. 
Problems can arise when selective, rather than financial, incentives 
prompt a principal to monitor an agent.  The lead plaintiff provision 
held out just such an invitation, and the plaintiffs’ law firms readily ac-
 
277 Thompson & Sale, supra note 60, at 884-85. 
278 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2006). 
279 Id. 
280 Institutional investors commonly have the largest financial stakes in the larges 
securities class action settlements.  Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money 
Do the Monitoring:  How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class 
Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2088-94 (1995). 
281 See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Share-
holder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 474 (1991) (noting that incurring the costs associated 
with attempting to check and control corporate governance is inimical to the end goal 
of a passive indexed portfolio—being the least-cost producer).  
282 Choi & Thompson, supra note 58, at 1504. 
283 See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory 
Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1914-18 (1995) (describing 
the “financial and selective incentives” for public and private institutions). 
284 See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS:  Survey Evidence on the De-
veloping Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 330 
(2008) (“With the adoption of the PSLRA and the creation of the lead plaintiff provi-
sion, institutional investors and public pension funds in particular have become increa-
singly active, serving as lead plaintiffs in a higher percentage of cases every year . . . .”). 
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cepted it.  As a result, different pension funds have developed long-
term ties with different law firms.  The law firms, looking to maintain 
these ties, make strategic political contributions in the pension funds’ 
states.285  This “pay to play” practice has spurred a new round of corrup-
tion allegations from FOTM opponents.286  High-profile criminal pro-
ceedings against prominent plaintiffs’ lawyers alleging improper pay-
ments to named plaintiffs add to the aura of corruption.287 
Let us assume that any pay-to-play practices are brought under 
control (legislation has been introduced288).  Given that assumption, 
FOTM may very well emerge from the long process of congressional 
containment with its legitimacy enhanced.  Strike suits do not appear 
to be as salient a problem in the wake of the PSLRA.289  Without a basis 
 
285 See Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner & Adam C. Pritchard, The Price of 
Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming) (manu-
script at 13), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1527047  (showing that while 
pension fund supervision implies lower attorneys’ fees, the differential disappears 
when one controls for campaign contributions made to officials with influence over 
state pension funds).  For a skeptical approach to pay-to-play allegations, see David H. 
Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class Actions?  
An Empirical Study (NYU Law Sch., Ctr. for Law, Econ & Org., Research Paper No. 09-
28, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1432497. 
286 See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 263, at 30-34 (de-
scribing the corruption that emerges in a pay-to-play legal culture); RICHARD M. KO-
VACEVICH ET AL., THE FIN. SERVS. ROUNDTABLE, THE BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. FINANCIAL 
COMPETITIVENESS 69 (2007), available at http://www.fsround.org/cec/pdfs/ 
FINALCompetitivenessReport.pdf (recommending that Congress should amend the 
PSLRA to eliminate pay to play).   
287 See Jonathan D. Glater, High-Profile Trial Lawyer Agrees to Plead Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 21, 2008, at C1 (reporting that Melvyn I. Weiss, a well-known attorney, agreed to 
plead guilty “to [making] hidden side payments to plaintiffs in class-action lawsuits 
filed by his firm”); Michael Parrish, Leading Class-Action Lawyer is Sentenced to Two Years 
in Kickback Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at C1 (“William S. Lerach . . . was sen-
tenced Monday two years in prison and ordered to forfeit $7.75 million for concealing 
illegal payments to a plaintiff in the class-action lawsuits . . . .”). 
288 Legislation has been proposed that would require disclosure of all payments, 
fees, and contributions between law firms and lead plaintiffs.  In addition, a competi-
tive bidding process would be added as an alternative means of choosing lead counsel.  
Securities Litigation Attorney Accountability and Transparency Act, H.R. 5463, 110th 
Cong. §§ 3–4 (2008). 
289 See Choi, supra note 63, at 616 (comparing matched sets of firms that were sued 
and not sued pre- and post-PSLRA to suggest that “plaintiffs’ attorneys post-PSLRA 
shifted away from cases requiring lengthy and costly investigation prior to the filing of 
suit toward cases with more obvious indicia of fraud”); Eric Talley & Gudrun Johnsen, 
Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation and Securities Litigation 25 (Univ. of S. Cal. 
Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 04-7, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=536963 (finding that the PSLRA deters both frivolous and 
meritorious litigation).  
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for credible allegations of corruption, antiplaintiff politics would lose 
impetus.  Litigation would fall back into the more nebulous politics of 
deregulation, taking a place on long legislative agendas as one of a 
number of regulatory costs businesses would prefer to do without. 
Indeed, current proposals concerning securities litigation appear 
as items on lengthy corporate legislative wish lists.290  National compe-
titiveness, particularly in light of international securities listings, is the 
across-the-board policy imperative of choice.291  A string of proposals 
regarding securities litigation awaits the light of day.  The number-one 
agenda item is an arbitration opt-in.292  Also on the wishlist are credit 
in damages calculations for Fair Funds paid out,293 tighter controls on 
parallel actions in state courts,294 a defendant’s interlocutory appeal on 
 
290 See, e.g., BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 39, at 19-25 (recommending na-
tional priorities, methods for leveling the international playing field, and ways to pre-
serve financial preeminence); COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM RE-
PORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 16 (2006), available at 
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (recom-
mending policy changes in shareholder rights); U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, supra note 263, at 42 (advocating greater transparency in the settlement 
process and more widespread use of arbitration).  
291 See, e.g., BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 39, at 100 (“Congress should bol-
ster America’s long-term competitiveness by enacting legislative reforms to securities 
law that will eliminate inappropriate lawsuits without undermining relevant substantive 
rights.”); COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 290, at 109-12 (recom-
mending an opt-in to arbitration in the context of across-the-board reform proposals 
designed to make U.S. capital markets more attractive to foreign companies).  
292 Management would like the privilege to amend corporate charters to opt into 
arbitration of securities fraud claims.  Alternatively, companies should be able to opt 
into nonjury trials.  See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 290, at 110 
(recommending that “shareholders should be able to choose their reme-
dies . . . including providing for arbitration (with or without class action procedures)”). 
293 Management argues that a double recovery results when a company makes a 
payment to the SEC and also makes a settlement payment in a parallel class action.  
The argument is that corporate defendants should receive a damages credit equal to 
any Fair Funds paid out.  See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 290, at 
80 (recommending that the SEC “limit the amount of damages recoverable through 
class actions when the SEC provides victim compensation with funds obtained through 
a Fair Funds remedy”); COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 
21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 89 (2007) (“The Commission recom-
mends that the SEC adopt a formal policy that prohibits duplicate payments from Fair 
Funds and private litigation on similar claims.  Specifically, any amount investors receive 
from a Fair Fund should offset the amount that they are allowed to collect as damages 
in private securities litigation on similar claims.”); U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, supra note 263, at 43 (“[P]rivate damages awards should be offset in the first 
instance by any Fair Funds collected by the SEC for compensating shareholders.”). 
294 Management has also been watching institutional investors opt out of federal 
class actions only to bring parallel actions in state court.  See supra note 120 and ac-
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denial of motion to dismiss,295 pleading particularity for loss causa-
tion,296 and damages limitations.297 
These proposals lie dormant, ready for enactment in a favorable 
political environment.  If the past is any guide, such an environment 
presupposes an expanding economy and a rising stock market.298  It 
follows that the proposals may be gathering dust for some time.  In-
deed, none found their way into the Dodd-Frank Act. 
D.  Summary and Analysis 
FOTM’s political economy also has undergone changes in recent 
years as a result of developments in the political economy of share-
holding.  FOTM continues to enjoy the protection of the manage-
ment-accountability imperative that brought securities regulation into 
existence during the Depression.  Because the shareholder interest 
now registers politically, FOTM’s superficial qualities of shareholder 
friendliness enhance its stature—congressional gestures in the share-
holders’ direction validate FOTM by mimicking its economics.  But 
shareholder solicitude is a two-sided coin:  FOTM’s opponents point 
out that innocent shareholders pay the compensation. 
We emerge in a political equipoise with a narrow stretch of con-
testable territory.  The plaintiffs’ side has had the upper hand re-
cently, convincing Congress to commission studies under Dodd-
Frank that look to roll back inconvenient Supreme Court opinions.  
The management interest bides its time, looking for opportunities to 
 
companying text.  It asks Congress to close off the state court route altogether, or, fail-
ing that, to stay state court actions until final resolution of a federal class action.  See 
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 263, at 39 (noting the harmful ef-
fect of state-law claims filed in state court that are not class action, which circumvent 
federal regulation). 
295 Management argues that it is unfair that a dismissed plaintiff can appeal when 
a defendant losing on a dismissal motion cannot.  See BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra 
note 39, at 104 (arguing that litigating parties should be able to appeal interlocutory 
judgments immediately to the circuit courts); U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 
supra note 263, at 35 (advocating equal access to interlocutory appeals).  This doubt-
less has less to do with fairness than settlement value.   
296 See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 263, at 37 (stating that 
Congress should “mandat[e] that plaintiffs plead loss causation with the same level of 
specificity currently reserved for scienter”). 
297 Management would abolish aggregated damages in favor of a regime based 
on actual submission and verification by class members with any undistributed set-
tlement funds returned to the defendant.  Id. at 34, 41.  The pocket-shifting argu-
ment is also invoked.   
298 See supra text accompanying notes 234-50. 
BRATTON-WACHTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  6:02 PM 
2011] Fraud on the Market 147 
reduce FOTM’s scope and salience without creating new public en-
forcement initiatives. 
Interestingly, outright abolition of FOTM is not on any current 
management wishlist.  No doubt political expediency has something to 
do with this.  However, there may also be a juncture at which manage-
ment’s interest intersects with that of the plaintiffs’ bar.  Suppose that 
FOTM’s termination was a possibility and gave rise to a perception of an 
enforcement gap.  This in turn might lead to pressure for stepped-up 
public enforcement.  Given this scenario, management might prefer 
FOTM constraint to FOTM termination.  As between a private action 
safely nested in enterprise liability and a public enforcement resource 
that could move in the direction of direct actions against individuals, 
management’s interest clearly lies with the former.  More generally, 
FOTM increases managers’ legitimacy by disempowering them, even as 
it presents little threat to individual malefactors.  Anti-FOTM activists 
in the business lobby should be careful what they wish for. 
Our account has only mentioned the SEC in passing.  As the 
agency responsible for enforcing the securities laws, it occupies a cen-
tral position in the political economy of FOTM.  We turn to it in the 
next Part, first taking an historical look at the SEC’s funding and then 
considering its role as a political actor in the battle over FOTM. 
V.  THE SEC AND REFORM 
We have seen that FOTM survives and prospers even though it 
doesn’t work from a public policy perspective.  It prevails in the courts 
by virtue of stare decisis.  Outside, in the world of political contestabil-
ity, it occupies a safe spot amid opposing forces in equipoise.  Whatev-
er its actual policy shortcomings, FOTM retains associations with po-
werful justificatory concepts, such as management accountability and 
shareholder protection.  Its opponents, with a political wind at their 
backs, have proved able to delimit but not eliminate it.  Meanwhile, 
law reform proponents focus on superior alternative modes of private 
enforcement,299 with few mentioning the simpler expedient of doing 
away with FOTM’s reliance presumption.300  This hesitance stems from 
 
299 See supra note 121. 
300 Professors Langevoort and Pritchard are exceptions.  See Langevoort, Corporate 
Executives, supra note 13, at 656 (imagining abandonment of the presumption of re-
liance “[w]ithout necessarily endorsing it as a reform”); Pritchard, supra note 138, at 
248 (suggesting a shareholder opt-out); see also Roberta S. Karmel, When Should Investor 
Reliance Be Presumed in Securities Class Actions?, 63 BUS. LAW. 25, 54 (2007) (suggesting 
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the assumption that public enforcement resources are inadequate to 
contain fraud, a situation deemed natural and inevitable.  Given the 
limited public apparatus, it follows that any private enforcement is 
better than none at all.301 
The inadequate resources claim sounded as loudly as ever in 2011.  
The Dodd-Frank Act directed the engagement of a consultant to re-
view the SEC’s structure and operations.302  The consultant confirmed 
the inadequacy of the agency’s resources.303  The report posed a stark 
choice to Congress:  either provide the agency with funds sufficient to 
support its required capabilities or cut back on its responsibilities to fit 
the available funds.304  Any hopes that Congress would choose the 
former option were dashed during the budget fracas of 2011.305 
This Part reconsiders the inadequate resources assertion, despite 
the consultant’s recent confirmation.  The objective is not to contro-
vert the assertion but rather to reframe the question, inquiring into 
the degree of resource deficiency instead of asking a yes or no ques-
 
abandonment of the presumption respecting third parties); cf. Stephen J. Choi, Com-
pany Registration:  Toward a Status-Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 591-98 
(1997) (recommending no change in the reliance presumption, but suggesting stricter 
scienter and materiality standards for the largest issuers). 
301 In an empirical multicountry comparison, La Porta asserts that a combination 
of disclosure mandates taken together with private enforcement remedies better pre-
dicts market robustness than public-enforcer empowerment.  See La Porta et al., supra 
note 184, at 20 (hypothesizing that “public enforcement plays a modest role at best” in 
structuring stock markets, while, “in contrast, the development of stock markets is 
strongly associated with extensive disclosure requirements and a relatively low burden 
of proof on investors seeking to recover damages”).  Jackson and Roe rebut this by 
showing a stronger connection between market robustness and public enforcement 
resources.  More to the point, Jackson and Roe show that disclosure has a significant 
relationship to market capitalization where private liability does not.  Jackson & Roe, 
supra note 1, at 217-19. 
302 Dodd-Frank Act § 967(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d-4 (West Supp. 2 2011).  The 
directive was incidental to Dodd-Frank’s imposition of new administrative burdens on 
the agency. 
303 BOS. CONSULTING GRP., U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION:  ORGA-
NIZATIONAL STUDY AND REFORM 165-69 (2011), available at www.sec.gov/news/ 
studies/2011/967study.pdf. 
304 Id. at 9.  Boston Consulting examined the SEC from an organizational perspec-
tive, recommending numerous infrastructural improvements.  The report estimates 
that the SEC would require an additional $200 to $300 million to implement the first 
phase of improvements.  Id. at 147.  If new funding is not forthcoming, the report re-
commends that the SEC delegate certain rulemaking and enforcement functions to 
self-regulatory organizations.  Id. at 150-53.  This would mean, for example, devolution 
of broker-dealer and investment advisor examinations.  The report recommends no 
changes respecting antifraud enforcement.   
305 See infra note 312. 
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tion.  The policy literature on antifraud takes the yes-or-no approach 
and makes a strong-form inadequacy assertion:  the public glass is 
empty, period.  This was indeed the situation when the Supreme 
Court first implied a private right of action under the federal securi-
ties laws in 1964.  But public resources have increased greatly since 
then—particularly during the last decade306—so much so as to again 
raise the question about relative reliance on public and private en-
forcement.  Here is that question:  is it plausible to suggest that the 
SEC could pick up any enforcement slack occasioned by the removal 
of the FOTM presumption?  This Part answers in the affirmative, sug-
gesting that FOTM’s elimination could be paired with an increase in 
public enforcement funding for a net improvement in deterrence at 
no added cost to shareholders. 
Section A conducts an historical survey of the SEC budget and 
shows that the agency has emerged in recent years as an expansive 
and powerful enforcement apparatus.  To the extent additional agen-
cy resources would be needed to make up for diminished reliance on 
private enforcement, funding would be readily available from the 
SEC’s dedicated income sources at no cost to the taxpayers.  As with 
private enforcement, the funding ultimately comes from shareholder 
pockets, provoking an intriguing comparative question:  which en-
forcement mode, public or private, makes better dollar-for-dollar use 
of the shareholders’ money?  This Part suggests that shareholders 
would be better served if they funded greater SEC enforcement in a 
system without a private side FOTM presumption available against 
nontrading issuers.  Inadequate public enforcement is neither natural 
nor inevitable. 
Section B explores the institutional implications of this analysis.  A 
shift to a well-equipped public enforcer presupposes an administrative 
commitment at the SEC and a political commitment in Congress.  As 
between the two, primary responsibility falls on the SEC as the agency 
charged with the federal securities laws’ articulation, administration, 
and enforcement.  Although the SEC arguably has the power to elim-
inate FOTM through rulemaking, it certainly does not have the power 
 
306 Precedent inquiries into SEC enforcement resources have found an increase in 
the SEC’s resources.  However, that increase has been accompanied by an even greater 
increase in the number of enforcement actions filed.  See Burch, supra note 242, at 129-
31 (looking at the years 2000–2002 and 2005); James D. Cox & Randall Thomas, SEC 
Enforcement Heuristics:  An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 757-60 (2004) (describing 
the SEC’s resource limitations in the mid to late 1990s and early 2000s and noting that, 
since approximately 2002, many of those limitations have decreased). 
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to set its own budget, so an enforcement initiative would require con-
gressional support.  We suggest that such cooperation could be se-
cured through a tradeoff of more money for enforcement in ex-
change for FOTM’s removal, with a net benefit for the shareholders.  
Unfortunately, it is not at all clear that the initiative we suggest aligns 
well with present interests, either of actors at the SEC or in Congress.  
We pose it as a structural possibility rather than as fruit on the tree for 
immediate harvest. 
Before proceeding, we pause to note what this Part does not con-
tend.  We do not claim that public enforcement is categorically supe-
rior to private enforcement, whether as regards securities law307 or any 
other legal regime.  Nor do we argue for across-the-board withdrawal of 
private rights of action.  We address only the shortcomings of FOTM. 
A.  Enforcement Resources 
It is a truism that FOTM, despite its flaws, passes cost-benefit test-
ing because the SEC needs a private enforcement supplement.  In-
deed, the SEC itself has long viewed the private supplement as essen-
tial to the accomplishment of its mission.  In 1979, then–Chairman 
Harold Williams, described the private enforcement role as follows: 
[O]ur resources are inadequate to police all securities law violations 
which may take place.  As a result, our enforcement activities are de-
signed not only to address specific wrongdoings, but also to alert the pri-
vate sector as to the kinds of activities which we believe violate the securi-
ties laws. 
 Private actions . . . supplement the Commission’s own enforcement 
program, and significantly increase the likelihood that securities law vi-
olations will be challenged and corrected.
308
  
Things have changed since 1979.  The story that depicted private 
plaintiffs as robust enforcers has imploded under sustained inspection.  
Perhaps public enforcement conditions also have changed since 1979, 
or, more to the point, since 1964, the year the Supreme Court ap-
proved the first securities law private-enforcement supplement.309  It 
accordingly is time to take another look at SEC enforcement capability.   
 
307 For this line of argument, see Rose, The Multienforcer Approach, supra note 20, 
at 2175-78. 
308 44 SEC ANN. REP., supra note 245, at vii. 
309 See supra note 4. 
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1.  The SEC’s Budget 
In 1964, the SEC’s budget was $13.9 million; in 2010, its budget 
was $1.12 billion.310  Adjusting the 1964 number for inflation yields a 
directly comparable 1964 budget figure of $99.2 million.311  This in 
turn yields a multiple of increase of 11.4.  Figure 1 shows the SEC’s 
budgets from 1964 to 2011 in 2011 dollars.  Although large increases 
do not occur annually, there is only one extended period of real de-
cline, the period from 1976 to 1985, during which high inflation was 
followed by the first Reagan administration’s political disfavor.  At no 
time has an anti-enforcement Congress or executive used budget cuts 
to eviscerate the agency.312 
 
Figure 1:  SEC Budgets (Inflation Adjusted), 1964–2010313 
 
310 The calculation was performed using the Bureau of Labor Statistics calculator 
to yield dollars in 2011.  Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, BUREAU LAB. STAT., 
http://data.bls.gov.  
311 See supra note 310. 
312 SEC partisans recently made just this allegation, when Congress rejected the 
agency’s 2012 budget request and some House members threatened cuts.  See John J. 
Curran & Jesse Hamilton, Schapiro SEC Seen Ineffectual Amid Dodd-Frank Funding Curbs, 
BLOOMBERG MARKETS MAG. (Mar. 30, 2011, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2011-03-31/schapiro-sec-seen-ineffectual-amid-dodd-frank-funding-curbs.html.  But 
cuts have not been forthcoming.  Under the present Continuing Resolution, the SEC 
comes away with a $74 million increase.  See Melanie Waddell, Congress Moves Budget 
Vote to Thursday; SEC, CFTC See Budget Boost, ADVISOR ONE (Apr. 12, 2011), 
http://www.advisorone.com/article/congress-moves-budget-vote-thursday-sec-cftc-see-
budget-boost. 
313 SEC budget data were collected from the SEC’s annual reports for the years 
1964–2010.  See SEC ANN. REPS., available at http://www.sec.gov/about/annrep.shtml 
(compiling the SEC’s annual reports). 
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There are three instances of significant increase, all contempora-
neous with high profile enforcement activity:  the first in the mid 1970s, 
coincident with the foreign payment scandals; the second in the early 
1990s, after the Drexel Burnham action and the savings and loan crisis; 
and the third in 2001 after Enron.  Of the three, the post-Enron budget 
increase is the most notable, amounting to a historic upward jump in 
the amount of public resources devoted to securities law enforcement. 
 
Figure 2:  SEC Resources to Publicly Traded Stocks, 1964–2010314 
Some claim that no matter what budget increases the SEC rece-
ives, its available staff always lags behind market growth.315  There is 
something to this,316 but not as much as once was the case.  Figure 2 
takes the SEC budget, expressed in real terms, and compares it to the 
number of personnel employed by the agency as well as the number 
of publicly traded stocks.  In 1964, the SEC had budget lines for 1379 
personnel; in 2010, it had lines for 3748 personnel.  In 1964, there 
were 2127 publicly traded stocks; in 2010, the number was 5701. 
 
314 Id.  The stock data were taken from the Center for Research in Securities Prices’s 
US Stock & Index Databases, which collect data from the last business day of each year.  
Access to the database is available for purchase at http://www.csrp.com/documentation/ 
product/stkind. 
315 See Cox & Thomas, supra note 306, at 757-58 (detailing staff shortages at the 
SEC notwithstanding budget increases). 
316 The Boston Consulting Group opines that the SEC presently needs 375 to 425 
additional full-time employees.  BOS. CONSULTING GRP., supra note 302, at 196-97.  En-
forcement was not one of the divisions singled out as needing additional staff.  Id. 
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Prior to Enron, the three figures increase at relatively similar rates 
with the SEC personnel figure lagging.  Personnel finally returned to 
parity with the number of stocks traded in 2009.  In contrast, the 
budget, once stoked in the wake of Enron, breaks out of the band with 
a sharp increase. 
Figure 3 tracks annual SEC personnel and budget figures, here 
expressed in nominal terms, across the same period against the mar-
ket value of publicly traded equities, which increased from 
$490,134,900,000 to $17,526,408,500,000, also expressed in nominal 
terms.  The budget roughly tracks increases in equity market capitali-
zation until the mid 1990s, when the stock market’s sudden rise out-
stripped budget increases.  The pattern reverses after 2000, when the 
market entered a period of backing and filling while the SEC enjoyed 
more robust financing in the wake of Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley. 
 
Figure 3:  SEC Resources to Equity Market Capitalization,  
1964–2010317 
 
Figure 4 fleshes out the picture, using SEC-initiated enforcement 
actions as a yardstick for agency productivity.  These enforcement ac-
tions increased from forty-three per year in 1964 to 681 in 2010.  The 
numbers impress when compared to the personnel numbers, and stay 
ahead of inflation-adjusted budget increases.318  At the same time, 
 
317 Id. 
318 If the nominal budget numbers were used, the budget increases would outstrip 
increases in enforcement activity. 
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numbers of enforcement actions per dollar of resources never re-
turned to the level achieved in the early 1970s—the complexity and 
magnitude of the cases doubtless has something to do with this. 
 The numbers show a burst of activity in the wake of the collapse of 
the 1960s bull market, followed by more moderate and steady increas-
es with notable upticks after 1990 and again after Enron.  The early 
1990s increases may reflect a legislative adjustment, as Congress mate-
rially added to the SEC’s stock of enforcement weapons in the Securi-
ties Enforcement and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990.319  Before 1990, 
   
Figure 4:  SEC Resources to Enforcement Activity, 1964–2010320 
 
the agency had only two choices in addressing violations of mandato-
ry-disclosure rules outside of the public offering context—either 
going to court for an injunction or proceeding administratively to re-
quest a corrective filing.  The 1990 legislation added the administra-
tive cease-and-desist order with an express provision for profit dis-
gorgement 321 and opened doors for the agency to seek civil monetary 
penalties outside of the insider-trading context.322 
 
319 Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C).  The previous step-up in legislative authority, the Insider Trading Sanctions 
Act of 1984, Pub L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.), addressed insider trading.  For further discussion, see Cox & Tho-
mas, supra note 306, at 746-48. 
320 See supra note 313. 
321 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1(a), 78u-3(e) (2006). 
322 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3). 
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Figure 5 offers another view of enforcement beginning in 1981, 
when the SEC’s annual report first included the penalties and profit 
disgorgements ordered in connection with its enforcement actions.323  
The sequence begins with $30 million in 1980, picks up magnitude af-
ter the 1990 legislation, and ends at $2.85 billion in 2010.324  On an in-
flation-adjusted basis, the average annual number of fines and dis-
gorgements ordered during the last five years of the sequence increased 
20.2 times over the average amount during the first five years.  
 
Figure 5:  Fines and Disgorgements Ordered in SEC Enforcement  
Actions (Inflation Adjusted), 1981–2010325 
2.  Comparing the Public and Private Sectors 
The figures tell us that the SEC’s enforcement reach has been ex-
tended materially since 1964.  But they tell us nothing about the “ade-
quacy” of the resulting enforcement operation. 
 
323 Penalties and disgorgements are regulated under sections 21B and 32 of the 
1934 Act.  Id. § 78u-2, 78ff.  
324 Amounts ordered are often greater than amounts actually collected, as the SEC 
has difficulty collecting awards from judgment-proof defendants.  See, e.g., 2004 SEC 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 48 (2004), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar04.pdf (reporting a balance sheet allowance for 
doubtful accounts of 81.02%).  The problem presumably stems from the fact that se-
curities violations tend to occur at companies experiencing financial difficulty.  See Ar-
len & Carney, supra note 55, at 724-26 (confirming empirically that securities fraud 
tends to be an end-period problem). 
325 See supra note 313. 
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Figure 6 offers some information respecting magnitude and sa-
lience by comparing annual amounts of penalties and disgorgements 
reported by the SEC with total annual class action settlement dollars.  
The private sector certainly extracts larger sums, especially given big 
ticket cases like those settled in the wake of Enron and WorldCom.  
However, in recent years the SEC has pulled itself up to parity.  In-
deed, apart from the spike in private returns in 2006, the divergence 
between the lines is surprisingly small.  Figure 7 offers a contrasting 
view, comparing annual numbers of initiated class actions to the an-
nual number of initiated SEC enforcement actions.  By this case-by-
case measure, the SEC has the larger volume. 
 
Figure 6:  SEC v. Private Actions, Dollar Amounts, 1998–2010326 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
326 For SEC data, see, SEC ANN. REPS., supra note 313.  For class action settlement 
data see RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 1, fig. 1, and ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. 
SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS:  2008 
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1 fig.1 (2009), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/ 
Settlements/REVIEW_1995-2008/Settlements_Through_12_2008.pdf. 
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Figure 7:  SEC v. Private Actions, Numbers Initiated, 1996–2010327 
 
Not too much should be made of either comparison.  The larger 
private-sector dollar amounts reflect different incentives and objec-
tives.  Lawyers in the private sector are motivated by the possibility of 
personal financial gain, while those working at the agency pursue re-
putational gain in addition to whatever motivation public service im-
parts.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys evaluate potential class actions by settle-
ment value.  The SEC is more interested in the magnitude and 
character of the violation and the proceeding’s deterrent pay off.328  It 
also seeks to innovate by bringing new fact patterns within the ambit 
of the antifraud regime.329  Finally, its enforcers cover a much broader 
range of subject matter,330 dealing with the defalcations of broker-
dealers, investment companies, and investment advisors in addition to 
the narrow antifraud subject matter covered by private class actions.  
 
327 For SEC data, see supra note 313.  For class action filing data see CORNERSTONE 
RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 3 fig.2. 
328 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-662T, MAJOR HUMAN CAPITAL 
CHALLENGES AT SEC AND KEY TRADE AGENCIES 6 (2002) (statements of Richard J. 
Hillman, Director, Fin. Markets and Cmty. Inv., & Loren Yager, Director, Int’l Affairs 
and Trade); see also Cox & Thomas, supra note 306, at 777 (arguing that SEC enfoce-
ment actions focus on small companies, thus diminishing the overall deterrent effect 
of SEC enforcement). 
329 See Cox & Thomas, supra note 306, at 752 (describing communication to mar-
ket participants as the foremost metric that SEC uses in prioritization); supra text ac-
companying note 308. 
330 See 2009 SEC PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNATABILITY REP.:  PUTTING INVESTORS 
FIRST 9-11 (2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2009.pdf (de-
scribing the range of enforcement initiatives used by the SEC). 
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The antifraud overlap segment makes up fifty percent of enforcement 
volume at the SEC.331  The SEC still emerges as the higher volume en-
forcer, but less than Figure 7 indicates.332 
Finally, we compare the number of lawyers deployed in the public 
and private sectors.  From 2009 to 2010, five law firms were responsi-
ble for 61% of all payouts from class action settlements.333  The law 
firms in question employed a total of 453 lawyers in mid-2010.334  
Extrapolating, it took around 743 attorneys to produce the 2009–
2010 settlement yield.  In 2009, the SEC enforcement division had a 
total of 1223 personnel.  Based on a rough estimation, 782 of those 
were attorneys.335  The SEC thus matches the private sector in per cap-
ita human resources. 
But there are significant differences in focus as well as subject 
matter coverage.  The SEC spends most of its enforcement resources 
on primary investigation.336  If there is a front line in fraud enforce-
ment, it is here.  In recent years, the number of investigations initiated 
by the Enforcement Division has ranged from 3500 to 4500 annual-
ly.337  Eighty percent of the Division’s nonsupervisory lawyers work on 
 
331 In 2008, twenty-three percent of SEC actions concerned issuer reporting prob-
lems.  Adding actions concerning securities offerings (eighteen percent) and insider 
trading (nine percent) brings the total to fifty percent.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILI-
TY OFFICE, supra note 268, at 23.  The SEC also initiated significant numbers of actions 
against investment advisors, broker-dealers, and market manipulators.  Id.; see also Cox 
& Thomas, supra note 306, at 750 (calculating that half of SEC enforcement actions 
could have a parallel private class action claim and noting that the subclass is split 
fifty-fifty between actions respecting public offerings and those respecting other re-
porting violations). 
332 Simi Kedia and co-authors compare SEC enforcement actions to private class 
action litigation respecting GAAP violations, respectively, during the period 1996–
2006.  Simi Kedia et al., The Deterrence Effects of SEC Enforcement and Class Action 
Litigation ( June 2011) (manuscript at 3) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1868578.  The SEC initiated 474 proceedings; there were 1111 
private class actions.  Id.  By this measure, private class actions show the higher volume. 
333 See RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 14 (showing Robbins, Geller, Rudman, & 
Dowd (30%); Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger, & Grossman (10%); Barroway, Topaz, Kess-
ler, Meltzer, & Check (7%); Labaton Sucharow (7%); and Milberg (7%)).  
334 The numbers were counted on the law firms’ web sites on July 24, 2010. 
335 We arrived at this number using percentages for 2008 detailed in the 2009 
GAO report.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 268, at 18.  Accord-
ing to the report, 54% of non-supervisory positions in the Enforcement Division are 
taken by investigative attorneys and 10.3% by trial attorneys.  Our estimate assumes 
that these percentages hold for supervisory personnel as well.  
336 Extrapolating from the numbers reported in supra note 335, 80% of the Divi-
sion’s lawyers do investigation and 20% do trial work. 
337 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 268, at 22. 
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the investigative side, while only twenty percent are trial lawyers.338  
This investigative investment spills over to the private sector where 
plaintiffs’ law firms file complaints against companies already sub-
jected to SEC investigations.  Thirty percent of the class actions settled 
in 2010 followed the settlement of an SEC action in the same case.339  
The average class action settlement in this SEC overlap subset was $13 
million from 1996 to 2010; the average settlement in cases without the 
overlap was $5.8 million.340 
Finally, we again note that the Enforcement Division is reputed to 
be a troubled operation.341  It suffers problems of morale and a high 
personnel turnover rate, although improvements have been noted in 
recent years.342  Agency staff also operate under cumbersome internal 
review and approval procedures.343  Moreover, overall enforcement 
capacity is subject to political controls because the Division can grow 
only to the extent that Congress allocates the necessary funds.344 
3.  Sources of Funds 
If Congress decided to make a stronger commitment to enforce-
ment, the necessary monies would be available at no cost to the tax-
payers.  As noted above, the SEC is funded by fees it collects from ex-
change transactions and registrations.  Figure 8 compares the agency’s 
fee revenues to its operating costs from 1964 to 2010.  Fee revenues 
have exceeded costs since 1983. 
 
338 See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 3 fig.2. 
339 RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 22, at 11.  Kedia and co-authors find in their sam-
ple comparing the SEC to class actions, that sixty percent of SEC investigations are ac-
companied by class action litigation.  Kedia et al., supra note 332, at 2. 
340 Id.; see also Cox & Thomas, supra note 306, at 763-77 (studying a dataset of cases of 
private-SEC overlap and finding also that the SEC is more likely to target an issuer with a 
lower market capitalization or an issuer in financial distress than are private plaintiffs). 
341 See BOS. CONSULTING GRP., supra note 302, at 211 (reporting a low level of staff 
engagement “exacerbated” by a structure “which leaves middle managers feeling dis-
empowered”); Cox & Thomas, supra note 306, at 757-59 (discussing staffing problems 
at the SEC). 
342 See U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 268, at 19-20 (showing that 
the turnover rate has decreased significantly in recent years); see also BOS. CONSULTING 
GRP., supra note 302, at 42-43 (describing recent administrative initiatives at the En-
forcement Division to improve morale and reduce turnover). 
343 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 268, at 27-30 (stating that 
“the process for supervisory review of enforcement cases is burdensome and unneces-
sarily redundant” and calling for a more efficient use of SEC resources). 
344 See 2009 SEC PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 330, at 73-74 
(describing the SEC budgeting process and its dependence on congressional approval). 
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Figure 8:  SEC Budget and Revenues, 1964–2010345 
 
The sharp decrease in revenues that begins in 2007 results less 
from decreased market volume than from Congress’s enactment of 
the Fee Relief Act in 2002.346   The Fee Relief Act achieved its objective 
of aligning the agency’s revenues and costs in 2008.  Previously, excess 
revenues were remitted to the Treasury, but under the Fee Relief Act, 
they are saved in a separate account for the SEC’s future use.347  The 
bottom line is that procuring funding for stepped-up enforcement 
would be as simple as resetting the fees. 
There is yet another potential source of funds.  The SEC histori-
cally endeavored to return profits disgorged by defendants to victi-
mized investors; penalties were remitted to the Treasury.  Sarbanes-
Oxley’s Fair Funds provision348 changed that, charging the SEC to en-
deavor to return penalty monies to injured investors.  The decision to 
remit is left to the agency’s discretion in any given case.349  The agency 
has followed the course indicated by the statute and remits the funds 
to investors.  Indeed, the agency has created a new Office of Collec-
tions and Distributions to administer these funds.350  The SEC distri-
 
345 SEC ANN. REPS., supra note 313. 
346 See supra text accompanying notes 258-75. 
347 2009 SEC  PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 330, at 73. 
348 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a)–(b) (2006).   
349 See id. § 7246(a) (“[T]he amount of such civil penalty shall, on the motion or at 
the direction of the Commission, be added to and become part of the disgorgement 
fund for the benefit of the victims of such violation.”). 
350 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 268, at 4.  The action came at 
the instance of a GAO recommendation.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
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buted $6.6 billion from 2002 to 2009, of which $2.1 billion flowed out 
in 2009 alone.351 
Congress, having elevated the shareholders’ interest in these 
funds in 2002, redirected a portion to cover the costs of stepped-up 
enforcement under the Dodd-Frank Act.352  This provides that 10-30% 
of penalties and disgorgements ordered in SEC proceedings be made 
available to pay any whistleblowers who provided the agency with es-
sential information in the case.  The SEC is directed to set aside a 
fund for this purpose, drawing on disgorgement and penalty fees.353  
The SEC duly set aside $452 million in 2010.354 
The whistleblower fund is a step in the right direction.  From a 
policy point of view, it correctly elevates the deterrence objective over 
shareholders’ interest in compensation.  From a practical point of 
view, it confirms this Article’s fiscal point:  should a future Congress 
again decide to invest in stepped-up antifraud deterrence, funding 
concerns do not present a barrier. 
Recall that some criticize FOTM because shareholders ultimately 
pay the settlements.  We now add a countervailing point:  it makes no 
difference who does the enforcing, as the shareholders always end up 
picking up the tab.  The costs, however, fall differentially within the 
shareholder class under each regime.  Private costs fall hardest on un-
diversified long-term holders; public costs fall hardest on those who 
do the most trading. 
4.  Bang for the Buck 
Given that the shareholders pay under either scheme, the ques-
tion remains as to comparative costs and results between the private 
and public sector enforcement. 
 
 
 
TO ENSURE PLANNED IMPROVEMENTS ADDRESS LIMITATIONS IN ENFORCEMENT DIVISION 
OPERATIONS 25-31 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07930.pdf 
(discussing the SEC’s plans to establish a centralized Fair Fund office). 
351 2004 SEC PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 330, at 11. 
352 Dodd-Frank § 922, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78-d (West Supp. 2 2011). 
353 Id. 
354 2010 SEC PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 21, available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2010.pdf. 
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Figure 9:  Judgment or Settlement Amounts  
per Dollar Invested in Litigation355 
 
Figure 9 sets out the results of an eleven-year (1999–2009) com-
parison between class action attorneys’ fees calculated assuming a 
payout of 23% of the settlement356 and the cost of the SEC Enforce-
ment Division calculated on the assumption that the Division receives 
34% of the agency’s annual budget.357  A 23% average class action at-
torneys’ fees award implies a damage payout of $4.35 per enforcement 
dollar invested.  The SEC enforcement payout, taken as the average 
annual quotient of announced disgorgements and penalties divided 
by the cost of running the Enforcement Division, is $6.20 per dollar 
invested.  On this comparison, then, private enforcement emerges as 
relatively more expensive than public enforcement.358 
Next comes the question of which sector, public or private, pro-
vides the shareholders with more bang for their buck?  Standard poli-
cy analysis in corporate law strongly favors the private side.  Private en-
 
355 RYAN & SIMMONS, supra note 23, at 11 fig.11. 
356 See supra note 99 and accompanying text (studying the period 1993–2008).  
357 The 34% figure is derived by comparing the Enforcement Division budget for 
the years 2004 to 2008, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 268, at 19, to 
the SEC’s overall budget for each year, SEC ANN. REPS., supra note 313.  It is an aver-
age of the five years’ figures.   
358 The result reverses conventional wisdom regarding the respective costs of pub-
lic and private enforcement.  See Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privati-
zation and Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1429 (2003) (citing studies on air-
lines, waste collection, electric utilities, and postal services that found a public sector 
approach to cost between 30% and 90% more than a private sector approach). 
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forcement benefits from the sharp prod of financial incentives, while 
public enforcers are civil servants working within burdensome admin-
istrative constraints.  The numbers here suggest a stronger case for the 
public side than generally assumed.359  High-powered private incen-
tives come at a cash price, and maintaining the cash machine builds a 
dependence on enterprise liability, a suboptimal result from an en-
forcement point of view.  An administrative framework could work 
better here, given the chance.  An adequately funded agency could 
redirect its efforts to individual perpetrators as a matter of policy 
choice, while the private bar is locked in by its own private economics. 
Now consider a follow-up question.  Suppose that shareholders 
were offered a choice:  maintain the status quo or double the SEC en-
forcement budget and abolish FOTM, leaving the door open for private 
actions against nontrading issuers where actual reliance can be shown.  
The case for doubling resources on the public side is quite plausible, 
but so is indifference between the two choices.  The only result that 
these numbers preclude is a hands-down preference for FOTM. 
B.  The SEC as Agent for Reform 
1.  A Quid Pro Quo 
The plaintiffs’ bar looks for settlement value, but the SEC has oth-
er incentives and can thus pursue law enforcement objectives.  Where 
the plaintiffs’ bar is driven by the economics of settlement and locked 
into enterprise liability, the SEC is limited by its budget.  The SEC also 
settles and, in so doing, often pursues the path of least resistance by 
accepting a payment from the corporation rather than pursuing indi-
vidual miscreants.360  Given additional funds and personnel, the SEC 
could push harder to target individual defendants and force them to 
pay, adding deterrent effect.  Indeed, the SEC has already taken a step 
in this direction in its settlements with individual defendants, using 
the settlement agreement to block resort to D&O insurance policies.361  
 
359 The Kedia study reports a roughly equal deterrent effect for SEC enforcement 
actions and private class actions directed against GAAP violations that use reversal of 
income-increasing accruals in the industry in question as a measure of deterrent im-
pact.  Kedia et al., supra note 332, at 3.  It follows that the SEC is not as ineffective as it 
is usually portrayed. 
360 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
361 See DAN BAILEY & TOM GEYER, SEC’S DIM VIEW OF INDEMNIFICATION DARKENS 1 
(2005), available at http://www.baileycavalieri.com/68-SECs_View_Indemnification. 
pdf (describing the SEC’s actions as motivated by public policy). 
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A stronger push need not implicate overdeterrence.  Administrative 
intelligence can seek out the sweet spot where a private incentive to 
maximize returns holds out risks. 
We have no answer as to how much additional funding and how 
much time would be required to build the needed organizational in-
frastructure.  We only point out that the money is available, whether 
from increased fees or further diversion of penalty and disgorgement 
proceeds to deterrent use.  If Congress doubled the SEC’s budget, 
and the SEC devoted the entire increase to enforcement, funding for 
enforcement would increase 300% over its present level. 
But why would the SEC make such a request?  Although calls for 
large SEC budget increases have been commonplace in the wake of 
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank,362 a one-time, precedent-breaking 
request for enforcement funding could hold out negative political 
implications.  Professor Langevoort describes the politics of the SEC’s 
budget as a balancing act.363  On the one hand, the agency needs to 
depict the markets as investor friendly, for otherwise it has failed in its 
mission.  On the other hand, it also needs to depict a continuing 
threat from miscreant executives.  Historically, both sides of the bal-
ance have signaled moderate increases in enforcement resources, 
even as the balance has inhibited the agency from seeking a large en-
forcement increase. 
Further, even assuming the SEC made the request, why would 
Congress agree?  While it has often increased the SEC’s budget, it has 
done so incrementally and never by leaps and bounds.  Unusual in-
creases tend to come in the wake of scandals and legislative over-
hauls.  In addition, strong opposition from the business lobby can be 
safely predicted.364 
Within the present political economy of securities law enforce-
ment, then, there is neither a reason for the SEC to request an ex-
traordinary budget increase directed to enforcement nor for Congress 
to grant one.  But political equilibriums can be disrupted. 
 
362 For example, in 2011, the SEC sought a fifteen percent increase at a time of 
budget austerity.  It found itself forced to drum up support to stave off a freeze.  See 
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Wall St. Aids S.E.C. Case For Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2011, at B1 
(reporting that former SEC lawyers now on Wall Street have lobbied for increased 
funding for the SEC). 
363 See Langevoort, supra note 150, at 1143-44. 
364 See id. at 1144-45 (discussing opposition to SEC budget increases from institu-
tional investors, broker-dealers, accountants, and the securities bar). 
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We think Congress would view increases in the SEC enforcement 
budget more favorably if a political giveback came in tandem.  More 
particularly, we propose a quid pro quo:  stepped-up public enforce-
ment in exchange for reduced reliance on private enforcement; in-
creased enforcement funding in exchange for the elimination of the 
FOTM presumption.  The objective is to achieve a more effective en-
forcement regime geared against individual defendants while avoiding 
an overall increase in costs borne by shareholders. 
2.  Rulemaking Power, Job Opportunities, 
and the Management Interest 
Our proposition is simple, and its objectives have solid grounding 
in two decades of policy analysis.  The party best situated to effectuate 
the proposal is the SEC, which recently has been reorganizing, re-
forming, and expanding its enforcement operation.365 
In our view, the SEC has the power to remove the FOTM pre-
sumption via rulemaking.  The authority follows from the words of 
section 10(b), which delegates authority to make such antifraud “rules 
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”366  It 
has been argued, plausibly in our view, that the resulting envelope of 
authority is capacious enough to allow the SEC to disimply the 10b-5 
private right of action.367  Even if that were not the case and judicial 
implication of a private action were somehow deemed to limit the 
SEC’s rulemaking authority,368 many of the terms of the private right of 
action remain open to clarification, modification, or reversal by rule. 
The matter is not entirely clear, however.  It can be argued that ex 
post statutory modifications of a private right of action imply congres-
sional ratification of the action’s basic terms, including the FOTM 
 
365 See supra note 275.  
366 1934 Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
367 See Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Se-
curities Laws:  The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 976-79 (1994) (failing 
to see any legal obstacle to the Commission’s ability to disimply private rights of action). 
368 We think that result is unlikely.  Our view would be different if the statute itself 
created the private right of action.  See Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1107-08 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (reading express private right of action to block administrative rulemaking over 
the scope of substantive rights). 
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presumption.369  Were this interpretation to prevail, our proposal 
would have to be remitted to Congress in its entirety. 
Either way, we look to the SEC to take the initiative.  The SEC 
should assume primary responsibility for antifraud enforcement, 
along with all accompanying management and planning problems, 
and step away from a longstanding, ad hoc public-private arrange-
ment.  The public-private back and forth presents career opportuni-
ties.  Many members of the SEC’s senior staff come from elite law 
firms, and they use their agency experience to return to the private 
sector with enhanced prestige.370  Upon return, they tend to do corpo-
rate defense work, which does not necessarily exist absent plaintiffs 
with plausible causes of action.  Even assuming more SEC enforcement 
actions, and hence more SEC defense work, eliminating FOTM could 
shrink billable hours across the sector.  Thus might our proposal excite 
opposition on both the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ sides of the bar. 
To the extent that the plaintiffs’ bar and its allies may exert their 
influence against our proposal, we could offer a modification.  Instead 
of striking FOTM from the books directly, the SEC (or Congress) 
could turn the matter over to the shareholder community and orches-
trate the across-the-board opt-in/opt-out referendum we hypothesized 
in Part III.371  To the extent the FOTM interest thereupon persuaded 
its putative beneficiaries (and financial underwriters) of the value of 
its services, the shareholders would opt to stay in, and FOTM would 
emerge with its legitimacy much enhanced. 
 
369 This occurred with the enactment of the PSLRA.  PSLRA § 21D, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-4.  The theory would be that recognition implies the reception of the basic judi-
cial outlines of the action into the statutory scheme, so as to shield the action from al-
teration by agency rulemaking.  The Supreme Court brought congressional ratification 
to the fore in Stoneridge Investment Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 
165 (2008), concluding that congressional recognition tied the Court’s hands and 
blocked an expansion of the action’s scope.   
370 Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker:  Choices About Investor Protection in 
the Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591, 1604-05 (2006) (scrutinizing the revolv-
ing door of SEC lawyers and private practice and its connection to new regulations). 
371 There are incidental questions concerning the SEC’s institutional disposition.  
Respecting antifraud, the agency has always followed a regulation-by-litigation strategy 
and expressed a preference for standards over rules.  See id. at 1619-20 (noting the 
formation of policy more often through enforcement than through rulemaking); Lan-
gevoort, supra note 206, at 1337 (referring to William L. Cary’s comment that rules are 
a “blueprint for fraud” because of unintended loopholes and barely legal schemes).  
Our proposal does not traverse these preferences, but it simply relegates private plain-
tiffs’ lawyers to a diminished role in the creation of law.   
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We also acknowledge a risk of unintended effects.  The manage-
ment interest could seize the occasion to effect a net reduction in en-
forcement resources.  This result would follow if, say, the SEC were to 
present a plan to Congress, and Congress then decided to eliminate 
the FOTM presumption legislatively without approving a compensat-
ing increase to the SEC’s enforcement budget. 
This is possible, but in our view unlikely.  We have seen that the 
politics tilt in favor of enforcement with the less attractive aspects of 
the private action providing the political point of engagement for 
management opposition.  Any residual chance of political disruption 
can be minimized if the SEC took the lead and eliminated FOTM by 
rule.  Congress would be called on only to assent to budgetary expan-
sion,372 which could precede a FOTM rulemaking, which could be 
conditioned on the budget initiative’s success.  Alternatively, an opt-
in/opt-out approach holding open a door for company-by-company 
reentry would minimize the risk of an unintended decrease in overall 
enforcement resources. 
C.  Summary 
We hold out no hopes for early adoption of either of our reform 
proposals—this Part’s quid pro quo, or the national shareholder 
FOTM referendum proposed in Part III.  We propose them as possi-
bilities to make a point about federal securities laws’ reliance on a mix 
of private and public enforcement.  Private class actions continue to 
be endorsed solely on the assumption that public enforcement is 
crippled by budgetary and incentive constraints, but that assumption 
went out of date in the post-Enron era.  Meanwhile, substantive criti-
cisms of FOTM formerly made by a minority of observers have risen to 
the status of a consensus view.  It is time to conjoin these two devel-
opments and rethink the whole. 
CONCLUSION 
The question is not whether FOTM as we know it should go.  The 
closer one looks at FOTM’s doctrinal and economic supports, the 
 
372  Statutory limits on penalties might also need to be considered.  Under sections 
21(d)(3) and 21B(b) of the 1934 Act, penalties max out at $100,000 “for each act or 
omission.”  15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(3)(B), 78u-2(b).  These penalties are subject to peri-
odic upward inflation adjustment under the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjust-
ment Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 2461 note. 
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harder it is to defend.  Rather, the questions are how and when FOTM 
will go.  These are tougher, for FOTM’s institutional and political sup-
ports stand up to inspection much better than its substantive supports. 
We expect the questioning to intensify in coming years.  Manage-
ment is ready to hand the Congress another PSLRA whenever a favor-
able political window opens.  At the same time, the SEC is slowly 
pointing its growing enforcement operation toward individual mi-
screants.  These oppositional forces could over time precipitate a root-
and-branch reconsideration of securities law enforcement policy, with 
FOTM being eclipsed as the SEC accepts more responsibility. 
 
